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In this thesis, I analyse the interactions of wages and job attributes in labour markets
in the UK and Germany. In the first chapter, I estimate female workers’ marginal will-
ingness to pay to reduce commuting distance using a flexible stratified partial likelihood
model on a large administrative dataset for West Germany. I find that men’s marginal
willingness to pay as a share of their wage is 20% lower than childless women’s, which
nearly doubles after the birth of a child. In sensitivity analyses I discuss the role of
childcare, housing cost, regional structure and part-time work. In the second chapter,
I use innovative survey data to analyse workers’ willingness to pay for schedule auton-
omy. I find that whilst childless women’s willingness to pay is lower than childless men’s,
motherhood (but not fatherhood) significantly increases willingness to pay. Moreover,
I find that workers who enjoy schedule autonomy perceive their wages to be fairer, feel
a greater sense of loyalty towards their employer and are more likely to report making
an “above-and-beyond” effort at work. In the third chapter, I analyse the impact of
a series of minimum wage increases in the UK on a range of schedule amenities. Us-
ing region-industry level data, I find that in regions and industries most impacted by
minimum wage policies, the prevalence of zero-hours contracts increases. The effect is
robust to a range of specification choices, including a dynamic Arellano-Bond model. I
find less strong evidence of a decrease in schedule amenities valued by workers including
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Introduction
This thesis is concerned with the interplay of wages and job attributes, in particular
those related to the time cost of work. This includes fixed costs in the form of commut-
ing, as well as schedule types that make it easier to combine market and non-market
work by offering additional flexibility to workers, or that make it more difficult by
reducing the predictability of working hours.
These amenities reduce the opportunity costs of market work in terms of lost home
production. Within the household, willingness to trade them off against wages reflects
preferences and drives choices on the division of labour between different household
members. In the market, it contributes to gender and motherhood wage gaps. Whereas
the popular discourse on pay gaps often paints a stark dichotomy between unrestricted
free choice on the one hand, and externally imposed obstacles on the other, economic
analysis makes explicit the trade-offs involved in voluntary choices. This not only pro-
vides a clearer picture of the decisions that underlie observed discrepancies in labour
market outcomes but can also help design and evaluate policy measures designed to
redress them.
In the first chapter, joint work with Annette Bergemann and Stephan Brunow, I
consider trade-offs between wages and commuting distances with a focus on gender and
parenthood. We use a large administrative dataset from Germany with multiple job
spells per individual, which enables us to account for unobserved heterogeneity in a
flexible way. We estimate that West German, non-university educated childless women
are willing to give up .5% of their wage to reduce their commuting distance by 1km
at the margin. After the birth of their first child, willingness to pay doubles. We also
explore heterogeneity with regard to housing costs and childcare availability, between
urban and rural areas and between full-time and part-time workers.
In the second chapter, joint work with Gerard van den Berg, I study willingness
to pay for flexible working hours using innovative survey data on multiple reservation
wages. We find that whilst childless women’s willingness to pay is lower than than
childless men’s, motherhood (but not fatherhood) significantly increases willingness to
pay. Moreover, we discuss the potential role of reference points in our results and test
a theoretical prediction of willingness to pay affecting worker decisions beyond job offer
acceptance, such as effort provision. We find that workers who enjoy schedule autonomy
conditionally perceive their wages to be fairer, feel a greater sense of loyalty towards
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their employer and are more likely to report making an “above-and-beyond” effort at
work.
In the third chapter, I analyse the impact of a set of policy changes in the UK -
upratings of the National Minimum Wage and the introduction of the National Living
Wage - on schedule amenities. I find that in regions and industries most impacted
by minimum wage policies, the prevalence of zero-hours contracts increases, an effect
which is robust to a range of specification choices, including a dynamic Arellano-Bond
model. I find less strong evidence of a decrease in schedule amenities valued by workers,
including flexitime.
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1 There and Back Again: Women’s Marginal Commuting Cost
with Annette Bergemann and Stephan Brunow
Statement on co-authorship: This chapter is joint work with Annette Bergemann
and Stephan Brunow. I have made very significant contributions to all aspects of the
work, including data cleaning, estimation and writing up the paper. Placement in the
literature, specification search as well as heterogeneity analysis were done by myself
alone. Annette Bergemann, in addition to offering guidance on all aspects of the work
in her role as PhD supervisor, contributed to the development of the empirical model
and the interpretation of results. Stephan Brunow contributed to data cleaning and
running estimation in the later stages of the project.
Statement on originality: A previous version of this chapter was submitted to 2018
annual congress of the German Economic Association (Verein für Socialpolitik), which
keeps an online repository.
Additional acknowledgements: We especially thank Gerard van den Berg, Gregory
Jolivet, Annette Haas and Gerd Ridder for their very helpful comments. Isabel Stock-
ton acknowledges the support of the Economic and Social Sciences Research Council
through an Overseas Institutional Visit award. We are grateful for comments by partic-
ipants of the Bristol Ph.D. seminar, EALE, ESPE, IAB colloquium, and the CASD-IAB
conference.
Commuting as an important element for the functioning of the labour market has
received renewed interest in labour economics in recent years. It is well known that
workers able and willing to commute further have access to more and potentially higher-
paid jobs. Some evidence has also emerged (see for example Gutierrez [2018], which
was written simultaneously to our paper and Hirsch et al. [2013]) that differences in the
willingness to commute between men and women might be a contributor to the gender
and motherhood wage gaps. The opportunity cost of commuting is likely to be higher
for women and in particular mothers with caregiving responsibilities.
This paper analysis the marginal willingness to pay to reduce commuting with a
particular focus on women which can help evaluate policies to address the gender and
motherhood wage gap. These include policies directly reducing the need to commute,
such as telecommuting schemes and other alternative forms of workplace organisation,
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or policies aimed at enabling mothers to commute further, including childcare, which
we discuss in this paper.
Looking beyond commuting, the issue of willingness to pay for job attributes has
also been in the renewed focus of labour economics lately. New methods address some
of the econometric and conceptual problems of older, hedonic estimates, which have
been shown to deliver biased results in the presence of worker and firm heterogeneity as
well as for markets with search frictions [Gronberg and Reed, 1994, Hwang et al., 1998].
Gender differences in willingness to pay for job attributes could contribute significantly
to observed disparities in labour market behaviours and outcomes, such as participation,
labour supply, job mobility and particularly wages but have not been widely studied in
this respect. In this paper, we built upon the results of Gronberg and Reed [1994] and
van Ommeren et al. [2000] who show that on the basis of a partial job search model the
willingness to pay for a job attribute can be estimated with the aid of a hazard rate
models to leave a job.
Using a large administrative dataset on job durations and commuting distance for
West Germany we estimate female and male workers’ marginal willingness to pay to
reduce commuting distance with a flexible Cox Model where we also take account of
unobserved heterogeneity by using a stratified model. We find a marginal willingness
to pay for childless women of e0.31 to reduce commuting distance by one kilometre
at their mean daily wage. Willingness to pay nearly doubles after the first birth from
0.52% to 1.03% of the daily wage, but since the daily wage drops at the same time,
the Euro value at the mean wage for mothers of young children at e0.55 is less than
twice its counterpart for childless women. Compared to other high-income countries, the
German unadjusted gender and motherhood wage gap [Grimshaw and Rubery, 2015] are
particularly high, making the issue particularly salient. While the differences we find,
in particularly those associated with childbirth, are qualitatively striking, our evidence
suggests that commuting costs overall are not large enough for these differences to
explain a large fraction of gender and motherhood pay gaps. However, the mechanisms
underlying differences in commuting cost, notably differences in the opportunity cost
of time, are likely to play a role in a range of other labour market inequalities, not just
commuting patterns.
The paper is structured as follows: The first section provides an overview of the
relevant literature. Subsequently, we specify a partial-equilibrium model of job search
with jobs characterised by a wage and a commuting distance. Particular reference is
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made to to differences by gender and the impact of the regional labour market situation,
and a tractable estimator of marginal willingness to pay to reduce commuting distance
is derived, following Van Ommeren et al. [2000]. We then present and discuss an
estimate of marginal commuting cost using a Cox model on an administrative linked
employer-employee dataset.
1.1 Literature Review
Our paper connects to a number of different strands of literature: it considers com-
muting decisions in the context of a search labour market with a focus on gender and
motherhood.
Methodologically, early studies on compensating wage differentials for job amenities
augmented Mincerian wage regressions on education, labour market experience and
tenure with measures of different job attributes, in particular risk of injury or death
[Brown, 1980, Viscusi, 1978]. In addition to the mixed evidence it delivered, the hedonic
approach has a number of theoretical weaknesses. Search frictions and unobserved
productivity differences between workers and firms are not taken into account, leading
to a substantial downward bias of OLS estimation of worker’s marginal willingness to
pay [Hwang et al., 1998]. One way to reduce bias from unobserved worker and firm
heterogeneity is by instrumenting for non-wage job characteristics [e.g. Olson, 2002, for
health insurance coverage]. However, even in the rare case that a credible instrument
is available, the bias deriving from search friction still remains when using Mincerian
wage regression in order to estimate compensating wage differentials.
Concerns about biased hedonic estimates gave momentum to the development of
alternative estimation techniques. These methods are closely related to search models,
putting quit data and job spell durations in the focus. They also improve on very
early models of wage premia in a search environment [Khandker, 1988] by enabling
the analysis of continuous job attributes and addressing issues such as sensitivity to
outliers and measurement error [Eckstein and van den Berg, 2007]. The central idea is
that more desirable job attributes decrease the probability of quitting in a search model
with multi-dimensional jobs [Clark, 2001].
Marginal willingness to pay for non-binary1 job attributes cannot be directly recov-
1Some authors [e.g. Villanueva, 2007] discuss a marginal willingness to pay for binary job attributes.
However, utility should change infra-marginally with the presence of a binary job attribute and would
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ered from observed search processes from unemployment, which were at the centre of
the first generation of search models. But on-the-job search was an early and intuitive
extension [Burdett, 1978] which Gronberg and Reed [1994] used to derive a measure
of willingness to pay that is robust to search frictions. As long as the problem is sta-
tionary2, this preserves the tractability and many of the core predictions of the original
model.
In the labour search literature, differences in the job search process of male and
female workers have been formalised in a number of different ways: as differences in
job offer arrival rates, in job destruction rates, or in parameters governing exits into
non-participation. Our model allows for all these differences. In addition, potential
differences in the marginal willingness to pay to reduce commuting, derives in our
model from different instantaneous utility functions over wages and commuting distances
between men and women.
In Bowlus [1997] and Bowlus and Grogan [2009], parameter estimates such as job
finding and job destruction rates exhibit significant differences across genders. These
differences are heterogeneous – in several instances, they even change sign – across
education levels, highlighting the importance of interactions of gender with other de-
terminants of labour market behaviour. In our main analysis, we exclude university
graduates to create a more homogeneous group in terms of education. We also explore
various other types of heterogeneity, analysing the role of housing costs and childcare
availability as well as differences between urban and rural areas and between full-time
and part-time workers.
A number of different economic and behavioural explanations have been proposed
to explain these differences in model parameters. They include differences in the value
of non-market time related to home production and especially childcare, an explanation
highly relevant to our own application. Other authors have stressed differences in search
methods [Kuhn and Skuterud, 2004], in the propensity to bargain over wages [Hall and
Krueger, 2012], and in willingness to relocate for a job [Blackaby et al., 2005]. Still
others highlight gender-segregated professional networks [Montgomery, 1991, Mencken
and Winfield, 2000] and discrimination [Bowlus and Eckstein, 2002, Flabbi, 2010].
Moving back to the literature on trade-offs between wages and job attributes, studies
consequently not be continuous, much less differentiable.
2The search environment does not depend on the current job, nor on the elapsed duration of the
spell.
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such as Reed and Dahlquist [1994], DeLeire and Levy [2004] and Felfe [2012] examine
gender differences in willingness to pay for attributes including workplace safety, type
of tasks, promotion opportunities and different work schedule arrangements. They use
duration models or conditional logit models, and studied the effect of job attributes on
job-to-job mobility as well as mobility between labour market states around childbirth.
Taber and Vejlin [2016] use a structural model to determine the importance of com-
pensating differentials as a whole in explaining workers’ utility, wages and job mobility
as opposed to other, competing explanations. Their model is identified without data on
observed job characteristics and instead attributes voluntary transitions with wage cuts
to compensating differentials. Using Danish matched employer-employee data for the
period of 1985-2003, they find that job attributes, along with search frictions, explain a
substantial part of the variation in utility and turnover. However, compensating differ-
entials are less important for college-educated men than for all other gender-education
groups.
Commuting distance as a job attribute is increasingly receiving attention in the
context of gender differences, but few studies have been published so far. Van Ommeren
and Fosgerau [2009] apply a combination of a job search model with a short-run model
of commuting time for a fixed distance to the commuting decision. The authors estimate
the marginal cost of an hour’s additional commuting in the Netherlands at about twice
the hourly wage using a discrete-time framework, imposing quite strong functional form
assumptions and self-reported information on workers search as outcome variable. This
is much higher than estimates from models which focus on time costs only, which leads
the authors to conclude that monetary costs make up about half of the overall amount
at the margin. They find economically significantly differences between gender, but not
statistically significant differences.
Our approach is similar in spirit to Van Ommeren et al. [2000] and Russo et al.
[2012], who use parametric or semi-parametric duration models in continuous time to
estimate parameters from job spell data.3 We complement their results by using a 10%
sample of all German employees, allowing us to examine more general patterns than their
analysis of a single large employer, with our particular focus on gender differences. At
the same time, we retain the advantages of administrative data with a panel dimension,
which allows us to account for individual heterogeneity in a more flexible way than Van
Ommeren et al. [2000].
3We will discuss this in more detail when presenting the theory underlying our own work.
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By its nature, commuting distance arises as the result of decisions in at least two
markets – one in the housing market and one in the labour market. The literature in
labour economics has usually treated residential location as exogenous, turning commut-
ing distance into a job or match attribute. Conversely, in urban economics, commuting
distance is studied as a result not of job choice, but of residential location decisions. In
this tradition, compensation for commuting distance is available in the housing market
through lower house prices, while the wage is usually considered exogenous.
Early models of commuting in urban economics considered a household with one
worker, often quietly presumed to be male. In an early contribution White [1986] uses an
OLS regression of commuting time on income and demographic variables, with a focus on
gender differences, in particular women’s shorter commutes, a highly persistent finding
across time and space [for Germany, see Auspurg and Schönholzer, 2013]. However,
her approach is unable to account for a number of unobserved differences between
households classified as male and female-headed, and is vulnerable to simultaneity bias.
Models such as Black et al. [2014] extend the traditional framework to accommodate
household decision-making.
Timothy and Wheaton [2001] showed that the one-dimensional wage gradient pre-
dicted by the monocentric models4 [White, 1986, Alonso, 1960, 1964] common in the
early urban and regional literature on commuting does not fit the observed wage varia-
tion in US Census data well. To explain the observed multidimensional variation, they
therefore present a multinodal model where jobs are spread out over multiple locations
across a city. The spatial focus of the model can explain interactions between hous-
ing and labour markets, which most models in labour economics ignore. On the other
hand, workers and firms are assumed to be matched without costly search, a substantial
limitation from the labour-economic point of view.
Gutierrez [2018] find that among mixed-sex married couples in the United States,
one-tenth of the gender pay gap among childless workers and more than a fifth of the
motherhood pay gap are explained by commuting differences. Their modelling approach
emphasises a different set of decisions from ours: Given the high mobility in the US,
they explicitly model residential location decisions, relying on a monocentric model of
the city with a central business district and a gradient of wages and housing costs.
They also explicitly model household fertility and labour supply decisions, imposing a
gendered division of labour where only wives can engage in household and child-rearing
4Models of a city with a single central business district where jobs are located.
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tasks. On the other hand, search frictions are not modelled and since the data does
not have a longitudinal dimension, individual heterogeneity cannot be modelled in as
flexible a way.
Rouwendal and Rietveld [1994] and Rouwendal [1999] develop spatial models of
labour market search in the same spirit as our theoretical model. However, their empir-
ical strategy differs substantially from ours. Rouwendal and Rietveld [1994] parametrize
a distribution function and estimate it on a short panel. Rouwendal [1999] estimates a
full structural model on cross-sectional survey data, again relying heavily on functional
form assumptions for identification and to address unobserved heterogeneity. The two
papers find that the presence of children in the household decreases women’s commuting
distance [Rouwendal and Rietveld, 1994] and increases their marginal commuting cost
[Rouwendal, 1999].5
In contrast, our strategy relies on a relationship derived from a partial-equilibrium
search model and estimated using duration analysis on spell data. The daily precision of
our dataset allows us to use the semi-parametric method of partial likelihoods, granting
additional flexibility compared to strong distributional assumptions. The multiple-spell
structure of the data also allows us to account more flexibly for unobserved heterogene-
ity.
Estimating marginal commuting cost from a partial labour market search model
requires the assumption that residential location is exogenous. Exogenous does not
necessarily mean fixed, but a low residential mobility is consistent with a lack of re-
optimisation in response to job changes and thus, exogenous residential location. The
estimated rate of household residential mobility in Germany over a period of two years
is estimated to be just over ten percent, substantially lower than the UK rate and only
about half of the US rate [Sánchez and Andrews, 2011]. Moreover, residential mobility
has been shown to increase with educational attainment (ibid and references therein)
and our sample excludes university graduates. We therefore work with a relatively
immobile sample.
The studies discussed above, whether in the tradition of labour market search or
urban economics, focus on longer-term job and residential location choices. There are
two estimation strategies in the choice and transportation economics literatures which
5This evidence is consistent the household responsibility hypothesis, which explains differences in
commuting time with the uneven division of non-market work between men and women and consequent
higher productivity of women’s non-market time.
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estimate the value of travel time directly, without modelling job or residential location
choices. On the one hand, stated preference methods study hypothetical choices from
survey data. The results exhibit quite striking variations, even when similar models
are applied [e.g. Calfee et al., 2001, Small et al., 2005]. It could be the case that the
treatment of unobserved heterogeneity drives the stark differences in estimates, in which
case the problem would be econometric in nature. Another possibility is that stated
preference data could simply be an unreliable signal of underlying preferences [Hensher,
2004]. Parallel to our paper Le Barbanchon et al. [2019] are using incentivised stated
preference data arising from an administrative process, whereby job seekers in France
have to state the lowest wage and longest commuting distance they would be willing to
accept, to the employment agency. Conditional on the characteristics of the previous
job and the local labour market where the search takes place, they find a gender gap in
willingness to pay to reduce commuting distance that is very close to our own results.
On the other hand, revealed preference methods analyse observed choices nested
within the commuting decision, such as mode, route, or vehicle choices. For example,
Brownstone et al. [2003] and Lam and Small [2001] both estimate a high marginal will-
ingness to pay for commuting time of more than 70% of the wage rate. They circumvent
the problem of biased reporting of willingness to pay, but data with sufficient variation
of alternatives is not readily available, and the interpretation often extrapolates far
beyond the range of commuting times actually observed. Older studies using revealed
preference data also relied on strong assumptions on the shape of the utility function,
as Van Ommeren et al. [2000] point out.
1.2 A Model of Job Search with Commuting
In this section, we will outline an on-the-job search model extended to two-dimensional
jobs, closely following Van Ommeren et al. [2000]. Without information on rejected job
offers, marginal willingness to pay for non-binary job attributes cannot be recovered
from search from unemployment. Voluntary job-to-job transitions, on the other hand,
do identify this parameter.
Consider an employed worker in a job with wage w and commuting distance d, who
receives alternative job offers (w∗, d∗) drawn from a distribution F (w∗, d∗) according to
a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. Thus, an important assumption underlying the
model is that residential location is exogenous to the search process. An assumption
that fits to our context (see previous section).
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A potential source of bias related to endogenous residential location is compensation
for long commutes in the housing market as in the classical models of urban commuting
to a single central business district discussed in section 1.1. Those who have long
commutes live far away from the central business district and may therefore face lower
housing costs. This would lead to an underestimation of marginal commuting cost in
our model, since workers are compensated for part of the cost in the housing market,
in addition to the labour market. We address this issue by conditioning on a measure
of local housing cost.
In addition to voluntary job-to-job transitions, employment spells end for exogenous
reasons at rate δ. The expected discounted stream of utility from accepting job offer
(w, d) over the whole of the life course is
ρR(w, d) = u(w, d) + θ
∫ ∫
max{0, R(w∗, d∗)−R(w, d)}dF (w∗, d∗)
+ δ(U −R(w, d))
where ρ is a discount parameter and U is the expected present value of unemployment.
Lifetime utility is thus composed of an instantaneous component, a continuation value
in case of a job switch and another continuation value in case of exogenous job loss.
The optimal strategy, as in the one-dimensional job case treated by Mortensen [1986],
is myopic. The reason for this is that lifetime utility R depends on (w, d) only through
instantaneous utility u(w, d) and there are no transaction costs. Intuitively, whereas in
a model without on-the-job search, a worker may “hold out” for a better offer, workers
here have nothing to lose in accepting a job offer. They will still have an equal chance
of receiving a better offer on the job.
Therefore, the worker pursues a reservation utility strategy: She accepts all job
offers which offer a higher instantaneous utility than her present job, since the future
stream of job offers is not affected by the job currently held. Formally, the set of job
offers that are acceptable (i.e., strictly preferred to the current job) is
ς(w, d) = {(w∗, d∗)|u(w∗, d∗) > u(w, d)}
This search and decision process leads to the following specification for the hazard
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rate from a job (w, d):
θ(w, d) = δ + λ
∫
ς(w,d)
dF (w∗, d∗) = δ + λ(1− Fu(u(w, d)),
i.e. the rate of exit from a job is given by the rate of exogenous exits into unemployment,
plus the product of the rate of arrival of alternative offers and the probability that the
offer will induce the worker to switch jobs. The second expression follows by substituting
the above characterisation for the set of acceptable job offers, with Fu denoting the c.d.f.
of u(w, d).
As stated before, lifetime utility in this model depends on the wage and the com-
muting distance only through instantaneous utility. Therefore, the partial derivative of








Clearly, an analogous statement holds for the derivative with respect to the commuting
distance d.
This, in turn, gives us the equality stated by Gronberg and Reed [1994]: the instan-
taneous marginal rate of substitution or marginal willingness to pay for a job attributes




















Regional Labour Market Conditions As an extension to their basic model, Van
Ommeren et al. [2000] discuss the inclusion of business cycle effects in the model. They
would affect the rate of arrival of job offers λ and/or the distribution F (w, d) from which
wage offers are drawn. Realistically, not only macroeconomic conditions at the national
level should affect these two structural parameters of job search, but also regional trends,
which therefore enter into the hazard rate.
In our empirical specification, we therefore include dummies for county settlement
structure, as well as local unemployment and growth rates to reflect regional labour
market conditions. We have also experimented with indices counting regular employ-
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ment relations in the individual’s county of residence and in neighbouring districts, in
her occupational field, by gender. The intuition is that the individual is likely to receive
offers to work in her own profession, as well as in other professions within the same
occupational field, which are defined with respect to similarity of tasks performed and
skills required. Results were unaffected by the inclusion of different local labour market
indicators. Importantly, we assume residential location to be fixed and define the local
labour market environment around it, which conserves the stationarity of the decision
problem.
Gender As explained in section 1.1, a number of structural sources for different out-
comes by gender in the search model have been suggested, such as different job offer ar-
rival rates or different wage offer distributions. However, these would not affect marginal
willingness to pay as a function.6 Since the hazard rate depends on (w, d) only through
the instantaneous utility u(w, d), the structural source of differences in marginal will-
ingness to pay across the (w, d)-plain has to be differences in the instantaneous utility
function. The search environment is allowed to differ in many other ways for men and
women, or indeed between individual workers of the same gender. These differences are
captured in a very flexible way by the individual-level baseline hazard. Notable sources
of such heterogeneity could be the job offer arrival rate and the distribution of wages
and commuting distances offered.
As for the underlying causes of differences in instantaneous utility (which, in turn,
generate differences in marginal willingness to pay), a common assumption in the liter-
ature is that women’s non-market time is more productive than men’s. This could be
the case because they remain responsible for the bulk of household and child-rearing
tasks. If social norms dictate that mothers should be nearby, for example to attend
school-related meetings or events or to be available in case of emergencies, the opportu-
nity cost of commuting time would be higher for women than for men and for mothers
than for non-mothers. Other possible explanations include differences in access to a car,
as suggested by Best and Lanzendorf [2005], or in the disutility from travelling due to
differences in taste or perceived safety.
6Marginal willingness to pay at an observed wage may differ if, as in most estimations in the literature
as well as our baseline specification, it varies in the wage. In addition to purely empirical goodness-





The data sets used are samples of the Institute for Employment Research’s Integrated
Employment Biographies. Since the data comes from administrative social security
records, they are more accurate than survey datasets commonly used in studies of com-
muting. For instance, they avoid problems of recall error in job spell durations and
biased self-reporting of wages. The main sample consists of the inflow into employ-
ment after January 1st, 2000 until December 31st, 2013, recording employment and
unemployment spells in days. Self-employment is observed only in exceptional cases,
since self-employed workers do not usually contribute to national insurance. The inflow
sample is constructed from a 10% sample of all individuals with a national insurance
number, going back to 1975. We restrict the sample to West German workers in order
to be able to use information on work experience based on the full biography and, cru-
cially, to reliably identify the first birth for women. Since East German workers’ records
are only available from the early 1990s, it is difficult to distinguish first from subsequent
births to East German women during our sample period. This problem is exacerbated
by fertility patterns around reunification, when birth spacing in East Germany often
showed a long gap, between a first child born before reunification and further children
born much later.
Employment spells in the sense of the model are times in regular full- or part-time
employment with full national insurance contributions, which make up just over two-
thirds of the full sample. The wage information refers to daily wages. Wage income
above a certain threshold, which is usually adjusted annually, is not subject to national
insurance contributions and therefore censored. To alleviate bias arising from this selec-
tion, we restrict our analysis to workers without a university degree, who less frequently
earn wages above this cutoff values. Some systematic underreporting of higher educa-
tion is known to occur. However, education information during job spells is considered
most reliable, since it is employer-reported [Fitzenberger et al., 2005]. To minimise
selection bias from underreported education, we smooth education, classifying individ-
uals as university graduates after the first reporting of a university degree, even if the
recorded variable switches to vocational training or no training afterwards, based on
one of Fitzenberger et al. [2005]’s correction procedures. Adding to the problem of
top-coded wages, university graduates are also likely to be more geographically mobile,
which makes the assumption of exogenous residential location more questionable.
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Apprenticeships and marginal employment (geringfügige Beschäftigung with either
low total earnings or on short-term contracts, which are exempt from national insurance
contributions) are excluded, since job mobility behaviour for these groups is likely to
follow different patterns from regular workers and data is unavailable for earlier years.
We also exclude publicly sponsored employment, jobs within the context of an active
labour market programme and jobs where the worker claims a mobility subsidy, since
the observed wage and/or commuting distance do not adequately describe the worker’s
decision problem. For consistency, we also exclude jobs which switch back and forth
between regular and marginal or sponsored employment. Moreover, we observe unem-
ployment benefit claims, a number of other benefits such as early retirement programmes
and participation in active labour market policies and training.
Following the majority of the literature, we measure commuting as distance. More
specifically, our distance variable measures Euclidean distance between postcode area
centroids. We argue that particularly for Germany distance and travel time are very
closely related. Firstly, Germany’s geography generates little heterogeneity in travel
time for a given distance. Secondly, we control for regional structure, which captures
elements of transport infrastructure. Finally, only 12% of the traffic volume associated
with travel to work in Germany uses public transport [Follmer et al., 2010]. This means
that public transport infrastructure is not an central determinant of travel time, again
making travel time relatively more homogeneous in space. We drop observations with
a distance above 100km. We conduct sensitivity analyses to make sure this does not
unduly affect our results.
We measure distance between a worker’s home and place of work, rather than jour-
neys made or journeys required by the employer. Similarly to willingness to pay esti-
mates for other job attributes, our estimates therefore take as given any adaptations
that employers and/or workers use to make the attribute less onerous, such as telecom-
muting schemes. According to an analysis based on the Mikrozensus [Brenke, 2014], 8%
of employees in Germany occasionally or primarily work from home, but the share was
highest in high-skilled occupations which normally require a university degree and are
not in our main sample. It is of course likely that many of the workers in the “occasional
work from home” group complete work-related tasks at home outside of working hours,
which needn’t reduce the number of journeys to their place of work.
A central finding of our paper is the large effect of childbirth on women’s willingness
to pay to reduce commuting distance. To identify the timing of births in the data, we
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use a routine due to Müller and Strauch [2017], based on exits from employment into
the mandatory part of maternity leave. Particularly for our sample of non-graduate
women who are unlikely to have a child before entering the labour market, this is a very
reliable way of identifying first births.
1.5 Specification and Model Choice
A duration model is the most direct and intuitive empirical implementation of the
job search model discussed in Section 1.2. While no real-world data is ever truly in
continuous time, the daily frequency of our dataset comes close. Job spells can and do
start, and wages and other job characteristics can and do change, at any point during
a month.
In the duration model of job mobility specified in this section, the failure event is
a job ending for any reason. These include voluntary job-to-job transitions, layoffs and
exits from the labour market. A job spell may be followed by a spell of missing data
for several reasons: periods of full-time education, parental leave, time spent abroad
and self-employment are all coded as missing. Voluntary transitions and layoffs are
not unambiguously distinguishable from the data. Under the assumption that layoffs,
like any exit events other than voluntary job-to-job transitions, are exogenous to the
model, they will be captured by the baseline hazard. Since the estimator for marginal
willingness to pay includes only partial derivatives of the hazard, the layoff risk drops
out. Given that we allow the baseline hazard to vary at the individual level, this
assumption is not very restrictive.
A more complete model would directly model the hazards of leaving a job for other
reasons in a competing risk framework. Identification of such a model is much more
difficult than in the present case [Van den Berg, 2001]. Bonhomme and Jolivet [2009]
specify a model where workers are at risk for different events ending a job and let the
hazards depend on individual characteristics. However, their model is quite different
from ours: they study an objective, continuous latent amenity whose value is compared
to a subjective, individual-specific threshold. This threshold varies by observed and
unobserved worker characteristics and the comparison determines “good” and “bad”
jobs. The authors then estimate this model on categorical attribute data. In contrast,
we conceptualise and measure a continuous amenity, which can in principle enter the
utility function in any functional form and whose offer distribution is unspecified. Also,
our model can accommodate a more general form of unobserved heterogeneity.
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The Stratified Cox Model Our sample contains multiple job spells per person,
enabling us to account for unobserved heterogeneity using the method of Stratified Par-
tial Likelihoods. As Ridder and Tunalı [1999] describe in their paper introducing the
method, failure to account for unobserved “group” characteristics (in our case, char-
acteristics which affect all the job durations generated by the same worker throughout
her employment biography) biases coefficient estimates. It bears repeating that this is
true even if these unobserved characteristics should be uncorrelated with the included
regressors. It has long been known that if unobserved heterogeneity is scalar and uncor-
related with the regressors, the estimated β coefficients we use to calculate willingness
to pay will be biased towards zero [Ridder, 1984, Ridder and Tunalı, 1999]. However, if
unobserved heterogeneity has an arbitrary form and a fortiori in the case of a correlation
between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors, the bias is much more complex.
Stratified Partial Likelihood estimation allows the baseline hazard to differ across
individuals in an arbitrary way. Coefficients are identified using within-individual varia-
tion. Whilst OLS estimates of wage premia have been augmented with fixed effects [e.g.
Duncan and Holmlund, 1983, Villanueva, 2007] and duration models have used shared-
frailty terms to capture scalar unobserved heterogeneity [van Ommeren et al., 2000],
data limitations have prevented previous work from using this within-person variation
in a stratified partial likelihood model. This approach is able to capture any hetero-
geneity that has the same shape within an individual across jobs and does not require
proportionality of baseline hazards of different individuals. This means that unobserved
heterogeneity could affect hazards differently at different points in the job spell. We
capture these unobserved influences in a very flexible way, under the assumption that
they are constant over the different jobs spells. This goes beyond the exiting literature.
One could argue that there are there are additional unobservables whose influence
varies across spells generated by the same individual. Several of these potential deter-
minants that are variable over spells, like the presence of children and business cycle
effects are already incorporated in our model. We rely on exits from a job to identify
willingness to pay, meaning that we do not capture the decisions of non-participating
women who are prevented from entering the labour market by high commuting costs.
Assuming that the willingness to pay is even larger in absolute terms for these women,
we estimate lower bound (in absolute terms) for the willingness to pay of all women.
We use a proportional hazards specification of the form
θij(t|x) = θj(t) exp(Xij(t)′β)
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for a worker j in job i with baseline hazard θj and (time-varying) covariate vector Xij(t).
Estimating a Cox model in continuous time means that ties arise only as a conse-
quence of imprecise measurement, not as a true feature of the data-generating process.
To handle them, we use the Breslow approximation [Breslow, 1974, Peto, 1972]. It cal-
culates the partial likelihood assuming that both individuals recorded to fail at the same
time are in the risk sets at each other’s failure times. This approximation introduces a
bias of the coefficients towards zero, but it is the least computationally demanding and
performs well if ties are not too frequent [Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, p. 105].
Ridder and Tunalı [1999] argue that censoring is non-independent under what they
call a synchronous observation plan, i.e. if analysis time returns to zero at the start
of each new spell, as it does in our setup where we assume that the baseline hazard
is defined in terms of the time elapsed in the current job. The problem could arise
because the interaction between censoring at the end of the observation period and
the timing of failure in an earlier spell within the same group affects risk sets. They
provide an illuminating example of the bias this could cause [p. 211]. This illustrates the
main limitation of the stratified approach, namely that like any fixed-effects method,
it cannot accommodate heterogeneity that changes within individuals across jobs. To
address this concern, we have also estimated the model on a sample where the censoring
date is earlier in order to check for the sensitivity of our results with respect to censoring.
This does not affect our main results.
Functional Form of Covariates The standard Cox model assumes a linear form
for the log relative risk, but a number of diagnostic tools are available to determine
whether this simple specification fits the data well. There is a clear trade-off in model
choice here: Linear and log-linear relative risk specifications are tractable and produce
estimates of marginal willingness to pay to reduce commuting distance that are easy to
interpret and to compare to previous work. However, they may oversimplify a complex
relationship. Since the goal of this analysis is estimating a marginal cost of commuting,
we prioritise finding a well-fitting specification for the effects of the wage over other
covariates (most of which are sets of binary variables anyway).
We explore fractional polynomials to find the best functional form for the wage.
This method runs through a pre-determined set of functions, and applies a formal
deviance criterion to choose the best form. The available functions are degree-1 and -2
additive combinations of natural logarithms, fractional and integer powers (hence the
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name) from the set {−2,−1,−0.5, 0, 0.5, 1, 2, 3}. Evaluation of alternative specifications
uses comparative measures based on the log partial likelihood, such that a higher-degree
functional form is adopted if it leads to a significant change in the transformed likelihood.
For a detailed discussion of fractional polynomials including an application to a Cox
model, see Royston and Altman [1994].
The log-transformation of the wage, which is attractive on theoretical grounds and
much-used in the literature, is confirmed.7 We let commuting distance enter the speci-
fication linearly to keep the estimate interpretable and comparable to previous studies.
Dimensions of heterogeneity in willingness to pay, for example the measures of rental
housing cost and childcare places, enter as dummies to ensure flexibility and produce
willingness to pay estimates for interpretable groups.
Summary statistics are presented in table 1. On average, men’s daily earnings are
32% higher than women’s and their commutes are 20% longer. Over ninety percent
of men, but only just over 60% of women, work full time and the share of jobs in
unskilled occupations is higher among women than men. The appendix gives details
on variable definitions, corrections applied and rules for inclusion in the sample. In
addition, Table 2 compares summary statistics for childless women with those for all
mothers and those for mothers of older children. Mothers earn lower daily wages and
have shorter commutes than childless women and are less likely to be in full-time, skilled
jobs.
Main Specification We specify a stratified partial likelihood model with a log rel-
ative risk that is linear in commuting distance and log-linear in the daily wage. This
specification yields a marginal willingness to pay that depends linearly on the wage
and is thus comparable to many previous estimates. Moreover, since time costs have
previously been found to constitute a substantial part of overall commuting cost, it
is theoretically plausible that they would vary in the opportunity cost of the worker’s
time, i.e. the wage rate. The hazard rate can be expressed as
θi(t,X) = θi(t) exp(βw ln(wage) + βddistance+ βxf(X(t))) (2)
where the control vector X includes age as a time-varying variable and linear and
quadratic terms for work experience up to eight years and a dummy for greater work
experience, local unemployment rates and (sets of) dummies for full-time work, un-
7This analysis was done on a previous version of the estimation sample.
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Table 1: Job-level summary stats, baseline estimation sample
Women Men
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Daily Wage 57.29 27.65 75.82 31.78
Starting Wage 55.20 27.03 73.35 31.10
Final Wage 58.77 30.49 77.66 34.28
Distance (cond. < 100) 11.50 13.90 13.58 15.69
Age 35.46 10.24 34.80 9.990
Work experience 5.515 5.186 6.059 5.948
Full-time work 0.623 0.469 0.916 0.255
Unskilled job 0.114 0.309 0.0817 0.261
Core cities 0.281 0.450 0.271 0.444
Urban areas 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500
Rural areas 0.220 0.414 0.229 0.420
Child(ren) present 0.396 0.487
Child(ren) over age 12 0.190 0.385
Observations 4,817,289 5,384,276
Job-level values of time-varying variables are averages weighted by span length.
skilled occupation, regional categories of nationality, occupation, regional structure at
the county level. Moreover, we include annual dummies to capture variation in the
general macroeconomic conditions and national institutional environment, and regional
GDP growth. We also include an interaction between each of the nine regional structure
dummies and a dummy for zero distances, allowing a certain amount of discontinuity in
willingness to pay. This addresses potential bias from different behaviours at the lower
bound caused by different sizes of postcode areas in rural and urban areas. For women,
we include a time-varying dummy switching to one at the time their first and second
children are born. As this information is constructed from information on (mandatory)
maternity leaves [Müller and Strauch, 2017], we are unable to reliably identify childbirth
in men’s biographies.
Predictability of Time-varying Covariates One of the advantages of the survival
analysis methodology over more traditional regression models is its ability to model the
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Table 2: Job-level summary stats, mothers and childless women
Childless women Mothers Mothers of older
children
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Daily Wage 60.00 28.05 53.32 26.57 54.13 26.74
Starting Wage 55.88 26.84 50.37 26.00 51.06 26.06
Final Wage 57.47 27.89 51.38 26.69 52.59 26.89
Distance 12.20 14.87 10.52 13.15 9.910 12.88
Age 32.08 10.25 41.22 7.786 45.61 5.278
Work experience 4.740 5.058 6.651 5.161 7.228 5.477
Full-time work 0.736 0.425 0.458 0.481 0.440 0.478
Unskilled job 0.107 0.300 0.126 0.321 0.146 0.341
Core cities 0.308 0.462 0.240 0.427 0.223 0.416
Urban areas 0.482 0.500 0.524 0.499 0.535 0.499
Rural areas 0.210 0.407 0.236 0.424 0.242 0.428
Child(ren) present 0 0 0.977 0.136 1.000 0.00862
Older children 0 0 0.468 0.484 0.924 0.203
Observations 1376874 939756 475669
Job-level values of time-varying variables are averages weighted by span length. Mothers of older
children are those whose youngest child is aged twelve or over. Presence of children is also time-varying,
leading to values below one for the average of the children’s variable. The mean distance is conditional
on the distance being less than 100km.
influence of the current value of a time-varying covariate on the hazard. The level of
observation in our data is a span, or national insurance record, which in principle allows
for recording changes over time to any covariate, which helps with identification. For
a stochastic covariate process to be valid in a survival model, it has to be predictable.
Heuristically, a predictable process does not look into the future: At each point in time,
a realisation of a predictable process is determined only by information on the past
history of the process itself and its covariates, not their future paths.8
8For a more formal definition, recall that a stochastic process is a function that assigns random
variables to time. It is predictable if and only if the preimage of this random variable is in the process’s
filtration [Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, p. 157]. The filtration is usually defined as the sigma algebra
generated by the history of the counting process of events up to and including the time t, as well as of
the at-risk process and the covariate processes [Therneau and Grambsch, 2000, p. 18]. Left-continuity
is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for predictability. Therneau and Grambsch [2000, p. 5ff]
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This condition could be problematic for the modelling of job mobility, if time-varying
covariates are affected by agents’ inside knowledge about the future path of the counting
process. For example, a worker may learn about a job opportunity at a different firm
and use that knowledge to negotiate his or her wage with her present employer. The
employer may choose to raise the employee’s wage to avoid losing her to a competitor.
In this case, the covariate process – the wage – is affected by information on the future
path of the job mobility process.
Therefore, its preimage is not contained in the filtration of the job mobility process
up to the point where the wage negotiation takes place (it includes information on the
counting process after this time), which makes the process non-predictable. In this case,
the wage would not be a valid covariate in a model of job mobility. In our main study, we
only use workers without a university degree, which should strongly reduce the impact
of this problem, since individual wage negotiations are rare among this group.9
Estimation









Main findings The baseline estimation (Table 3 implies a marginal commuting cost
for childless women of 0.5% of the daily wage per kilometer of commuting distance
(i.e., half this figure per kilometre travelled), or e0.31 at their mean wage. This is less
than the e0.49 estimated for a mixed-gender sample of employees of Amsterdam’s Vrije
Universiteit by Russo et al. [2012], but more than the 0.4 Guilders or 18 Euro-cents
estimated by Van Ommeren et al. [2000] at the mean wage for men, even accounting for
inflation. This estimate, too, is for the Netherlands, so infrastructural, institutional and
cultural differences might all contribute to a differences in marginal commuting cost.
Also, it refers to the late 1980s, and it is plausible to assume that marginal commuting
costs change over time, as prices for the monetary components of commuting cost,
infrastructure, and the labour force composition change.
provide a good intuitive explanation in their introduction, relating the concept of predictability to a
game of chance.
9Hall and Krueger [2012] estimate a “dramatic” positive effect of education level on the probability
of individual bargaining for the United States (p. 64).
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Table 3: Baseline estimation: Partial likelihood model of exits from a job, stratified by
individual.
Women Men
Age -0.0000112∗ (0.00000485) -0.0000493∗∗∗ (0.00000479)
- Squared -4.30e-09∗∗∗ (1.55e-10) -2.86e-09∗∗∗ (1.61e-10)
Unskilled 0.0566∗∗∗ (0.00532) 0.00980 (0.00507)
Full-time 0.142∗∗∗ (0.00335) 0.180∗∗∗ (0.00570)
Local growth -0.212∗∗∗ (0.0254) 0.124∗∗∗ (0.0250)
Local unemployment -0.000680 (0.000813) 0.000802 (0.000779)
Work experience -0.264∗∗∗ (0.00288) -0.338∗∗∗ (0.00301)
Squared 0.0384∗∗∗ (0.000293) 0.0379∗∗∗ (0.000299)
> 8 years -0.978∗∗∗ (0.0218) -0.710∗∗∗ (0.0209)
First child -0.405∗∗∗ (0.0321)
Second child 0.401∗∗∗ (0.0397)
Older child(ren) 0.143∗∗∗ (0.0354)
Log wage -0.615∗∗∗ (0.00520) -0.860∗∗∗ (0.00443)
Distance 0.00318∗∗∗ (0.000124) 0.00356∗∗∗ (0.0000917)
Child × Wage 0.154∗∗∗ (0.00784)
Child × Distance 0.00157∗∗∗ (0.000244)
2nd child × Wage -0.0661∗∗∗ (0.00993)
2nd child × Distance -0.000249 (0.000329)
Older child(ren) × Wage -0.0104 (0.00888)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.00105∗∗∗ (0.000295)
Observations 6,595,290 7,185,463
Stratified Cox partial likelihood model, controls: age, unskilled occupation, full-time status, nationality,
occupational field, motherhood (time-varying, for women), regional structure (9 types), local unemploy-
ment rate, local GDP growth. Zero distance in each region-type (urban to rural) captured by separate
dummies). Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Men’s estimated marginal willingness to pay per kilometre is 20% less than that of
childless women. However, due to men’s higher wages, commuting cost per km at the
respective mean wages are close together. This gap is very close to the one found by
Le Barbanchon et al. [2019] using French administrative data on reservation wages and
reservation commuting distances. Marginal commuting cost close to doubles upon the
birth of a woman’s first child. This increase supports the hypothesis that women’s higher
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Table 4: Marginal willingness to pay
No children -0.00518 (0.000205) -0.00414 0.000108
One child u12 -0.0103 (0.000510) —
One child over 12 -0.00785 (0.000552) —
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00854 (0.000594) —
2+ children over 12 -0.00642 (0.000651) —
Estimated willingness to pay for men is for the whole sample of men, with and without children.
commuting costs are related to the time cost of non-market childcare work. We derive
the information on childbirth from social security records and fathers are much less
likely to interrupt their employment upon childbirth. Therefore, an analogous analysis
for men which could shed additional light on gendered allocations of non-market work, is
not possible with this dataset. Both an increased marginal effect of commuting distance
on the job mobility hazard and a decreased marginal effect of the wage contribute to
the increase in women’s marginal commuting cost upon childbirth. In the context of
our model, this implies that the marginal utility of a higher wage has decreased relative
to that of a shorter commute. This is consistent with increased specialisation after the
birth of the first child, with new mothers specialising in non-market work.
In addition to the impact on willingness to pay for a reduced commuting distance,
family composition affects women’s job mobility patterns directly. After a first birth,
the hazard of a job-to-job transition declines, reflecting strong job protection legislation
for new mothers, but this effect is reversed after a second child is born. The impact
of the youngest child reaching the age of twelve (covariate “older child(ren)”) on job
mobility is also positive. This is consistent with our finding that willingness to pay
decreases somewhat at this stage, although it does not go back to the level it was at
before the first child’s birth and possible related changes in the willingness to pay for
other job attributes as children grow more independent.
Older and more experienced workers have more stable jobs, as we would expect,
with a larger effect for men than for women. Women workers are less likely to leave
a job, but men more likely to do so in areas of higher economic growth. Full-time
workers of either gender are more likely to transition. This would be consistent with
job mobility being associated with career progression. Unskilled jobs, identified using
occupation codes, are less stable, potentially reflecting low job security or progression
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into more skilled work (recall that the effect of any time-invariant worker attributes will
be captured by the individual-level baseline hazard).
For comparison, we estimate an unstratified model (table 5). The stratified model is
our preferred specification: However, we provide this comparator to show that the dif-
ferences are quantitatively important and to provide some evidence on the direction of
bias introduced by unobserved heterogeneity, which a priori is unclear. The interaction
of the baseline and the systematic component of the hazard in the Cox model is multi-
plicative. Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity leads to attenuation of covariate effects
through dynamic sorting if observed and unobserved determinants of the hazard are
uncorrelated [Ridder and Tunalı, 1999, and the references therein]. This is the case for
the coefficient on the log wage in our case. However, failure to account for unobserved
heterogeneity generates a substantial upward bias in the effect of commuting distance,
many of the effects associated with children, as well as estimated marginal willingness
to pay for both men and women.
This indicates that unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with motherhood, com-
muting distance and job-to-job mobility. Given that preferences over different types
of jobs are likely to contribute to sorting into motherhood, this is not surprising. For
example, part of the effect of the first birth on the transition hazard is explained by un-
observed heterogeneity: Giving birth makes a job-to-job transition less likely, but women
who give birth would also have “settled down” and had more stable job biographies in
any case. Both the interaction effect of a child with the wage and with commuting dis-
tance are also overestimated when unobserved heterogeneity is unaccounted for. This
substantiates our claim that stratification is a more appropriate technique of dealing
with unobserved heterogeneity than a frailty method for this application. Note also that
the gender gap in marginal commuting cost, at just under 18%, is slightly smaller in
this specification compared compared to the main specification. This implies that the
gender gap is not explained by person-constant unobserved heterogeneity in job-to-job
mobility.
We also estimate a model on the sample censored in 2011, two years before the main
sample, to see how sensitive our results are to the censoring pattern. This is regarded
as a good test in order to investigate whether the assumption of independent censoring
is appropriate (see Ridder and Tunalı [1999]). Coefficients in this specification are very
similar to our main specification. The differences in estimated willingness to pay are
small and insignificant.
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We allow for interactions of the wage, distance, motherhood and part-time status
in Table 9 and report the resulting separate marginal willingness to pay for part-time
and full-time workers. Childless women’s willingness to pay is virtually the same for
full-time and part-time workers. However, the jump upon the birth of the first child
is much smaller for part-time working mothers. This is consistent with them being
less time-constrained than full-time working mothers, but the interaction between the
wage, part-time status and the birth of the first child also suggests that whereas the
wage becomes less important after the first birth for full-time working women, but not
part-time working women. This suggests that part-time working mothers - perhaps due
to lower wages overall - are less willing to give up (even more) pay. Another interesting
result is that as their children get older, part-time working mothers’ willingness to pay
does not “bounce back” as is the case for full-time working mothers, but even increases
by a small amount instead.
As discussed above, our main sample is restricted to vocationally educated women.
We estimate one specification on the full sample, with dummies for university graduates
(interacted with wage and distance) and top-coding interacted with the wage. It is not
possible to calculate willingness to pay for top-coded women, since we do not have
continuous pay information for them. But it is reassuring to note that the willingness
pay for childless women estimated for non-top coded women on this extended sample
is close to the baseline estimate, and the pattern of a large increase upon first birth
persists (Table 9).
The availability of childcare places could be an important factor in constraining
mothers’ ability to accept longer commuting distances. The important role of childcare
rationing and cost for female participation is well documented in the literature [Con-
nelly, 1992, Del Boca, 2002, Del Boca and Vuri, 2007]. We use county-level information
on the share of children under the age of three who attend daycare centres or are looked
after by a qualified childminder (Tagesmutter). We argue that over the sample period,
variation in this indicator is largely supply-driven. Daycare centres operated long wait-
ing lists, indicating that demand far outstripped supply across the country. It is possible
that areas with a large supply of childcare places have characteristics that also directly
affect women’s commuting cost - for example, if more affluent municipalities provide
better transport infrastructure as well as more childcare places. However, the stratified
method identifies differences in willingness to pay based on within-person changes over
time (residential moves and childbirth), conditioning on time-invariant differences.
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This information is only available for the period from 2005, restricting the sample rel-
ative to the baseline estimation. Estimating the baseline specification on this restricted
sample leads to estimated willingnesses to pay which are not statistically different from
our main estimates. We next allow willingness to pay for a reduced commuting distance
to differ by childcare tercile for women who have young children (Table 7). There is a
clear pattern: mothers in areas where more childcare is available have a lower willingness
to pay to reduce commuting distance. Areas with more childcare places may also have
implemented more other support for mothers that remains unobserved in our analysis.
Therefore our results do not necessarily and directly produce a policy recommendation
of providing more childcare places - however, they do provide evidence that motherhood
gaps in willingness to pay are amenable to policy levers at the local level.
We estimate a model that allows willingness to pay by the area’s settlement struc-
ture, distinguishing between core cities, densely populated areas and rural areas. There
are a wide range of differences between those areas that could affect willingness to pay,
in particular transport infrastructure. We report our estimates of willingness to pay in
the different types of areas in Table 11. Differences in willingness to pay are quite small
for childless women, with only a slightly lower willingness to pay in rural areas, driven
by a lower marginal utility of the wage in rural areas, possibly related to a lower cost
of living.
There is a much stronger contrast between mothers, with mothers in core cities
having a much lower willingness to pay than mothers in either urban or rural areas
outside of those core cities. The effect is driven by the interaction between the presence
of a child, the regional structure and distance (rather than the wage), i.e. the marginal
value of a shorter commuting distance increases by less after the first birth in core cities.
A potential explanation would be differences in the availability of flexible working hours
or workplace-based childcare: Core cities offer a greater variety of job bundles. This
reduces the need to “triangulate” between home, work and childcare and makes it easier
to find a good fit. In addition, core cities offer more hours of childcare. For example, a
report by the Federal Statistical Office [Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder,
2013] shows that the share of under-threes in full-time public childcare (defined as
seven hours or more) in West Germany is currently highest in the cities of Frankfurt
and Heidelberg. Even in these cities, the share was only slightly above 25%, highlighting
the sparse provision of full-time childcare in West Germany.
The regional difference in willingness to pay persists as children get older. This
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could reflect better public transport in core cities, which allows older children to be
more independent and rely less on parents to drive them. For men, only the difference
between core cities and rural areas is statistically significant.
We are able to add information on housing costs to a subsample of the data (the
period from 2005 to 2013). The confidence intervals for willingness to pay for this
restricted sample overlap with the ones for the full sample for the baseline specification
(table 13). We then estimate a model that allows for willingness to pay to differ between
more and less expensive rental housing markets by interacting dummies for terciles of
housing cost with the wage. Willingness to pay for commuting distance is slightly lower
in more expensive areas, but the differences are very small.
The dataset contains some very large distances: The 99th percentile of distance for
women is 314km. It seems improbable that individuals should travel this far every day.
Instead, these are likely to be either weekend commuters or individuals who delay noti-
fying their employer of their residential relocation. Therefore, we dropped all distances
above 100 km in our main analyses. Including them in our linear specification leads to a
substantial downward bias in estimated marginal willingness to pay, but if we allow for
a kink at the 100km mark, the results again become similar to our baseline estimates
(Table 15).
Endogeneity of residential location is a concern in our model. Workers may accept
a job with a temporarily long commuting distance if they anticipate moving closer to
their place of work in the future. To address this problem, we tested specifications which
move all residential moves forward by one year, move them forward all the way to the
beginning of the job spell during which they occurred, and which exclude all job spells
that include a residential move between postcode areas. This last one is an imperfect
solution: On the one hand, it also excludes some spells that do not violate exogeneity if
women and men move for reasons other than to reduce their own commuting distance.
On the other hand, an ex-post fixed residential location is not a sufficient condition for
exogeneity. Nevertheless, these specifications excludes the previously described scenario,
which would be the greatest cause for concern about biased estimates in this case.
Results showed that marginal willingness to pay were similar to the baseline estimate,
suggesting that the effect of endogenous residential moves is limited.
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Conclusion
Our estimates on a large administrative dataset indicate that non-university educated
women in Germany have a higher marginal willingness to pay to reduce commuting
distance than men, which results in shorter observed commuting distances. Unobserved
heterogeneity plays an important role, but gaps in the marginal willingness to pay by
gender and motherhood remain after it is accounted for in a flexible way. Marginal will-
ingness to pay is in the same range as previous estimates from search models for workers
in other countries. We find evidence of a substantial motherhood gap in marginal com-
muting cost, consistent with gendered specialisation after first birth. The marginal
willingness to pay of mothers of young children is somewhat reduced in areas where for-
mal childcare is widespread, suggesting that the additional cost faced by these women
can be mitigated using policy levers.
In additional analyses, we find that childless women have a similar marginal will-
ingness to pay in core cities, urban and rural areas, but mothers in core cities have a
much lower marginal willingness to pay than their counterparts in urban or rural areas.
We also find than the increase in willingness to pay with first birth is smaller, but more
persistent for part-time working mothers. Considering the housing market, willingness
to pay is slightly lower in areas where housing costs are high, but the differences are
small.
Differences in willingness to pay for job attributes such as commuting distance po-
tentially play an important role in determining gender and motherhood wage gaps. Our
measure of willingness to pay is a local one and can only approximate inframarginal dif-
ferences such as the one between men’s and women’s average wages. Taking this local
approximation at face value and extrapolating, our baseline specification suggests that
mothers of young children would be willing to give up almost 12% of their daily wage
to reduce their commuting distance from the sample mean to zero. In contrast, men
would only be willing to give up less than five percent of their wage for a change of the
same magnitude.
To put the gap in the marginal willingness to pay in the context of the gender pay
gap, consider a man employed at the mean childless female wage and mean childless
female commuting distance. To increase his commuting distance to the sample mean
of men he would need to be compensated by a wage increase (as linear approximation)
of 0.57%. This is about 2% of the gender wage gap for childless women. If the same
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calculation is done with respect to women with one child below 12 we can explain 3%
of the gender wage gap with commuting preferences.
Note that, similarly to a Blinder-Oaxaca composition, the choice of endowment
matters: If we use the mean wage and commuting distance of men and weight it by the
preferences of women then we get an explained part of 3% gender wage gap for childless
women and 10% explained gender wage gap for women with children below 12 years. In
other words, a person with the preferences of a mother of a child under twelve who was
currently employed at men’s average wage and commuting distance would be willing to
give up 10% of the gap to lower their commuting distance to mothers’ average distance.
The higher value is due to men’s higher wages and commuting distances. Thus, our
empirical results in combination with this back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate
that commuting preferences indeed contribute to gender wage gap and in particular
motherhood wage gap, but only to a limited extent.
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Table 5: Early censoring and non-stratified specification
Censored in 2011 Unstratified Model
Women Men Women Men
Log wage -0.741∗∗∗ -0.794∗∗∗ -0.491∗∗∗ -0.630∗∗∗
(0.00658) (0.00515) (0.00205) (0.00185)
Distance 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00358∗∗∗ 0.00345∗∗∗ 0.00372∗∗∗
(0.000153) (0.000106) (0.0000609) (0.0000476)
Age -0.000209∗∗∗ -0.000161∗∗∗ 0.0000501∗∗∗ 0.000126∗∗∗
(0.00000682) (0.00000593) (0.00000166) (0.00000167)
Squared -3.38e-09∗∗∗ 8.52e-10∗∗∗ -2.51e-09∗∗∗ -4.23e-09∗∗∗
(2.19e-10) (2.01e-10) (6.02e-11) (6.13e-11)
Work experience -0.267∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.512∗∗∗ -0.595∗∗∗
(0.00363) (0.00350) (0.00163) (0.00165)
Squared 0.0403∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗
(0.000355) (0.000339) (0.000196) (0.000200)
Full-time 0.203∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.00439) (0.00697) (0.00161) (0.00299)
First child -0.526∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗
(0.0414) (0.0147)
Second child 0.588∗∗∗ 0.0214
(0.0532) (0.0171)
Older child(ren) 0.431∗∗∗ -0.0643∗∗∗
(0.0474) (0.0160)
Child × Wage 0.182∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.00367)
Child × Distance 0.00183∗∗∗ 0.00204∗∗∗
(0.000311) (0.000131)
2nd child × Wage -0.117∗∗∗ -0.00179
(0.0133) (0.00433)
2nd child × Distance 0.000534 -0.000433∗∗
(0.000430) (0.000168)
Older child(ren) × Wage -0.0960∗∗∗ 0.00466
(0.0119) (0.00405)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.00103∗∗ -0.00162∗∗∗
(0.000385) (0.000155)
Observations 5360802 5848739 6595290 7185463
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Table 6: Marginal willingness to pay with early censoring and non-stratified specification
No children -0.00549 (0.00021) -0.00702 (0.000126)
One child u12 -0.0105 (0.000540) -0.0184 (0.000439)
One child over 12 -0.00743 (0.000518) -0.0131 (0.000441)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00951 (0.000611) -0.0168 (0.000549)
2+ children over 12 -0.00700 (0.000599) -0.0116 (0.000592)
Men -0.00451 (0.000136) -0.00591 (0.0000769)
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. (3) and (4) include a full set of
year dummies.
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Table 7: Estimation by availability of childcare in the local area
Childcare Sample Full model
Log wage -0.639∗∗∗ (0.00749) -0.594∗∗∗ (0.00982)
Distance 0.00322∗∗∗ (0.000169) 0.00318∗∗∗ (0.000241)
Age 0.000119∗∗∗ (0.00000949) -0.0000298∗∗ (0.0000103)
Squared -6.85e-09∗∗∗ (2.89e-10) -5.24e-09∗∗∗ (3.09e-10)
Work experience -0.226∗∗∗ (0.00442) -0.255∗∗∗ (0.00468)
Squared 0.0337∗∗∗ (0.000411) 0.0352∗∗∗ (0.000429)
Full time 0.129∗∗∗ (0.00451) 0.127∗∗∗ (0.00465)
First child -0.345∗∗∗ (0.0466) 0.0571 (0.108)
Second child 0.435∗∗∗ (0.0565) 0.497∗∗∗ (0.0586)
Older child(ren) -0.134∗∗ (0.0500) -0.103 (0.117)
Child × Wage 0.152∗∗∗ (0.0114) -0.175∗∗∗ (0.0263)
Child × Distance 0.00151∗∗∗ (0.000340) 0.00438∗∗∗ (0.000873)
2nd child × Wage -0.0484∗∗∗ (0.0141) -0.0482∗∗∗ (0.0146)
2nd child × Distance -0.000531 (0.000444) -0.000495 (0.000457)
Older child(ren) × Wage 0.0375∗∗ (0.0126) 0.376∗∗∗ (0.0286)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.00134∗∗∗ (0.000399) -0.00441∗∗∗ (0.000927)
Childcare Tercile: 2nd 0.434∗∗∗ (0.0353)
3rd 0.749∗∗∗ (0.0416)
2nd × Young child -0.0788 (0.114)
3rd × Young child -0.116 (0.118)
2nd × Young child × Dist -0.00258∗∗ (0.000925)
3rd× Young child × Dist -0.00404∗∗∗ (0.000962)
2nd × Young child × Wage 0.280∗∗∗ (0.0279)
3rd × Young child × Wage 0.277∗∗∗ (0.0289)
Observations 3622355 3501774
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 8: Willingness to pay by availability of childcare in the local area
Baseline: No children -0.00505 (0.000269 ) -0.00535 (0.000412 )
One child u12 -0.00972 (0.000674 ) -0.0121 (0.00117 )
One child over 12 -0.00754 (0.000770 ) -0.00803 (0.00102 )
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00784 (0.000798 ) -0.00980 (0.00124 )
2+ children over 12 -0.00574 0.000936 ) -0.00602 (0.00116 )
Medium: One child u12 -0.0102 (0.000941 )
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00836 (0.000992 )
High: One child u12 -0.00716 (0.000963 )
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00561 (0.000988 )
Baseline MWP for mothers of young children in second model is for the lowest tercile of childcare.
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Table 9: Part-time workers and graduates
Part-time Incl. Graduates
Log wage -0.634∗∗∗ (0.00594) -0.591∗∗∗ (0.00479)
Distance 0.00330∗∗∗ (0.000137) 0.00319∗∗∗ (0.000117)
Age -0.00000464 (0.00000487) -0.00000668 (0.00000455)
Squared -4.43e-09∗∗∗ (1.55e-10) -4.54e-09∗∗∗ (1.46e-10)
Work experience -0.266∗∗∗ (0.00288) -0.262∗∗∗ (0.00265)
Squared 0.0385∗∗∗ (0.000293) 0.0382∗∗∗ (0.000271)
Full time 0.140∗∗∗ (0.00308)
First child -0.468∗∗∗ (0.0402) -0.392∗∗∗ (0.0282)
Second child 0.387∗∗∗ (0.0398) 0.443∗∗∗ (0.0360)
Older child(ren) 0.123∗ (0.0500) 0.129∗∗∗ (0.0329)
First child × Wage 0.182∗∗∗ (0.00967) 0.150∗∗∗ (0.00676)
First child × Distance 0.00201∗∗∗ (0.000302) 0.00148∗∗∗ (0.000217)
Older child(ren) × Wage -0.0281∗ (0.0122) -0.00605 (0.00818)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.00163∗∗∗ (0.000402) -0.00102∗∗∗ (0.000275)
2nd child × Wage -0.0598∗∗∗ (0.00996) -0.0851∗∗∗ (0.00887)
2nd child × Distance -0.000122 (0.000330) -0.000401 (0.000301)
Part time -0.490∗∗∗ (0.0356)
PT × Child 0.591∗∗∗ (0.0541)
PT × Older child(ren) -0.393∗∗∗ (0.0641)
PT × Wage 0.101∗∗∗ (0.00916)
PT × Distance -0.000418 (0.000256)
PT × Wage × Child -0.189∗∗∗ (0.0139)
PT × Distance × Child -0.00102∗ (0.000444)
PT× Wage × Older child(ren) 0.146∗∗∗ (0.0162)
PT × Dist × Older child(ren) 0.00150∗∗ (0.000555)
Graduate 0.212∗∗∗ (0.0354)
Graduate × Wage -0.0574∗∗∗ (0.00807)
Graduate × Distance -0.0000843 (0.000222)
Top-coded × Wage -0.107∗∗∗ (0.00238)
Observations 6595319 7811505
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 10: Willingness to pay for part-time workers and graduates
No children -0.00520 (0.000220) -0.00540 (0.000202)
One child u12 -0.0117 (0.000651) -0.0106 (0.000485)
One child over 12 -0.00766 (0.000701) -0.00819 (0.000553)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.0101 (0.000729) -0.00812 (0.000549)
2+ children over 12 -0.00659 (0.000762 -0.00612 (0.000614)
Part time: No children -0.00541 (0.000444)
One child u12 -0.00716 (0.000569)
One child over 12 -0.00884 (0.000829)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00625 (0.000596)
2+ children, all over 12 -0.00749 (0.000869)
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Table 11: Estimation by region type
Women Men
Full time 0.193∗∗∗ (0.00366) 0.179∗∗∗ (0.00570)
First child -0.519∗∗∗ (0.0348)
Second child 0.447∗∗∗ (0.0437)
Older child(ren) 0.384∗∗∗ (0.0391)
Log wage -0.780∗∗∗ (0.00783) -0.812∗∗∗ (0.00696)
Distance 0.00402∗∗∗ (0.000250) 0.00344∗∗∗ (0.000173)
Child × Wage 0.168∗∗∗ (0.00872)
Child × Distance 0.000883 (0.000531)
2nd child × Wage -0.1000∗∗∗ (0.0110)
2nd child × Distance 0.000135 (0.000359)
Older child(ren) × Wage -0.0799∗∗∗ (0.0101)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.00218∗∗ (0.000730)
Urban × Wage 0.0170∗ (0.00848) -0.0857∗∗∗ (0.00840)
Rural × Wage 0.0681∗∗∗ (0.0107) -0.0303∗∗ (0.0110)
Urban × Distance 0.000247 (0.000314) 0.000301 (0.000217)
Rural × Distance -0.000683 (0.000357) -0.000114 (0.000251)
Urban × Child × Wage -0.00270 (0.00320)
Rural × Child × Wage -0.00404 (0.00404)
Urban × Child × Distance 0.00145∗ (0.000625)
Rural × Child × Distance 0.00194∗∗ (0.000688)
Observations 6581025 7185463
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Table 12: Marginal willingness to pay by region type
Cities: Childless women/all men -0.00516 (0.000323) -0.00423 (0.000215)
One child u12 -0.00802 (0.000799)
One child over 12 -0.00395 (0.000864)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00709 (0.000769)
2+ children over 12 -0.00362 (0.000832)
Densely pop.: Childless women/all men -0.00560 (0.000256) -0.00416 (0.000150)
One child u12 -0.0111 (0.000567)
One child over 12 -0.00758 (0.000560)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00967 (0.000584)
2+ children, all over 12 -0.00678 (0.000590)
Rural: Childless women/all men -0.00469 (0.000361) -0.00394 (0.000219)
One child u12 -0.0113 (0.000795)
One child over 12 -0.00878 (0.000804)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00974 (0.000755)
2+ children, all over 12 -0.00775 (0.000773)
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Region-distance/wage interac-
tions are allowed to differ for older children, but effects are insignificant.
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Table 13: Willingness to pay by housing cost
Baseline Full model
Age 0.0000429∗∗∗ (0.00000817) 0.0000484∗∗∗ (0.00000818)
Squared -6.78e-09∗∗∗ (2.51e-10) -6.73e-09∗∗∗ (2.52e-10)
Full time 0.125∗∗∗ (0.00422) 0.126∗∗∗ (0.00422)
Work experience -0.208∗∗∗ (0.00398) -0.209∗∗∗ (0.00398)
Squared 0.0332∗∗∗ (0.000378) 0.0333∗∗∗ (0.000378)
First child -0.349∗∗∗ (0.0428) -0.416∗∗∗ (0.0617)
Second child 0.438∗∗∗ (0.0520) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.0521)
Older child(ren) -0.0554 (0.0461) -0.0506 (0.0462)
Log wage -0.621∗∗∗ (0.00693) -0.641∗∗∗ (0.0107)
Distance 0.00316∗∗∗ (0.000158) 0.00325∗∗∗ (0.000158)
Child × Wage 0.155∗∗∗ (0.0105) 0.177∗∗∗ (0.0153)
Child × Distance 0.00139∗∗∗ (0.000315) 0.00133∗∗∗ (0.000316)
2nd child × Wage -0.0564∗∗∗ (0.0130) -0.0577∗∗∗ (0.0130)
2nd child × Distance -0.000450 (0.000414) -0.000433 (0.000414)
Older child(ren) × Wage 0.0209 (0.0116) 0.0195 (0.0116)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.000984∗∗ (0.000372) -0.000987∗∗ (0.000372)
Rent Tercile: 2nd -0.101 (0.0522)
3rd tercile 0.194∗∗∗ (0.0580)
2nd tercile × Child 0.109 (0.0724)
3rd tercile × Child 0.0506 (0.0806)
2nd tercile × Wage 0.0425∗∗∗ (0.0127)
3rd tercile × Wage 0.00422 (0.0139)
2nd × Child × Wage -0.0322 (0.0180)
3rd × Child × Wage -0.0247 (0.0198)
Observations 4118548 4118548
39
Table 14: Marginal Willingness to Pay by Housing Cost
No children -0.00509 (0.000258) -0.00507 (0.000258)
One child u12 -0.00975 (0.000650) -0.00986 (0.000675)
One child over 12 -0.00800 (0.000730) -0.00807 (0.000744)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00784 (0.000760) -0.00794 (0.000770)
2+ children over 12 -0.00620 (0.000867) -0.00628 (0.000871)
Medium: No children -0.00542 (0.000276)
One child u12 -0.0101 (0.000692)
One child over 12 -0.00827 (0.000765)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00810 (0.000788)
2+ children, all over 12 -0.00642 (0.000892)
High: No children -0.00510 (0.000260)
One child u12 -0.00944 (0.000649)
One child over 12 -0.00772 (0.000715)
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00764 (0.000744)
2+ children, all over 12 -0.00604 (0.000840)
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Full time 0.139∗∗∗ (0.00324)
Work experience -0.265∗∗∗ (0.00278)
Squared 0.0383∗∗∗ (0.000284)
> 8 years -0.978∗∗∗ (0.0214)
First child -0.373∗∗∗ (0.0309)
Second child 0.401∗∗∗ (0.0387)
Older child(ren) 0.138∗∗∗ (0.0344)
Log wage -0.606∗∗∗ (0.00496)
Distance 0.00277∗∗∗ (0.000118)
Child × Wage 0.145∗∗∗ (0.00755)
Child × Distance 0.00169∗∗∗ (0.000238)
2nd child × Wage -0.0663∗∗∗ (0.00966)
2nd child × Distance -0.000246 (0.000321)
Older child(ren) × Wage -0.00840 (0.00862)
Older child(ren) × Distance -0.00109∗∗∗ (0.000288)
Distance× Long distance -0.00201∗∗∗ (0.000115)
Distance× Long distance × Child -0.00154∗∗∗ (0.000235)
Distance× Long distance × Second Child 0.000356 (0.000317)
Distance× Long distance × Older child(ren) 0.00107∗∗∗ (0.000285)
Observations 6836871
Marginal Willingness to Pay
No children -0.00457 (0.000198 )
One child u12 -0.00967 (0.000495 )
One child over 12 -0.00717 (0.000538 )
2+ children, youngest u12 -0.00799 (0.000578 )
2+ children over 12 -0.00583 (0.000635 )
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Appendix
Structure of the dataset
The data consists of spans that can last for any period between a day and a year. A
span ends when an event mandates an employer notification to the national insurance
agency. These events include the beginning and end of a job spell, but also any change
that triggers a change in contribution liabilities, such as a change in the wage. Exits
into maternity leave are identifiable separately from other exits. In principle, changes
to the worker’s home address could also be recorded immediately, in practice this is
likely to happen with some delay. If no even happens within a year - i.e. if an employee
works for the same employer at the same wage in the same position during the whole
of a calendar year - then the employer still needs to make a notification for the year.
Variable Definitions
Commuting distance The distance is the Euclidean distance between the centroid
of the employee’s residential and work post code. Work post codes are measured at the
plant level.
Earnings and hours of work The dataset records daily earnings and a discrete
variable with the categories full-time, “large” part-time and “small” part-time. There
is no more precise information on hours worked and it is therefore not possible to
construct an hourly wage.
Occupational Characteristics The dataset contains two occupation variables, a
3-digit variable based on the 1988 classification [Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, 1988], and
a 5-digit variable based on the most recent classification [Bundesagentur für Arbeit,
2011]. Since the observation window ends in 2010 and re-coding of older observations
to the 2010 system is not error-free, the older variable is likely to be more accurate.
However, the 2010 classification combines a horizontal (occupation) and a vertical (skill
level) dimension. I recover the skill level information, which is absent from the older
variable at the available aggregation level. For the horizontal occupation information,
I match the 1988 information to 53 task-based occupational fields, as defined by the
Institute for Vocational Education and Training.
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Unskilled is the lowest of four skill levels, characterised as a un- or semiskilled activity
with simple or routine tasks of little complexity, where formal vocational training not
usually required.
Regional Characteristics We match the individual data to classification which dis-
tinguishes 9 types of district, due to the Federal Institute for Research on Building,
Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR). They are based on administrative dis-
tricts, but differ from them where administrative divisions group structurally different
areas into one unit. We include dummies for the type of area and interactions with a
dummy for zero distances (workers who live and work in the same postcode area) to ac-
count for the larger geographical size of postcode areas in sparsely populated regions..
Moreover, we estimate a separate willingness to pay for three broader types of area,
proposed by the institute as characterising city-periphery relationships:
• Core cities
• Districts with a predominantly urban character (“urban areas”)
• Districts with a predominantly rural character and rural areas (“rural areas”)
For more detailed information on the classification, see Görmar and Irmen [1991] or
the institute’s online information [Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung,
2006].
Rental cost The proxy for rental cost is also provided by the Federal Institute for
Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development. It is based on ask prices
for flats gathered from online platforms and newspapers, using the following criteria:
• pure rental prices with no heating or other utilities included
• non-furnished flats between 40 and 130 square metres
• the ad is displayed for no more than six months
• some additional filters to exclude implausible levels and changes
The providers suggest that their measure is likely to omit some flats offered by
very large housing companies, particularly in Berlin and Hamburg, who use their own
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information channels. It is also likely to omit some flats in rural areas which are only
advertised on local notice boards or find a new tenant by word of mouth. Actual rent
paid may be slightly lower in areas of low demand where prospective tenants are able
to negotiate a lower price.
Treatment of Missings Individuals’ Nationality, while not necessary constant, is
unlikely to change back and forth, more so in a short time span. Therefore, up to two
subsequent missing values were filled if coded nationality was identical for the individual
before and after the gap arising due to the missing values. This affects a small part of
the sample, since less than 1 percent of observations originally had nationality coded as
missing.
If the wage was coded as zero or missing in a subspell, but valid wage information
was available in another spell within the same aggregate job spell (a continuous em-
ployment at the same firm), the valid wage information was extended to the missing
observation.
Residential Moves A typical job spell used in the model consists of a number of
spans, which correspond to national insurance records. There is at least one record per
year, plus additional records in case of changes in the employee’s data, e.g. a change
in the wage. The residential location corresponds to the end of the sub-spell. It is
not known to what extent employers proactively register their employees’ changes in
residential location with national insurance. It is plausible that at least some employers
simply wait until the next regular entry is due, so we might observe residential moves
with a certain delay.
Children We use two dummies for the birth of the first and second child, respec-
tively. These dummies stay at one forever. We additionally use dummies to capture
the youngest child in the family reaching the age of twelve, to reflect differences in the
time constraints of parenting younger versus older children.
Sample Construction
Employment spells according to the above-mentioned definition are included in the
sample if:
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• they are not overlapped by a spell in registered unemployment or an active labour
market programme 10, a mobility-related subsidy or retirement. Small overlaps of
up to three days are tolerated. Individuals are observed as registered unemployed
if they are eligible for top-up unemployment benefits to close the gap between low
earnings and the subsistence level. In this case, the wage paid by the employer is
not the wage actually perceived by the worker, who faces a wage distribution that
is truncated at the legal minimum subsistence level. A similar distortion of the
wage-commuting trade-off arises in the case of a mobility subsidy. Participants in
active labour market programmes, on the other hand, do not choose their place of
work, and their behaviour can therefore not be adequately reflected in the model.
Therefore, these cases are not included in the sample. Selection into standard (i.e.
non-subsidised) employment is not addressed here.
• the individual is never recorded as having a university degree, with certain cor-
rections applied. To avoid complications arising from the decision to return to
education, we do not include employment spells before university graduation. We
do not know if individuals acquire a university degree after the end of the ob-
servation window. Eight to ten years after leaving vocational education, this is
unlikely to apply to many individuals.
• they belong to a job identified as the main job at that time (more details below).
• they are not part of a seasonal work pattern, i.e. the worker does not return to
the same employer without an intervening spell at a different firm. Spells with
the same employer with gaps of up to a week are considered part of a single job to
avoid misinterpreting administrative delays to contract renewal as seasonal work.
About a quarter of spells are dropped for this reason.
• they are part of the inflow sample starting on January 1st, 2000. The data is
right-censored on December 31st, 2013.
• they last for more than 60 days. Temporary workers whose contracts last less than
two months are usually not liable to pay full social security contributions, which
should preclude their inclusion in the sample. Spells of under two months could be
due to exceptions in the national insurance treatment, early firings, miscoded part-
time work, or misreported dates, which are difficult to disentangle. Moreover, the
optimisation process underlying short-term job location may differ substantially
10a programme to support the long-term unemployed, publicly sponsored employment, or a seasonal
or temporal work placement organised by the employment agency
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from the one related to long-term job mobility decisions and temporary residential
relocations are likely to not appear in the data, which makes distance calculations
unreliable. Therefore, spells of under two months are dropped.
• the implied monthly wage is within the limits that make a worker liable to pay
national insurance contributions (Geringfügigkeitsgrenze and Beitragsbemessungs-
grenze). Due to different timings of reports, wage information in some spells which
are not actually subject to contributions was included in the original dataset.
These criteria are applied in the stated order, e.g., if short and long job spells form a
seasonal work pattern, they are dropped, even if the short spells would later be excluded
by the two-months rule.
We exclude spells where either the place of work or the place of residence was missing
or invalid, or where an individual was recorded as living in, or a firm recorded as being
located in, two or more different zip code areas at once, since no valid commuting
distance could be determined.
Treatment of overlapping employment spells Overlapping spells present a chal-
lenge to the model, since neither the theory nor the empirical model allows for an agent
to be in two states at once. To keep the model tractable, we make the simplifying
assumption that individuals have one main job, and mobility behaviour in any other
jobs is not reflected in the model. Cases where no clear hierarchy of parallel jobs can
be determined are excluded.
Multiple job spells with different employers at the same time Overlapping
job spells of the same individual with different employers are excluded, except in the
following cases:
• Transitional overlap: If the overlap is less than two weeks, both spells are
included, with the transition assumed to occur at the start of the overlapping
period.
• Short temporary jobs: If one and only one of the jobs lasts for less than a year
and the other one is at least three times as long, the longer spell is considered the
main job and included in the sample.
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• Part-time jobs: If one of the jobs is full-time whereas the other one is part-time,
the full-time spell is considered the main job and included in the sample
The three criteria are hierarchical, i.e. we first check for transitional overlap, then for
temporary jobs, then for part-time jobs.
Multiple spans with the same employer Spans are records, i.e. within-job
observations. In the case of overlap between multiple spans, the outcome - job mobility
- is unaffected, and the only question is which values of time-varying covariates are
valid at which point in time. Pairs of these spells were split. The span created from
the overlapping spans has the covariates of the two original spans if they are non-
contradictory. Otherwise, the covariate is set to missing. In the case of conflicting wage
information, if the difference is less than 5%, the mean is used. 11
11Browsing the data where spells overlap suggest that while some probably refer to changing wages,
others appear to refer to bonuses instead, which would imply that the true wage is the sum of both
recorded wages. Separating the two cases would involve (more) arbitrary cut-offs. Since less than 1
% of spells are affected, so no attempt at this is made. In the rare case of triple or greater multiple
overlaps which only affects about 1 in 2000 spells, the overlapping portions were dropped without any
corrections to the covariates.
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Working schedule autonomy is frequently named as an important characteristic of
family-friendly workplaces and a means of improving labour market opportunities for
workers with care-giving responsibilities, especially women [e.g. Parker and Wang, 2013,
Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2017]. More formally, in a Beckerian frame-
work where time inputs and market-bought goods are inputs into home production,
workers gain utility from schedule autonomy depending on the production functions
and marginal utilities for commodities other than market work. People for whose home
production some types of time are much more productive than others will benefit most
from being able to reallocate those time inputs away from market work. Examples of
such commodities are picking up and dropping off children and home-cooked meals.
However, Mas and Pallais [2020] argue that in real workplaces, flexible schedules come
bundled with less attractive job attributes and in fact are detrimental to combining mar-
ket work and care giving responsibilities. In this paper, we use novel data to examine
whether, in the institutional setting of a social market economy, the earlier argument
that flexibility is valued by those with caregiving responsibilities and traded off against
wages, still holds.
Analyses of willingness to pay, such as ours, quantify the trade-offs between in-
creased home production enabled by schedule autonomy and potentially lower wages in
48
the market, a potentially important contributor to gender and parenthood wage gaps.
Several studies have analysed schedule autonomy, its determinants and its effects on
worker satisfaction in Germany. We will briefly review this literature here and sub-
sequently discuss recent work on willingness to pay for schedule autonomy from the
US.
Definitions of what exactly schedule autonomy is vary, as do findings about its de-
terminants and impacts. Hunt [2013] defines flexibility as overtime that is compensated
by time-in-lieu. Using the German SOEP, she finds that workers who access this type
of flexible schedule are slightly less satisfied with their work, but more satisfied with
the amount of leisure time they have. She uses the cyclicality of overtime to disen-
tangle worker- from employer-led schedules. With this approach, measuring autonomy
over short-term scheduling decisions, for example how to allocate working hours across
a single day or week, remains challenging. However, productivity of time inputs into
home production is likely to vary across these short time horizons - with peaks for the
school run and mealtimes - as well as longer periods, when it is driven by household
composition and child age.
Another option is to directly use worker-reported schedule autonomy. Hanglberger
[2010] finds that complete schedule autonomy increases job satisfaction of full-time
employees, but not limited autonomy through a flexitime scheme with a working time
account, which usually includes some core period with mandatory attendance. The
analysis accounts for unobserved individual heterogeneity through fixed effects. Since
the analysis excludes the self-employed, the group of workers with complete schedule
autonomy is a fairly small one, at less than 15% of employees (own calculation). He
finds no effect of the timing of non-autonomously scheduled hours (standard working
hours vs weekend or evening work) and no significant interactions with the presence of
children in the household.
Wanger [2017] considers effects of schedule autonomy and a range of personal and
job characteristics on both satisfaction with working time and job satisfaction more
widely defined. Her measure of schedule autonomy is based on the survey question,
“How often do you succeed in taking your private interests and the interests of your
family into account when planning your working hours?”. It therefore focuses less on the
formal arrangement in place and more on de facto incidence of work-family scheduling
conflicts. This also means that measured autonomy may depend on the demand for it,
as those workers whose family and personal life places fewer demands on their time may
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report greater schedule autonomy.
She finds that autonomy over schedules and work planning increases satisfaction with
working time as well as with one’s job in general. Unlike general job satisfaction, working
time satisfaction is not related to personal characteristics. Although she excludes this
variable from her main model due to concerns about reverse causality, she mentions
that working time satisfaction is affected by satisfaction with the wage, opening up
interesting questions of wage-amenity trade-offs which we explore in this paper. The
earned wage itself also has a small positive effect on both satisfaction measures.
Zapf and Weber [2017] study the determinants, rather than the effects of sched-
ule autonomy using a version of SOEP that includes a linked employer survey, the
SOEP-LEE, and focusing once more on the working time arrangement itself. They find
that worker characteristics have little impact on observed schedule autonomy, which is
instead largely determined by employer and job characteristics. Economic theory sug-
gests that the benefits workers obtain from schedule autonomy will be heterogeneous.
However, whether those workers with the greatest utility gain from schedule auton-
omy actually consume more of it will depend on search frictions, the offer distributions
faced by different workers and income effects. We are therefore interested in studying
willingness to pay directly, with a particular focus on gender and parenthood.
The literature has previously found that schedule autonomy leads to different out-
comes for men and women. Lott and Chung [2016] use data from the German SOEP to
show that for men, schedule autonomy is associated with increases in income and over-
time. Whilst women in full-time jobs with schedule autonomy also work more overtime,
their income does not increase.
The question of schedule autonomy in a context of a wage-amenity trade-off has
received less attention in the literature on the German labour market. Heywood et al.
[2007] use the British 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey, a linked employer-
employee survey and find large compensating wage differentials of 20% for family-
friendly practices, with the effect mainly driven by schedule autonomy. A dummy
variable for schedule autonomy is generated, identifying cases where both workers and
managers report that flexible hours are available. They then instrument for workplace
practices with employer (in practice, manager) attitudes. However, “progressive” man-
ager attitudes may affect a range of workplace characteristics and even be considered
an amenity in itself. It is therefore unclear whether this estimation strategy succeeds
in isolating a premium for schedule autonomy.
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Experimental evidence of willingness to pay for schedule autonomy of telephone
interviewers in the United States is provided by Mas and Pallais [2017]. They find that
most workers are not willing to pay for schedule autonomy and that their aversion to
evening and weekend work drives their dislike of employer-led flexibility that introduces
unpredictability for workers. However, there is a minority of workers who have a high
willingness to pay for schedule autonomy, which could sustain pay differentials.
We provide new, direct evidence on willingness to pay for schedule autonomy of
workers in Germany. By using data on reservation wages themselves, we show that the
hedonic wage premium is large and wrong-signed as an indicator of worker willingness
to pay. We confirm previous findings of substantial heterogeneity across workers in
the experimental and non-experimental literature in Europe and the US. We also show
that beyond the job offer acceptance/rejection decision, the trade-off between wages
and schedule autonomy matters at other points of the utility function, such as for the
determination of a fair wage, linking the literature on job attributes and search to the
one one fair wages.
In the following subsection, we set out a theoretical framework for schedule au-
tonomy in a search environment and motivate our measure of willingness to pay. In
subsection 2.2, we describe the new survey data we use. subsection 2.3 quantifies will-
ingness to pay for schedule autonomy, carefully distinguishing worker- from employer-led
flexibility and examine worker heterogeneity along several dimensions. We test a theo-
retical prediction that external factors such as the presence of children in the household
and access to support networks determine willingness to pay for schedule autonomy.
Furthermore, we analyse the role of schedule autonomy through the lens of the fair
wage-effort hypothesis of Akerlof and Yellen [1990] and test some of its predictions
using our sample as well as the main SOEP panel.
2.1 Willingness to Pay for Schedule Autonomy in a Search Model
If workers engage in household production as well as market work and need to allocate
time inputs amongst those competing uses, schedule autonomy always enables a weakly
better allocation of time inputs. Workers could thus achieve greater overall utility from
consumption of household and market goods. The utility workers gain from a job thus
depends on the schedule autonomy it grants, as well as its wage. Gronberg and Reed
[1994] present a search model with job attributes, in which the reservation wages for
“good” and “bad” jobs will differ from each other. Their framework has subsequently
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been applied to estimate workers’ willingness to pay for job attributes such as commuting
distance [van Ommeren et al., 2000].
We apply their extension of the classic Burdett [1978] model to schedule autonomy.
Consider an employed worker in a job with wage w and schedule type x. In most of our
empirical application, x is a binary variable which takes the value 0 for jobs with a fixed
schedule and the value 1 for a worker-led flexible schedule. We abstract from labour
supply issues. The worker receives alternative job offers (w∗, x∗) both while employed
and while unemployed in a Poisson process with parameter λ.
The expected discounted stream of utility from accepting job offer (w, x) over the
whole of the life course is
ρR(w, x) = u(w, x) + λ
∫ ∫
max{0, R(w∗, x∗)−R(w, x)}dF (w∗, x∗)
+ δ(U −R(w, x))
where ρ is a discount parameter and U is the expected present value of unemployment.
Lifetime utility is thus composed of an instantaneous component, a continuation value
in case of a job switch and another continuation value in case of exogenous job loss.
The optimal strategy, as in the one-dimensional job case treated by Mortensen [1986],
is myopic. The worker pursues a reservation utility strategy: She accepts all job offers
which offer a higher instantaneous utility than her present job if she is employed or
than unemployment if she is unemployed, since the “stream” of jobs that will become
available in the future is not affected by the current state. In the binary case we
consider here, this generates a pair of reservation wages (w̄0, w̄1) for autonomous and
non-autonomous jobs which are defined by the condition
u(w̄1, 1) = u(w̄0, 0) = u(w, x)
if the worker is currently employed at wage w, or else by the condition
u(w̄1, 1) = u(w̄0, 0) = U
if the worker is currently unemployed.
Then, w̄0 − w̄1 is a measure of willingness to pay for schedule autonomy: A wage
increase of this magnitude would exactly compensate a worker for the loss of schedule
autonomy.
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In measuring willingness to pay for schedule autonomy, it is crucial to distinguish
worker-led from employer-led working time arrangements, even if both frequently come
under the umbrella term “flexible working hours”. If flexibility means the option for
workers to optimally allocate a fixed number of working hours across time, it will always
be weakly beneficial. However, if fixed hours are replaced by a defined output which
will take an a priori uncertain amount of time to produce, working hours could be un-
predictable even without employers having the right to directly vary them. This would
expose workers to an additional risk of lost home production and these arrangements
would therefore be particularly unattractive to risk-averse workers.
Non-participating women in our sample are more risk-averse than employed women,
which is consistent with a participation cost risk. Our survey specifically asks workers
for their reservation wages for a job in which they would be free to allocate their working
hours across time. We are therefore able to focus specifically on worker-led flexibility.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Analysis
To analyse preferences for schedule autonomy, we use the SOEP 2010 pretest, a survey
of just over 1300 respondents which includes a module of questions on labour market
search, including preferences and reservation wages conditional on job characteristics
as well as risk attitudes and a range of demographic and labour market characteristics.
Jänsch and Siegel [2012] give details on the sampling method and structure. While
the sampling strategy mirrors the main SOEP panel, the sample is distinct from the
one used for the panel study and purely cross-sectional. Unlike the main panel sample
which surveys all household members, the sample primarily centres on an individual
and provides only limited household information. The sample is close to representative
in terms of gender, employment, marital status and education, but there is a degree of
over-representation of individuals aged 50 or over.
The key variables in our analysis are the questions on reservation wages:
“The decision whether someone accepts a job offer or not may depend on different sur-
rounding conditions. I am going to give you different surrounding conditions a position
may have. Please indicate for every case how high your net income would have to be
for you to take the position that is offered. How how would your net income have to be
to take the offered position if . . .
• . . . the new position had a fixed end of daily working time?
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Table 16: Summary statistics for the whole labour force and estimation subsamples
With non-missing WTP Whole Labour Force
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
WTP for Schedule Autonomy 59.848 456.455
as % of fixed-schedule RW .01055 .1174
Vocational 0.657 0.475 0.616 0.487
Academic 0.212 0.409 0.204 0.403
Age 43.19 11.95 43.83 13.42
Married (Binary) 0.526 0.500 0.525 0.500
Civil Servant 0.0299 0.171 0.0468 0.211
Not Full-time 0.348 0.477 0.446 0.497
From GDR 0.256 0.437 0.209 0.407
Gender 0.558 0.497 0.552 0.498
Children <16 in Household 0.331 0.471 0.306 0.461
Willingness to take Risks 5.015 2.397 4.936 2.459
Support from Workplace Network 0.214 0.410 0.190 0.393
Partner’s support 0.421 0.494 0.370 0.483
Other family support 0.150 0.357 0.167 0.373
Fixed 0.409 0.492 0.418 0.494
Shifts 0.262 0.440 0.225 0.418
Informal 0.162 0.369 0.188 0.391
Flexitime 0.167 0.373 0.169 0.375
Observations 468 855
WTP excludes one observation with a -900% willingness to pay. All remaining observations are between
-66% and +100%. Willingness to Take Risks on a 0-10 scale. “Not full-time” includes part-time and
marginal employment.
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• . . . you did not had a formal working pattern but could adjust your schedule in a
flexible way?”
The question immediately preceding this one asks about the reservation wage for a
new job which “. . . was the same as your current job in its other aspects, that is, it had
the same hours, same degree of flexibility and same commute?”. While it stresses three
attributes, the question suggests that the respondent hold constant the whole bundle of
other attributes. It is plausible that they will apply the same logic to the questions we
use. We therefore interpret the two reservation wages as varying only the dimension of
schedule autonomy and keeping all other aspects of the job identical to the current job.
Over a third of employed survey respondents (36%) do not answer at least one of the
two reservation wage questions necessary to calculate a willingness to pay. There are no
significant differences in propensity to answer both reservation wage questions by gender.
Respondents with missing reservation wages are more educated, with the difference
significant at the 10% level for both secondary and post-secondary education. They
are also five years older on average, have larger incomes by e700 and are significantly
less likely to have children under the age of 16 living in their household. A possible
explanation is that, having accumulated a large amount of specialised human capital,
these individuals are at a point in their career where they would be extremely unwilling
to move to another job at all. Some of the missing reservation wages could thus represent
“infinite” reservation wages. Civil servants are less likely to give reservation wages. This
could be related to the low variance in the distribution of schedule autonomy within
many civil-service careers, which may make these workers feel the scenario is not relevant
to them. However, there are a number of competing explanations: the hypothetical
scenario could be confusing to respondents, they may refuse to engage with it or be
unwilling to disclose their reservation wages. The questions are significantly longer
and more complex than many other questions in the survey, which may discourage
respondents. It is therefore not possible to reliably infer that, for example, missing
reservation wages must be larger than other reservation wages.
The gap between reservation wages for a job with and without schedule autonomy is
a measure of workers’ willingness to pay. Controlling for a range of demographic char-
acteristics, this measure significantly predicts preferences over fixed and autonomous
scheduling of working hours elicited using more traditional ordinal preference scales. A
high willingness to pay for schedule autonomy moreover strongly predicts workers work-
ing under a flexitime scheme at their current employer in a probit regression, showing
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Figure 1: Distribution of willingness to pay measure
that reported reservation wages are predictive of real labour market choices.
Table 16 gives descriptive statistics. Conditional on strict positivity, mean willing-
ness to pay for schedule autonomy is substantial at 16%. However, a large fraction
of respondents reports the same reservation wage for jobs with and without schedule
autonomy (see Figure 1). The implication that there is substantial heterogeneity in
preferences is in line with other recent evidence [Mas and Pallais, 2017] from the ex-
perimental literature for workers in the US. On average, workers who prefer flexitime
schedules are more risk-averse than other workers with the difference significant at the
5% level. However, this is mainly (in the case of male workers, entirely) due to the
contrast with those workers who prefer shift work or complete independence. In con-
trast, those who prefer a fixed schedule are similarly risk-averse to those who prefer a
flexitime schedule. Workers who prefer to have complete schedule autonomy, as well as
those who are actually observed in such a schedule type, are the most risk-loving. This
suggests that, as I outlined above, the flexible hours generated by such schemes are not
predictable, a cost which may outweigh the advantage of autonomy for many workers.
Some of the management literature has argued that line manager support is a crucial
determinant of the impact of “family-friendly” workplace practices on worker satisfac-
tion [Beauregard and Henry, 2009]. In a similar vein, a recent inquiry of the Women
and Equalities Select Committee was told, “One of the important things we need to
understand is that flexible working itself is not necessarily an answer. It is a useful
tool, but we are talking about workplace culture.”[Jackson, 2017]. Contrary to this, we
find that descriptively, workers who state that their co-workers or managers support
their career give a lower willingness to pay for schedule autonomy, with the difference
56
significant at the ten percent level overall and at the 0.1% level when the sub-samples
are restricted to those workers with a positive willingness to pay. Workplace network
support may act as a substitute for formal schedule autonomy provisions such as a flex-
itime scheme, if it allows workers to informally negotiate changes in their schedule or
workload in response to home productivity fluctuations.
2.3 Estimation and Discussion
Table 17: Parameter estimates from a hedonic regression model (OLS)
Gross Monthly Wage
Age 9.576∗ (1.68)





Civil Servant 836.1∗∗ (2.42)
Not Full-time -1491.0∗∗∗ (-10.26)
East German -741.3∗∗∗ (-5.03)
Female -461.1∗∗∗ (-2.94)
Children 305.8 (1.42)






t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. “Flexitime” refers to a formal
scheme with some restrictions, e.g. core hours. “Informal” refers to complete worker autonomy over
scheduling. “Not full-time” includes part-time and marginal employment. “East German” refers to the
respondent’s place of residence before reunification. “Children” are children under the age of 16 living
the respondent’s household.
In a hedonic regression of observed wages (table 17), workers with flexitime schemes
earn a large and significant premium compared to workers with fixed schedules. Worker
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willingness to pay thus does not even come close to coinciding with the market wage
premium, with the discrepancy potentially due to worker or firm heterogeneity or search
frictions [Hwang et al., 1992, 1998].
As in Mas and Pallais [2017], most workers in our sample do not give a positive
willingness to pay for schedule autonomy: A large fraction of workers reports a zero
willingness to pay, and a small group reports a negative willingness to pay. There are a
range of reasons why we might observe a zero willingness to pay, including rounding and
the cost of cognitive effort. Workers may also legitimately have a zero or even negative
willingness to pay. Whilst in a classical model, workers can never have a negative
willingness to pay for what is effectively an additional degree of freedom, the cost of
decision-making or self-commitment issues [Tan, 2019] may actually mean that some
workers are willing to pay to have a schedule imposed externally. To deal with the spike
of willingness to pay at zero as well as reduce the impact of outliers and functional
form assumptions, our preferred specification is an ordered probit model (table 18).
To estimate this model, we group responses into five categories of negative, zero, low
(willingness to pay of up to 8% of the reservation wage), intermediate (up to 20%) and
high (20% or more). Apart from the zero category (47% of all employed workers), these
are similarly sized groups.
As we would expect from the theoretical discussion, women with children give a
higher willingness to pay. Among childless workers, on the other hand, men state a
higher willingness to pay than women. People with a vocational qualification give a
higher willingness to pay than people without post-school qualifications or university
graduates. Risk-loving workers state a higher willingness to pay than moderately risk-
averse workers. There is no significant difference between moderately and highly risk-
averse workers and when interaction terms are included, results suggest that the effect
is driven by women and workers with children. One in five workers (but one in four
women workers) is classed as highly risk averse.
Even though the questionnaire clearly asks about worker- rather than employer-led
flexibility, task-based work with schedule autonomy may still generate risks associated
with unpredictable hours, as discussed above. It is also possible that risk preferences
are not stable across different domains, as the psychological literature has suggested, in
which case the risk aversion question may inaccurately reflect the relevant preferences.
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Table 18: Parameter estimates from an ordered probit specification of willingness to
pay (main model) and extension with expectations (subsection 2.3.3)
Willingness to pay for schedule autonomy
Age 0.00731 (1.24) 0.00835 (1.38)
Married (Binary) -0.179 (-1.24) -0.117 (-0.79)
Vocational 0.392∗∗ (2.09) 0.430∗∗ (2.24)
Academic 0.159 (0.71) 0.196 (0.86)
Self-Employed 0.0658 (0.30) -0.0616 (-0.27)
White-Collar 0.0420 (0.27) -0.0210 (-0.13)
Civil Servant -0.461 (-1.28) -0.707∗ (-1.85)
Not Full-time 0.124 (0.86) 0.0920 (0.63)
East German -0.0596 (-0.44) -0.0219 (-0.16)
Female -0.275∗ (-1.82) -0.299∗ (-1.92)
Children -0.329 (-1.63) -0.350∗ (-1.70)
Female × Children 0.550∗∗ (2.16) 0.610∗∗ (2.34)
Risk Aversion: High 0.164 (0.95) 0.190 (1.08)
Low 0.267∗∗ (2.07) 0.271∗∗ (2.02)
Workplace Support 0.0809 (0.58) -0.0121 (-0.08)
Partner’s support 0.377∗∗∗ (2.70) 0.403∗∗∗ (2.83)
Other family support 0.211 (1.14) 0.358∗ (1.87)
Expected: Shifts 0.0618 (0.40)
Informal 0.0998 (0.56)
Flexitime 0.390∗∗ (2.33)
Constant 1 -0.619∗ (-1.94) -0.473 (-1.44)
Constant 2 1.713∗∗∗ (5.22) 1.925∗∗∗ (5.64)
Constant 3 1.989∗∗∗ (6.01) 2.213∗∗∗ (6.42)
Constant 4 2.505∗∗∗ (7.37) 2.696∗∗∗ (7.64)
Observations 443 431
t-values in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. “Not full-time” includes part-time and
marginal employment. “East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before reunification.
“Children” are children under the age of 16 living the respondent’s household.
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2.3.1 Willingness to Pay and Ordinal Preference Scales
A comparison with ordinal-scale preference measures, which are also included in the
dataset, is instructive. We compare preferences on a 1-7 scale for three schedule types:
a fixed schedule, worker-led independent scheduling and a structured flexitime scheme.
Table 19 shows a probit regression where the outcome is a schedule type being weakly
preferred to all others, with the sample restricted to the sub-sample giving reservation
wages. The estimates indicate no difference between parents and childless workers and
a strong preference of university graduates for worker-led schedules.
These differences between ordinal preferences and willingness to pay can be explained
by different marginal utilities of the wage. The pattern is consistent with mothers hav-
ing a lower marginal utility of the wage, for example due to specialisation. This could
explain their higher willingness to pay compared to fathers and childless women, even
with the same preferences for schedule autonomy. In the case of university graduates,
their jobs may also vary more over other dimensions such as prestige or task content.
Respondents would then struggle to give reservation wages for the parsimonious scenar-
ios in the study and may default to giving equal reservation wages, even though they
have a strong preference for schedule autonomy.
So although willingness to pay predicts sorting into schedule types and ordinal pref-
erence measures, it still is a distinct concept from ordinal preference measures. Not
all workers who express a preference for a schedule type would be willing to trade off
wages to achieve it as their marginal utilities from the wage also differ. Moreover, in a
reference point framework, losses are more painful than gains are pleasant - this would
make workers less willing to make a trade-off that takes them below their reference
wage, even if it would leave them better off in terms of pure experienced utility. We
will discuss this possibility further in subsection 2.3.3.
2.3.2 Complementarities
Workers who report that their partners support their career or educational progress are
significantly more likely to report a higher willingness to pay for schedule autonomy.
We interpret this finding as an indication that schedule autonomy is complementary to
other support. This is consistent with home production requiring complementary time
inputs from other members of the household. The effect is not driven purely by women
or by workers with children.
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Table 19: Parameter estimates from probit models of the preferred schedule type on
an ordinal preference scale
Fixed, constant Flexitime Informal
Age 0.000648 (0.10) -0.00926 (-1.46) 0.0111 (1.60)
Married (Binary) 0.0724 (0.46) 0.0765 (0.49) 0.00749 (0.04)
Vocational -0.0241 (-0.12) 0.147 (0.73) 0.116 (0.53)
Academic -0.730∗∗∗ (-2.97) 0.592∗∗ (2.44) 0.579∗∗ (2.28)
Self-Employed -0.621∗∗∗ (-2.60) -0.00682 (-0.03) 0.756∗∗∗ (3.13)
White-Collar -0.215 (-1.27) 0.0313 (0.19) -0.0817 (-0.46)
Civil Servant -0.101 (-0.24) 0.241 (0.57) -0.402 (-0.88)
Not Full-time -0.187 (-1.18) 0.201 (1.29) 0.461∗∗∗ (2.80)
East German -0.00430 (-0.03) 0.160 (1.10) -0.0457 (-0.30)
Female 0.0817 (0.49) -0.223 (-1.38) -0.403∗∗ (-2.27)
Children 0.195 (0.86) 0.0360 (0.16) -0.121 (-0.51)
Female × Children -0.376 (-1.33) -0.0786 (-0.28) 0.408 (1.37)
Risk Aversion: High -0.00144 (-0.01) 0.211 (1.13) -0.142 (-0.70)
Risk Aversion: Low -0.213 (-1.52) -0.0272 (-0.20) 0.0763 (0.52)
Support: Workplace -0.199 (-1.29) 0.133 (0.87) 0.0320 (0.20)
Partner’s support -0.0767 (-0.50) -0.123 (-0.81) 0.102 (0.63)
Other family support 0.00107 (0.01) 0.139 (0.70) 0.0864 (0.41)
Constant 0.702∗∗ (2.02) 0.124 (0.37) -1.255∗∗∗ (-3.34)
Observations 439 433 432
t-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Outcome in column k: Schedule type
k is weakly preferred to all others. Sample restricted to individuals with non-missing willingness to
pay. “Flexitime” refers to a formal scheme with some restrictions e.g. core hours, “informal” refers to
complete worker autonomy over scheduling. “Not full-time” includes part-time and marginal employ-
ment. “East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before reunification. “Children” are
children under the age of 16 living the respondent’s household.
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There are potentially important implications for public and workplace policy design.
State and market resources may be insufficient to allow workers to fully exploit the
benefits of schedule autonomy if they cannot rely on support from their partner. A
report by Ruggeri and Bird [2014] for the European Union Programme for Employment
and Social Solidarity based on 2010 labour force surveys shows that among 22 EU
member states, Germany has the highest employment gap between young single mothers
and young single childless women, who are also substantially more likely to be working
full-time. The report specifically calls upon policy makers to consider the role of schedule
autonomy in these discrepancies. Although we only observe a small number of single
parents, our results on the importance of partners’ support nevertheless suggest that
schedule autonomy alone may not be enough to allow these workers to reconcile the
demands of employment and household production.
2.3.3 Expectations and Reference Points
Reference points could influence both the underlying reservation wages and their re-
porting. Reference points can affect real job search decisions if workers’ utility is asym-
metrical over gains and losses both in terms of schedule autonomy and of wages. In
addition to psychological loss aversion, this may also be due to spending commitments
and arrangements for childcare and other home production that are costly to change.
We find that workers who, based on the standard conditions in their sector, would ex-
pect to find a job with a flexitime arrangement in the event of a job change are much
more likely to report a higher willingness to pay for schedule autonomy than those who
expect other kinds of schedule arrangements (table 18).
Since Kőszegi and Rabin [2006] proposed using (rational) expectations as a measure
of reference points, they have been used in many applications, including labour market
applications such as income targeting. Intuitively, expectations are a better measure
of reference points than the status quo: A worker who has been promised or otherwise
expects a wage increase will consider a continuation of the status quo a disappointment
because her reference wage is above her current wage. As in other applications, the
status quo and expectations about future schedule types in our sample are correlated,
but not identical: Close to half of workers currently on flexitime schemes and about a
quarter of those on fixed schedules would expect a new job to have a different schedule
arrangement to the one they are currently subject to. Interpreting our finding through
this lens, workers who expect to find a job with a flexitime system would consider a
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Table 20: Parameter estimates from an ordered probit model of the effects of earned
wages and schedule types on loyalty
Loyal to Employer
Age 0.00192 (0.33)




Civil Servant 0.550 (1.51)
Not Full-time 0.288∗ (1.69)
East German 0.0885 (0.56)
Gender 0.0322 (0.22)




None of the above 0.828 (1.31)
Wage -0.0000457 (-0.71)
Constant 1 -0.997∗∗∗ (-3.12)
Constant 2 -0.261 (-0.84)
Constant 3 0.133 (0.43)
Constant 4 0.711∗∗ (2.28)
Observations 342
t statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Loyalty is self-reported on a 1-5 scale.
Wages are gross wages. Excludes self-employed workers.“Not full-time” includes part-time and marginal
employment. “East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before reunification.
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job with a fixed schedule as a loss, which would generate negative gain-loss utility in
addition to the loss in experienced utility from the fixed schedule itself. This increases
their willingness to pay.
Reference point effects could also affect rates of job-to-job mobility. To see this,
consider the search model we discussed in subsection 2.1 with two-dimensional jobs
consisting of a wage w and a job attribute x. Subject to stationarity conditions, a
worker currently in job (w, x) should accept any offer (w?, x?) that provides greater
instantaneous utility u(w?, x?) than the current job.
A special case of this model is one where the worker’s utility incorporates reference
points in the manner of Kőszegi and Rabin [2006]. They argue that the reference point
consists of the subject’s expectations in the recent past. In the case of voluntary job-
to-job mobility, it is not unrealistic to suppose that the reference point is the current
job, since the worker would have to actively give that job up to take a new one.
In that case, the instantaneous utility of quitting a job (w, x) in order to accept a
new job offer (w?, x?) would be
u(w?, x?|r) = m(w?, x?) + n(w?, x?|r)
= m(w?, x?) + µ[m(w?, x?)−mx(w, x)]
where m(·) denotes experienced utility and n(·) denotes gain-loss utility with respect to
the reference point r, which in this case corresponds to the current job (w, x).
Compare this model to a simpler one without reference point effects, where u(w?, x?) =
m(w?, x?). In the case of job offers which offer both a higher (lower) wage and a better
(worse) attribute, both models make identical predictions about the acceptance (re-
jection) decision. But in cases where there is a trade-off to be made, the two models
differ.12 Because of loss aversion, formalised as assumption A2 in Kőszegi and Ra-
bin [2006], workers in the reference point model will reject some offers that would be
accepted in the standard model.13
12Note that this distinguishes this explanation from a general mobility cost, which would discourage
all transitions with a low gain, whether this gain results from a slightly favourable trade-off or small
improvements in both the wage and the attribute.
13Assumption A2 [Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006] states that for any y > x > 0, µ(y) + µ(−y) < µ(x) +
µ(−x). The sequence (µ(1/n))n∈N is therefore increasing. By continuity of µ and µ(0) = 0, µ(y) +
µ(−y) < 0.
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This is because if the offer is rejected without reference points,
m(w?, x?) < m(w, x)
⇒ µ[m(w?, x?)−m(w, x)] < 0 by monotonicity of µ
i.e. gain-loss utility would make the offer even less attractive. So an offer that is
rejected on the basis of experienced utility is a fortiori rejected once reference points
are taken into account.
However, some offers that would be accepted in the standard model would be re-
jected in the reference point model, due to negative gain-loss utility outweighing gains
in experienced utility. As a simple example, consider an additively separable utility
function: u(w?, x?|r) = mw(w?) + µ[mw(w?)−mw(w)] + mx(x?) + µ[mx(x?)−mx(x)]
and a job offer (w?, x?) which in terms of experienced utility leaves the worker just
slightly better off: mw(w
?)+mx(x
?) = mw(w)+mx(x)+ ε for some ε > 0. Let the gain
be asymmetrical, i.e. a wage loss is more than compensated for by a better attribute:
mw(w
?)−mw(w) < 0 < mx(x?)−mx(x). The worker without a reference point would
accept this offer. But in a reference point model, we can choose an ε sufficiently small
such that µ[mw(w
?)−mw(w)] + µ[mx(x?)−mx(x)] < −ε < 0.
The set of acceptable job offers with reference points is therefore a true subset of
the set of acceptable offers in the corresponding simple additive-utility model without
reference points.
It is interesting to note that workers who report having an informal schedule arrange-
ment do not have a similarly high willingness to pay as those on flexitime schemes. In
part, this may be due to the heterogeneous nature of this group. But informal schedule
arrangements may also be associated with more uncertainty over working hours and
not deliver the same benefits in terms of additional home production as formal flexitime
schemes. In the UK, Bryan and Sevilla [2017] find that whereas flexitime increases
couples’ ability to coordinate their schedules, other types of flexible working does not.
With regard to effects on reporting rather than actual willingness to pay, the first
reservation wage elicited in the survey is one for the same schedule as in the current
job. This wage could act as a reference point in the interview and workers, especially
those who currently work fixed hours, may be averse to reducing the reservation wage
they state in subsequent questions.
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Table 21: Parameter estimates from an ordered probit model of the effects of earned
wages and schedule types on perceived fairness of wage
Fairness of Current Wage
Age -0.0224∗∗∗ (-3.99)




Civil Servant 0.121 (0.39)
Not Full-time 0.296∗ (1.88)
East German -0.347∗∗ (-2.36)
Gender 0.0327 (0.24)
Children <16 in Household -0.311∗∗ (-2.28)





Constant 1 -1.912∗∗∗ (-6.01)
Constant 2 -1.618∗∗∗ (-5.17)
Constant 3 -1.023∗∗∗ (-3.33)
Constant 4 -0.573∗ (-1.88)
Constant 5 -0.273 (-0.90)
Constant 6 1.507∗∗∗ (4.76)
Constant 7 1.753∗∗∗ (5.41)
Constant 8 2.649∗∗∗ (5.84)
Observations 345
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Ordered Probit. Fairness rating and
earned wages both refer to gross wages. Excludes self-employed workers. “Not full-time” includes part-
time and marginal employment. “East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before
reunification.
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2.3.4 Fairness and Effort
Akerlof and Yellen [1990] introduced the fair wage-effort hypothesis, which postulates
that when wages fall short of a reference point in employment situations with imperfect
monitoring, workers provide less effort. The hypothesis originates with the sociological
gift exchange paradigm. An employer’s decision to pay wages below the reference wage
is interpreted as a hostile act capable of triggering retaliation.
Table 22: Parameter estimates from a probit model of the effects of earned wages and
schedule types on perceived fairness of the wage in the main SOEP
Pooled Pooled Random Effects
Current Wage Fair
Age -0.00249∗ -0.00284∗ -0.00267
(-2.69) (-3.06) (-1.45)
Married 0.0547∗ 0.0550∗ 0.0555
(2.81) (2.83) (1.48)
Vocational -0.0794∗ -0.0802∗ -0.145
(-2.82) (-2.84) (-2.57)
Academic -0.259∗∗∗ -0.264∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗
(-7.47) (-7.59) (-6.04)
White-Collar 0.0295 0.0304 0.0706
(1.44) (1.48) (1.89)
Civil Servant 0.260∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗
(7.35) (7.20) (6.37)
Part-Time 0.538∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(21.13) (20.69) (15.73)
East German -0.308∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗
(-16.39) (-16.11) (-12.93)
Female 0.0770∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
(3.82) (4.09) (4.16)
Children -0.0134 -0.0147 -0.0247
(-0.71) (-0.78) (-0.63)
Wage 0.000241∗∗∗ 0.000254∗∗∗ 0.000333∗∗∗
(16.58) (14.22) (10.63)
Wage Squared -4.61e-09∗ -8.03e-10 1.78e-09
(-3.19) (-0.42) (0.54)
Shifts -0.131∗∗∗ -0.101 -0.184∗
(-6.29) (-2.48) (-2.92)
Informal 0.165∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(6.24) (8.91) (7.28)
Flexitime 0.150∗∗∗ 0.159∗ 0.216∗
(6.52) (3.09) (2.58)
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Year=2007 -0.252∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗
(-12.05) (-12.03) (-14.44)
Year=2009 -0.117∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(-5.25) (-5.21) (-5.76)
Year=2011 -0.0995∗∗∗ -0.1000∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(-4.14) (-4.15) (-4.47)
Shifts × Wage -0.0000152 0.0000116
(-0.89) (0.44)
Informal × Wage -0.0000925∗∗∗ -0.000112∗∗∗
(-6.20) (-4.63)
Flexitime × Wage -0.0000145 -0.0000179
(-0.86) (-0.65)





Observations 27349 27349 27349
t statistics in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.001, ∗∗∗ p < 0.0001. Excludes the self-employed.
“Wage” is the gross monthly wage. “East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before
reunification in 1989. “Children” are children under the age of 16 living in the respondent’s household.
This implies that, in addition to the reservation wage which determines job offer accep-
tance, there is a second important wage threshold, that of the “fair” reference wage.
Parts of the literature [Falk et al., 2006, for example] have used the two concepts inter-
changeably and postulated that workers would reject offers they consider to be unfair.
Certainly, the set of unacceptable wages would be a subset of the set of unfairly low
wages. However, the Akerlof-Yellen model specifically focuses on workers who are em-
ployed, so their wage must be above their reservation wage, but potentially below their
reference wage. This is consistent with a descriptive analysis of our data: When asked
to place their current gross wage on an eleven-point scale between “unfairly low” and
“unfairly high”, only just over half (52%) of respondents state that their wage is equal
to or more than the fair wage, which leaves a very substantial minority who perceive
their wages to fall in the interval between the reservation wage and the fair wage.
In the original model, only the wage enters the effort provision decision. However,
it seems likely that workers would also consider other job attributes to gauge whether
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Figure 2: Probit marginal effects from specification (3) in table 22 for a woman at the
25th, 50th and 75th wage percentile, of median age (45), with all discrete covariates set
at their mode.
the job as a bundle provided by the employer should be interpreted as a “friendly”
or a “hostile” action, if these attributes are costly for the employer to provide. This is
analogous to the extension of the reservation wage to a reservation utility and can equally
generate a willingness to pay, namely the marginal rate of substitution between the wage
and the job attribute at the reference utility. Depending on the shape of the utility
function, this substitution rate could be the same or different from the substitution rate
at the reservation utility.
Testable predictions of the fair job offer-effort hypothesis Our data does not
give a direct measure of this trade-off. However, we can test a number of predictions
of this extended fair wage-effort hypothesis, which we will hereafter refer to as the fair
job offer-effort hypothesis. Table 20 shows that workers on flexitime schedules report
a greater sense of loyalty towards their company, which is consistent with the theory
of gift exchange and would be expected to reduce shirking, one of the predictions of
Akerlof and Yellen [1990].
Moreover, if there is a trade-off between the wage and job attributes in the reference
utility, a given wage is more likely to be considered fair if it is accompanied by a
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Table 23: Parameter estimates from a probit model of the effects of earned wages and
schedule types on self-reported effort
Effort Effort
Wage 0.0000408 (0.95) 0.00000503 (0.08)
Schedule: Shifts 0.322∗∗ (2.26) 0.276∗ (1.88)
Informal 0.193 (0.87) 0.175 (0.76)
Flexitime 0.326∗ (1.88) 0.287 (1.59)
Other 0.549 (1.00) 0.556 (0.99)
Age -0.00553 (-1.01)
Married (Binary) 0.0135 (0.10)
Vocational 0.497∗∗∗ (3.00)
Academic 0.633∗∗∗ (2.84)
Civil Servant -0.196 (-0.65)
Not Full-time -0.0881 (-0.56)
East German 0.00562 (0.04)
Gender 0.163 (1.23)
Children -0.0424 (-0.30)
Constant 1 -1.876∗∗∗ (-10.66) -1.785∗∗∗ (-5.97)
Constant 2 -1.276∗∗∗ (-9.57) -1.164∗∗∗ (-4.23)
Constant 3 -0.730∗∗∗ (-6.02) -0.610∗∗ (-2.26)
Constant 4 0.306∗∗∗ (2.60) 0.455∗ (1.69)
Observations 374 372
t statistics in parentheses ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Ordered Probit. Excludes the
self-employed. “Wage” is the gross monthly wage. “Not full-time” includes part-time and marginal
employment. “East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before reunification in 1989.
“Children” are children under the age of 16 living in the respondent’s household.
favourable job attribute. In our case, this would mean that workers with schedule
autonomy would achieve their reference utility with a lower wage than those with a
fixed schedule. Table 21 shows an ordered probit model of the fairness rating (on an
eleven-point scale) of workers’ own gross wage. Workers on flexitime schedules are less
likely to consider their gross wage unfairly low, given the actual wage they are earning.
This finding can be substantiated by the main SOEP panel, which contains a binary
indicator of whether respondents consider their current wage to be fair. This loses some
information, but the greater sample size enables much more precise coefficient estimates.
63% of respondents assess their own wage to be fair, whereas in the pretest, only 53%
choose a non-negative rating on the 11-point scale, representing an exactly fair or more
than fair wage. This could represent differences between the two samples, but could
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also mean that some of those rating their wage as slightly too low to be fair would still
answer yes to the binary question.
Table 24: Share of flexitime work by worker and job characteristics in the Pretest and
main panel
Pretest Main Pretest Main
Age Group Sector
20-30 0.14 0.17 Industrial 0.1 0.068
30-40 0.22 0.21 White-Collar 0.23 0.26
40-50 0.21 0.21 Civil Servant 0.28 0.33
50-60 0.18 0.2 Full-time 0.21 0.21
60 and over 0.27 0.16 Others 0.18 0.13
Marital Status East German 0.22 0.18
Not married 0.21 0.18 Others 0.19 0.2
Married 0.18 0.19 Gender
Post-School Education Male 0.23 0.2
None 0.12 0.089 Female 0.17 0.18
Vocational 0.17 0.17 Children 0.22 0.21
Academic 0.34 0.28 No children 0.19 0.18
Observations 593 92,639
Excludes the self-employed and respondents who are students or pensioners as their primary status.
“East German” refers to the respondent’s place of residence before reunification in 1989. “Other than
full-time” includes part-time and marginal employment “Children” are children under the age of 16
living in the respondent’s household.
Furthermore, although the necessary variables only overlap for four out of the 31
waves of SOEP, the panel structure allows us to account for unobserved heterogeneity
in this model. Table 22 firstly shows results for an near-equivalent model to the one
estimated on the Pretest sample. Making use of the greater sample size and panel
structure, the effect of the wage is subsequently allowed to vary by schedule type and a
panel model with random effects. Image 2 shows that flexitime workers are substantially
more likely to consider their wage fair, as are workers who have complete schedule
autonomy without a formal arrangement (note that self-employed workers are excluded
from this model). The effect for flexitime workers is remarkably stable across the wage
distribution, whereas for workers without a formal schedule arrangement, the effect
is largest for low wages. Wages among workers with informal schedule arrangements
are higher on average and more dispersed than for other workers, such that the 75th
percentile of all wages (the “high” wage in the graph) remains below the mean for
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workers on informal schedules.
The hypothesis would also predict that given their wage, workers on flexitime sched-
ules will exert more effort. Our dataset provides some categorical information on effort.
Its distribution is highly skewed: 87 % of respondents say they rather agree or com-
pletely agree with the statement that they go above and beyond the required level of
effort. The descriptive evidence supports the fair job offer-effort hypothesis: Given their
wage, flexitime workers are more likely to report exerting more effort than their job de-
scription requires in order to support their firm. The effect is significant (p=0.06) in an
ordered probit model controlling for the wage and schedule type, but loses significance
(p=0.11) once we additionally control for workers’ demographic characteristics such as
age, education and marital status (table 23).
The prevalence of flexitime work varies widely across these dimensions (table 24),
likely reflecting a combination of preference-based sorting and different offer distribu-
tions. Workers on shifts also exert significantly more effort, which cannot easily be
explained by the fair job offer-effort hypothesis. We do not have information on re-
spondents’ occupation, but it is likely that shift workers include a high proportion of
pro-social occupations such as medical professionals, police officers, fire fighters, etc.
Workers in these occupations are likely to have a high degree of intrinsic motivation
leading to high effort levels, independently of wages and job characteristics.
Conclusion
We have used an innovative survey data set including reservation wages conditional on
schedule type to study differences in willingness to pay for schedule autonomy. We have
shown that gender, parenthood, education and career support by one’s partner matter
for willingness to pay and that willingness to pay measures a related but distinct concept
from pure preference. Theory suggests that if certain time inputs normally allocated
towards market work are very productive in home production or if productivity in home
production fluctuates, workers will benefit most from schedule autonomy. This is a likely
mechanism behind the result that women with children exhibit a high willingness to pay.
We have also found some evidence of reference points affecting worker’s evaluations
of wage-schedule type dyads at the offer acceptance and effort margins. Additional data
collection efforts, ideally combining external measures of effort with the information on
wages and schedule autonomy we used, could throw additional light on this relationship.
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Similarly, given the results on differences between mothers and childless women, panel
data that would allow an analysis of changes in willingness to pay around childbirth
would be promising.
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3 Have Minimum Wages Affected Schedule Flexibility in the UK?
Additional acknowledgements: I am grateful to Helen Simpson and workshop and semi-
nar participants at the Office for National Statistics, the University of Bristol and Royal
Holloway, University of London for helpful comments, and to the Economic and Social
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In this paper, I examine the effect of eleven increases in the prevailing minimum wage
rate for adult workers14 in the United Kingdom on schedule amenities and disamenities.
It is intuitive that a binding minimum wage might affect the distribution of on non-
wage amenities, including schedule types valued by workers, among employed workers
if employers attempt to keep the value of the overall job bundle constant.
However, previous theoretical and applied work have shown that compensating dif-
ferentials for non-wage amenities are often absent or wrong-signed in markets with
search frictions [Hwang et al., 1998, Bonhomme and Jolivet, 2009]. The introduction
or increase of a minimum wage causes a wage change that is exogenous to worker pro-
ductivity, and more exogenous to firm productivity than most other wage variation.
Therefore, this application has the potential to generate interesting insights on the
wage-amenity relationship in markets with low worker bargaining power.
Moreover, there are several reasons why this margin is an important one for policy
makers to consider: Firstly, if employers respond to higher minimum wages by reducing
job quality along non-wage dimensions, this unintended consequence could hurt the very
workers that the minimum wage is intended to help.
Secondly, if preferences over wages and non-wage amenities are heterogeneous, an
increase in the wage and compensating deterioration in an amenity would have a par-
ticularly negative effect on workers with a high willingness to pay for these amenities.
This is especially important in the case of flexible schedules, the amenity I focus on in
this paper. A growing literature shows that worker valuation for schedule flexibility is
heterogeneous and the marginal worker has a substantial willingness to pay [Mas and
Pallais, 2017]. If minimum wage legislation reduces the provision of flexible schedule
types that are costly to employers, this would have a disproportionate impact on workers
with a high valuation for those schedules, including women with caring responsibilities.
Thirdly, the scope for “consolidating” additional payments and job amenities into
14ten upratings of the National Minimum Wage and the introduction of the National Living Wage
74
base wages is likely to decrease with further increases in the minimum wage’s bite [Neu-
mark, 2018], since most job attributes are constrained from below by law, nature or
both. If this adjustment margin is very important when a minimum wage is first intro-
duced or when it is increased from a low level, then this is one reason to expect stronger
employment impacts for subsequent increases at higher levels, when these options have
been exhausted. This is becoming increasingly relevant as the policy debate in the US
as well as in Europe is seriously considering much more substantial minimum wage in-
creases than in the recent past. In particular, both major parties’ platforms in the 2019
UK General Election included a commitment to increasing the National Living Wage to
beyond ten pounds an hour. Given the evidence that compensating differentials often
do not arise in markets with search frictions, it is not certain a priori whether we should
expect an effect of an increase in wage costs on job attributes.
What is more, some contributors to policy debates around the minimum wage argue
that the effect could go in the opposite direction. This argument is based on multiple
equilibria, with minimum wages allowing policymakers to select a “good” equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, a more productive set of firms offer jobs that are both higher-paid
and have better attributes. In this case, the effect on job attributes would strengthen
the case for the minimum wage. In summary, the effect of minimum wage policies on
job attributes is an essential and under-researched part of a comprehensive evaluation of
its (re-)distributive effects, as well as providing an interesting source of wage variation
to study the wage-amenity trade-off.
In this paper, I use a well-established methodology to study effects of minimum
wage increases on an understudied, but potentially very important margin. I find that
in regions and industries most affected by increases in minimum wages in the UK,
schedule disamenities have become more prevalent. In particular, increases in the impact
of minimum wages are associated with the expansion of zero-hours contracts. There is
some evidence of a corresponding effect which decreases schedule amenities, but the
picture is less clear. The paper is structured as follows: The next section summarises
the existing literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the effects of a minimum
wage on job attributes. Section 3.2 presents potential mechanisms, which I expand
upon in an appendix (Section 3.3.3). Section 3.3 describes the sample, sets out the
empirical approach using a fixed-effects regression and a dynamic model and presents
contextualising results on wages and employment as well as the main results on schedule




Both traditionally and in the current literature, the focus of the minimum wage lit-
erature has been on employment and wages. Nevertheless, from the beginning of this
literature, there has also been an interest in other adjustment margins. These include
prices, capital, different types of labour inputs, quality [Giupponi and Machin, 2018]
and, most importantly for this paper, non-wage job attributes. Many early contri-
butions infer an effect on the utility provided by the whole job bundle from indirect
evidence on outcomes such as labour force participation, prices, application and quit
rates. Wessels [1980] argues that full compensation fell with minimum wage increases
in the US in the 1960s, based on an implicit assumption of a perfect market for job
attributes. In addition to indirect evidence from quit rates, prices and participation, he
also quotes a firm survey from New York where a large share of firms reported reducing
worker-friendly job attributes in response to an increase in a sector- and region-specific
minimum wage hike.
In contrast, Holzer et al. [1991] find that there is queuing for minimum-wage jobs,
which they interpret to mean that wage increases induced by the minimum wage are not
fully offset by a deterioration in job attributes. However, Sicilian and Grossberg [1993]
argue that this application behaviour is based on a misperception of job attributes on
the part of workers, who overestimate the overall utility from a job at the increased
minimum wage and only learn about the full vector of job characteristics when they are
already working.
Acemoglu [2001] conceptualises job quality somewhat differently: He presents a
model of a segmented labour market, where good jobs pay negotiated wages that include
rent sharing, but bad jobs pay low wages and are bound by the minimum wage. A higher
minimum wage increases the number of good jobs, as well as the value of unemployment.
A 1996 working paper version of the same paper included an empirical application where
he defined “good” jobs as jobs in occupations whose dummy has a positive coefficient
in a Mincer-type wage regression and analysed their share across states and time. He
finds that higher minimum wages increase the number of good jobs.
Amongst the wide range of specific attributes that are of interest, many researchers
have chosen to focus on minimum wage effects on employer-sponsored training. Here,
too, early work relied heavily on indirect evidence, especially experience-wage profiles, to
infer effects on training [Lazear and Miller, 1981, Hashimoto, 1982]. However, there are
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a number of competing explanations for their findings of flatter wage profiles, including
the possibility that minimum wages lead to a “frontloading” of the earnings path [Brown,
1999]. In addition to not being able to distinguish between these competing explanations
of reduced training on the one hand and a change in the earnings path which keeps
lifetime compensation constant, the methods used in this earlier part of the literature
are not able to account for search. Job attributes, firm and worker heterogeneity cannot
usually be disentangled.
The more recent empirical literature has therefore focused on direct measurement
of specific job attributes. The seminal paper by Card and Krueger [1994] includes
an analysis of free or discounted meals for fast-food industry workers - a very specific
non-wage amenity - and find no effect.
Health insurance and employer-provided pensions have also been studied in the US
context. Royalty [2000] studies the effect of state-level variation of minimum wages on
workers’ eligibility for health insurance and pensions between 1988 and 1993. She finds
that large increases, or increases at already high levels, lead to a decline in workers’ eligi-
bility for these benefits. Simon and Kaestner [2004] on the other hand, find no effect on
health insurance and pensions using different measures of coverage and variation in both
federal and state minimum wages over the period between 1979 and 2000. In a recent
contribution, Clemens et al. [2018] find that state-level minimum wage in the period
from 2011 to 2016 decreased the likelihood of individuals reporting employer-sponsored
health insurance plans. They use detailed occupational information to determine which
workers are most likely to be affected by minimum wage increases.
The literature on training has found mixed results for different institutional contexts
and time periods. Along with the rest of the minimum wage literature, much of the
work on the effects on non-wage job attributes has embraced difference-in-differences
strategies in the aftermath of Card and Krueger’s work. Neumark and Wascher [2001]
find a decrease in formal training of young workers in the US in 1991. In contrast,
Fairris and Pedace [2004], using firm-level variation in minimum wage bite in the US,
find no effect on training intensity in the US in 1997 and weak evidence of a reduction
in incidence.
In Europe, Schumann [2017] analyses the effect of the introduction of a sectoral
minimum wage in construction in Germany in 1997 on the provision of apprenticeships.
There is no possibility of a direct effect in this setting, only a spillover effect, or an
anticipation of reduced labour demand in the future. This is because the minimum
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wage under study applied to workers with a completed apprenticeship, rather than
incumbent or newly hired apprentices. The sectoral nature of the minimum wage lends
itself especially well to a difference-in-differences strategy. He finds a negative effect
on firms’ decision to train any apprentices, as well as on the number of apprentices
trained. Heterogeneity is important: The effects are much stronger in the East, where
the minimum wage bite was higher.
Arulampalam et al. [2004] find no evidence for a decrease in training caused by the
UK National Minimum Wage, and some evidence of an increase. Their difference-in-
differences strategy is based on workers’ position in the wage distribution or workers’
own reports of whether their wages were raised in response to the introduction of the
National Minimum Wage. This definition means that the treatment effect does not
include spillovers to workers whose wages may be indirectly affected by the minimum
wage. This, in addition to differences in institutions, could contribute to the difference
between their findings and those of Schumann [2017].
In the labour search literature, a number of economic models have set out effects of
minimum wages in segmented labour markets with “good” and “bad” jobs of varying
definitions, including Drazen [1986], Jones [1987], Acemoglu [2001] and Cahuc et al.
[2001]. Acemoglu’s model predicts an increase in good jobs in response to the intro-
duction of a minimum wage, whereas the other models make mixed or in some cases
no predictions. The framework set out by Clemens et al. [2018], which does not rely on
segmentation, also predict a reduction in amenity provision, at least for certain ranges.
Looking more specifically at the literature analysing the history of the UK National
Minimum Wage and National Living Wage, Papps and Gregg [2014] use wage gap
specifications in ASHE and the LFS to examine the effect of increases in the NMW
between 1997 and 2011 on labour market flows, as well as a wide range of job attributes,
including hours and weeks worked, employer-provided pensions and a range of schedule
types, as well as work from home. They find no effect on any schedule type. The
evidence on work from home they find is mixed, which, as another type of flexibility of
value to workers, could be considered a related job attribute to worker-friendly flexible
schedules. This result is for working mainly from home and conditional on not changing
jobs.
There are a number of reasons why this paper complements their evidence: Firstly,
theirs is an earlier paper, during whose period of observation zero-hours contracts were
very rare, and the adjustment mechanisms to subsequent minimum wage increases may
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have changed. Secondly, they use a wage gap specification, which defines treatment
intensity using the gap between the current wage and the incoming minimum wage.
A group of workers who already earn slightly more than the incoming minimum wage
is used as a control group. This specification captures direct effects on those whose
wages have to be raised to comply with the incoming minimum wage. However, many
schedule types are not easily implemented for individual workers, but instead enable or
even require some degree of restructing of the firm’s processes. It is therefore plausible
that workers in firms or industries that are strongly affected by a minimum wage increase
could experience spillover effects on the schedules they work, even if their own wages
are unaffected. Allowing for spillover effects is therefore an interesting extension to the
earlier work.
A recent paper by Datta et al. [2019] shows that the introduction of the National
Living Wage in 2016, the largest minimum wage increase in my observation period, was
associated with an increased use of zero-hours contracts, an employer-friendly type of
schedule flexibility, in the care home sector using the National Minimum Dataset for
Social Care. They also use the Labour Force Survey to show that individual workers
in low-wage industries were more likely to be on zero-hours contracts after the intro-
duction of the National Living Wage. The two papers were developed independently
from one another, and I complement their evidence in several ways: Firstly, I study a
broader range of schedule types, including those beneficial to workers, and discuss the
potential dual nature of zero-hours contracts as a schedule and a job security disamenity.
Secondly, I use variation from a longer time series of minimum wage increases, and com-
bine variation over time with variation across regions and industries in Great Britain.
Finally, I allow for dynamic effects in an Arellano-Bond specification and account for
differences in productivity growth using region-industry level gross value added.
Previous examples in the UK literature for a regional/industry-level approach similar
to the one I use in this paper are Dickens and Manning [2004], Stewart [2002] and Dolton
et al. [2012], all of whom focus on wages and employment as outcomes. They find that
minimum wages significantly increased wages at the bottom of the distribution, but
spillovers on non-treated workers were small. They did not find any disemployment
effects. In an appendix to his recent report, Dube [2019] used a similar approach to
analyse the effect of the introduction of the National Living Wage, the single biggest
reform in my period of observation, finding no impact on either headcount or full-time
equivalent employment.
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This chapter complements the analysis in the previous two chapters in several ways:
Firstly, I focus on the low-wage labour market. This is a segment where women are
overrepresented and where workers have very limited bargaining power. I show evidence
that minimum wage increases are associated with increased prevalence of schedule dis-
amenities, particularly in industries with a high share of women workers. Combined
with the evidence from the two previous chapters on differences in willingness to pay
for non-wage amenities, this suggests that minimum wage policies may have unequal
distributional consequences.
3.2 Mechanisms
Economic theory predicts a number of different channels for a higher wage floor to affect
the provision of job attributes such as schedule amenities. The direction of effects is
not always clear ex ante. In this section, I will illustrate two of those channels that are
likely to be relevant to the case of schedule amenities.
Pay consolidation To begin with, when a minimum wage is introduced or increased,
employers may decrease the provision of costly attributes to counteract the associated
increase in cost. This “consolidation” of amenities into basic pay also reduces the impact
of the minimum wage increase on workers’ utility. Manning [2003, p. 326] makes this
argument, stating that “[i]f there are non-pecuniary aspects to job (call them effort),
then one would expect employers to raise effort in response to a minimum wage [...]
(although it is fair to say that no evidence for these off-setting effects has ever been
produced).” In this paper, I think of job attributes primarily as positively valued
amenities, or reductions in effort. At its most basic, this argument predicts a reduction
in worker-friendly schedules and additional payments specifically among workers whose
wages were increased to comply with the National Living Wage, and among new hires at
the National Living Wage. The Commission [2017, p. 61] reports that some stakeholders
told them about cuts to additional payments or switches to (less worker-friendly) zero-
hours contracts in response to an increase in labour costs induced by the National Living
Wage.
However, if employers have some monopsony power in the sense that a cut in total
compensation does not lead to employees leaving immediately, they may also decrease
the provision of costly attributes for workers higher up the wage distribution. There is
some empirical support for the idea that off-setting actions by employers need not be
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limited to those workers directly affected by a new statutory wage floor [e.g. Clemens
et al., 2018, for health insurance]. In another example, Bellmann et al. [2017] analyse
the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany in an establishment-level difference-
in-differences framework and find that highly impacted employers decreased training
for medium- and high-skilled employees, rather than the low-skilled employees whose
wages had to be increased to comply.
A pay consolidation mechanism is intuitively plausible, and present across a range
of theoretical models. In a model without search, a firm seeking to minimise costs will
choose an optimal combination of wages and job attributes and a compensating wage
differential will arise. If the optimal bundle becomes infeasible after the introduction of
the minimum wage, we would expect to see an adjustment on the margin of (non-legally
mandated) attributes. A similar mechanism is present in a richer model with search
and differences in the cost of providing attributes. I sketch out the mechanism in such a
model, building on the search models of Gronberg and Reed [1994], Hwang et al. [1998]
and van den Berg [2003], in an appendix (Section 3.3.3).
The same intuition is formalised in Clemens et al. [2018]. They focus on a situation
where firms are homogeneous in their cost of providing non-wage amenities. This is
plausible for amenities with direct monetary costs like health insurance, which they
analyse, but less so for amenities whose cost is primarily in lost production or increased
need for coordination, like worker-led flexible schedules. In the latter situation, Hwang
et al.’s model [1998] with differences in production technology for job amenities is more
realistic.
Clemens et al. [2018] also assume that the reservation utility is exogenously fixed.
Van den Berg [2003] emphasises that in a search model, the equilibrium will depend
on workers adjusting their reservation wage (or utility) in response to the distribution
of offers of those firms remaining in the market. This has implications for the wage
(or utility) distribution in a market with a minimum wage. However, the qualitative
prediction (for a certain parameter range) that some firms will exit while others will
adjust their offer, is similar.
Differentials The role of a minimum wage as a reference point for a fair wage [Falk
et al., 2006, Fedorets et al., 2018] may have negative consequences on morale, effort
and/or turnover of employees previously paid at or close to the new minimum wage
rate. Employers could improve attributes of these jobs to preserve utility differentials.
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Previous studies have found that the National Minimum Wage, introduced in 1999, has
not led to wage spillovers high up the distribution [e.g. Dickens and Manning, 2004], but
the attribute distribution could be an alternative channel for positive spillovers. This
channel predicts positive effects on non-wage amenities for workers not directly affected
by the new wage floor, i.e. workers whose pre-policy wage was close to, but not below
the new wage floor.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
I use a region-industry level approach to analyse the effect of minimum wages on job
attributes. I exploit the fact that a uniform minimum wage floor such as the National
Living Wage will affect regions and industries to varying degrees due to pre-existing
differences in the wage distribution. I expect regions and industries where the minimum
wage reaches far into the wage distribution to experience larger effects on job attributes
than regions and industries where the minimum wage is low relative to the median wage.
Terminology and institutional context In this paper, I will refer to “the minimum
wage” to mean the adult rate of the National Minimum Wage in the period between
2006 and 2015, and the National Living Wage in 2016 and 201715. Treatment intensity
varies across region-industry cells and across time, since the National Minimum Wage
and the National Living Wage are uprated every year.16
Upratings can be of different magnitudes and while the decision is ultimately the
government’s, it usually follows the recommendation of the Low Pay Commission. The
commission is an arms-length body with members representing workers’, employers’
and academic perspectives. Its terms of reference task the commission with using the
best available evidence to recommend a rate that “will help as many low-paid work-
ers as possible without any significant adverse impact on employment or the econ-
omy”[Commission, 1998]. The remit of the commission also includes a policy goal to
increase the National Living Wage to 60% of median earnings by 2020, with a scientific
review currently in progress to determine a goal for the future. Figure 3 shows the
15The National Living Wage replaced the National Minimum Wage for workers aged 25 and over in
2016. It is not to be confused with the Living Wage (sometimes called the “real Living Wage”), which
is a voluntary certification scheme for employers overseen by the Living Wage Foundation, with rates
explicitly based on cost of living.
16Exceptionally, in 2016, there were two upratings, however the second one only changed the rates
for young workers and apprentices, leaving the adult rate unchanged.
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Figure 3: Minimum wages over time. Price adjustment using the Retail Price Index
(RPI) of all items except mortgage interest.
evolution of the National Minimum Wage and the National Living Wage over time.
3.3.1 Specification
In this section, I will first set out my empirical approach and define central concepts,
before giving detail on the data sources used.
Treatment Intensity Some previous papers [e.g Stewart, 2002] dichotomise treat-
ment intensity from the National Minimum Wage and compare a “high-impact” and a
“low-impact” group. While I follow their general approach of comparing sub-markets
impacted to different degrees by the increases in UK minimum wages, I opt for us-
ing treatment intensity directly. In a recent methodological paper, Schmidheiny and
Siegloch [2019] argue that “[T]he parameter estimates of such an artificial dichotomiza-
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tion are hard to interpret both in magnitude and direction. Moreover, the dichotomiza-
tion of the treatment variable eliminates valuable information which could otherwise be
used to identify the magnitude of the effect.”
My main measure of treatment intensity is the ratio of the minimum wage to the
median. Following the terminology of Machin and Manning [2004] and the Low Pay
Commission, I refer to this variable as the minimum wage bite.17 Figure 3 shows the
evolution of the equivalent national-level measure, i.e. the ratio of the minimum wage
to the national median.18 Treatment intensity varies at the region-industry level and
over time.
Regional measures of treatment intensity such as the share of workers earning a
wage below the new minimum or the minimum wage relative to the mean or median
wage are commonly used in the literature, especially in settings where the minimum
wage is set at the national level [Stewart, 2002, Neumark and Wascher, 2004, Dolton
et al., 2012, Caliendo et al., 2019]. Whilst a national minimum eliminates a source of
variation present in settings with state- or province-level minimum wages such as the US
and Canada, it is also more exogenous to region-specific shocks19, which are a potential
source of bias [Baskaya and Rubinstein, 2015].
As an alternative to this approach, workers slightly further up the wage distribution
are often used as a control group [Arulampalam et al., 2004, Stewart, 2004a, Dickens
et al., 2009, 2015, for example]. However, there is previous evidence of “spillover” effects
on job amenities, which cannot be captured using such a strategy. Dickens et al. [2015]
argue that concerns about spillover effects can be alleviated by using a group further
up in the wage distribution, instead of those whose wages fall in a bracket immediately
above the minimum wage. They acknowledge that there is a tension between the aims
of choosing a control group that is as similar as possible to those directly affected, and
avoiding spillover effects. There are, moreover, constraints on the availability of time-
series data on job attributes at the individual level. This is why I focus on variation in
17It is sometimes referred to as the Kaitz index [Dolton et al., 2015]. This term is not unambiguous,
as it is also used for the ratio of the minimum wage to the mean wage [Dolton et al., 2012], or for this
ratio multiplied by the proportion of the labour force covered [Belman et al., 2015]. The term “bite”, in
other national contexts such as Germany, is sometimes used to refer to the proportion of workers paid
at or below the minimum wage, but at least within the UK literature, it is used fairly consistently.
18I use publicly available median wages from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings. This leads to
a slight difference with the figures on bite published by the Low Pay Commission, which are constructed
using the median for the over-25s based on their own calculations with disaggregated data from the
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
19As Card et al. [1992] puts it, “From an evaluation perspective [...] a uniform minimum wage is an
under-appreciated asset.”
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treatment intensity across geographical and industry groups.
In a robustness check for the introduction of the National Living Wage only (Section
3.3.3), I compare results for a second measure of treatment intensity, namely prospective
coverage. This is the share of held by adults over 25 in 2015 which are paid below £7.20
and are therefore expected to be directly affected by the policy. This measure is highly,
but not perfectly correlated with bite (ρ = 0.94). The bite measure has fewer missing
values due to the ONS being able to estimate median wages with smaller coefficients of
variation. However, in these smaller cells the estimated change in the outcome variables
is also more uncertain. In an additional set of robustness checks, I use bite with respect
to the 30th percentile, instead of the median.
If worker-friendly attributes are a normal good, regions and industries that are with
high productivity growth may be expanding them at a faster rate, whilst at the same
time experiencing faster wage growth which leads to a low bite. Similar endogeneity
concerns have been raised in the literature on employment effects [Baskaya and Rubin-
stein, 2015]. I address this in a number of ways. I define the minimum wage bite with
respect to the previous year’s wage distribution. This is a more exogenous measure of
each uprating’s impact. Additionally, I condition on region-industry specific gross value
added to capture productivity shocks, as Dolton et al. [2015] recommend as a remedy
for a similar endogeneity concern in their analysis of employment effects of the National
Minimum Wage.
In their previous work on the employment impact of the National Minimum Wage,
Dolton et al. [2012] compared alternative measures of treatment intensity (the share
at or below the National Minimum Wage and the spike). They concluded that they
lead to qualitatively similar conclusions, suggesting that the choice among the different
continuous treatment intensity measures is not a crucial one.
Baseline specification I estimate a fixed-effect regression with standard errors clus-
tered by region-industry. The fixed effects capture differences in technology, which will
affect the cost of providing different attributes.
The regression takes the following form
Yit = Xitβx + β1biteit + β2bite
2
it + ci + εit
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where i indexes the region-industry cells and the outcome Y is the share of adult
workers (according to the minimum wage structure in year t) who report the schedule
type in question. The regional classification is on the basis of region of work. The
covariate vector X includes the composition of the region-industry cell (or “cohort”, as
Deaton [1985] calls it) with respect to age and gender20, non-UK nationality, educational
attainment and presence of children in the family. In addition, I condition on regional
employment and unemployment rates21 and region-industry level gross value added, as
well as the share of workers who are apprentices or young people, in the sense that they
are not entitled to the adult rate of the National Minimum Wage, or to the National
Living Wage. I provide summary statistics for these covariates in table 25. I also include
a set of year dummies. All standard errors are clustered at the region-industry cell level
and weighted by the number of underlying worker-level observations.
As mentioned above, I define the minimum wage bite with respect to the previous
year’s wage distribution, which is a plausibly more exogenous measure of impact than
bite with respect to the contemporaneous distribution. Dolton et al. [2015] address the
potential endogeneity problem by including regional gross value added, which I also do
as an additional safeguard. I exclude the industry of agriculture, forestry and fishing. In
addition to potentially important differences in the production process and issues with
seasonal fluctuation, it is the smallest industry in terms of observations in the Labour
Force Survey, which makes estimates of industry averages very noisy.
I allow for a non-linear effect of the bite on any given job attribute. This is likely
to be important since most job attributes are naturally constrained - for example, an
employer can discontinue a flexitime scheme, but they cannot offer negative flexitime.
Therefore, employers wishing to reduce their provision of job attributes would switch to
another job attribute when the margin of one has been exhausted. This would produce
a pattern where a certain job attribute would be reduced in response to increases at a
certain level of bite.
Dynamic specification Dolton et al. [2015] use a system GMM estimator to reflect
the dynamic nature of employment. An estimate of employment effects of minimum
wages in the UK is clearly vulnerable to simultaneity bias: Employment effects are a
central concern for the Low Pay Commission in its recommendations, opening a clear
20using a set of dummies for young, middle-aged and older men and women, respectively, with the
omitted category being middle-aged men
21from the Labour Force Survey, based on the unemployed workers’ regions of residence
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channel through which employment affects minimum wage increases. In contrast, whilst
the Low Pay Commission does discuss some submissions from stakeholders concerned
about a potential effect of the National Minimum Wage and National Living Wage
on job attributes, this is far from a primary consideration for their recommendations.
Therefore, my estimates are less likely to suffer from a reverse causality problem.
Nevertheless, job attributes may still be dynamic in the sense of a true state depen-
dency, which the fixed-effect regression cannot properly account for. To address this
concern, I also report results for Arellano-Bond (difference GMM) models. I estimate
the models using a two-step procedure for efficiency reasons and adjust standard errors
using the Windmeijer finite-sample correction [Windmeijer, 2005].
The main Arellano-Bond model takes the form
Yit = β1biteit+ x
′
itβ + δyi,t−1 + ci + εit.
Analogously to the fixed-effects specification, I weight by the number of underlying
worker observations. Using a separate instrument for each time period, variable, and
lag distance leads to a problem of instrument proliferation, where endogenous variables
are overfitted [Roodman, 2009]. I therefore restrict the number of lags used to construct
the instrument to two and collapse the instrument set, using one instrument for each
variable and lag distance. This leaves me with 35 instruments. In Section 3.3.3, I
report some additional results where I cull the set of covariates to keep the instrument
set manageable. In the main specification, I use the same set of covariates as in the fixed-
effects regression, treating gross value added and the employment rate as predetermined
covariates, and the remaining covariates as exogenous.
Dynamic effects are significant for some, but not all models I estimate. A single
lag is sufficient to pass a second-order autocorrelation test for the vast majority of
schedule types I examine and for some outcomes, the lagged value is not significant.
This suggests that dynamics are not central to the determination of some of the schedule
types analysed here. In the main part of this paper, I only report specifications with
one lag. In Section 3.3.3, I report specifications with two lags for some schedule types.
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Data and Descriptive Statistics
My approach requires me to identify region-industry cells where a higher impact of the
minimum wage led to larger increases in low percentiles of the wage distribution. I use
information on wages, job attributes and transitions from the Quarterly Labour Force
Survey (LFS), supplemented with aggregate-level wage information from the Annual
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), merged at the industry-region level.
Table 25: Summary statistics
Unweighted Weighted
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
NMW/NLW bite 0.604 0.145 0.575 0.140
Share of women 0.372 0.193 0.484 0.202
Age 44.21 2.631 43.75 1.734
Children aged 0-4 0.150 0.0414 0.152 0.0263
Children aged 5-9 0.154 0.0404 0.157 0.0248
Non-UK nationals 0.0691 0.0590 0.0809 0.0594
Degree or equivalent 0.232 0.124 0.291 0.138
GCE A level or eq 0.244 0.0833 0.223 0.0685
GCSE grades A*-C or eq 0.210 0.0590 0.203 0.0545
Share of youth 0.0599 0.0534 0.0584 0.0566
Share of Apprentices 0.00910 0.0116 0.00676 0.00834
Gross Value Added 0.953 0.105 0.938 0.0822
Unemployment Rate 0.0474 0.0122 0.0468 0.0118
Employment Rate 0.711 0.0323 0.718 0.0295
Observations 1296 1296
National Living Wage/Minimum Wage bite is the ratio of the minimum wage to the the previous period’s
median wage in the region and industry. Weights represent the number of underlying individual-level
observations.
The Labour Force Survey contains hourly pay and hourly rate data. Hourly pay
is constructed from information on the last pay received, the time covered and hours
worked per week. Since it is derived by combining information on these different aspects,
there are multiple potential sources of measurement error [Skinner et al., 2002]. Hourly
rate information is more accurate. But respondents who are not paid by the hour are
not directly asked for an hourly rate, which means that we only observe it for a selective
sample of just under half of observations with pay information. I therefore use external
data on wages from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings at the region-industry
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level. This information is provided by employers, who are legally obliged to respond to
the survey if their employee is selected for inclusion in the sample, and measurement
error is less of a concern.
Table 26: Summary statistics for low- and high-bite cells
Below-median bite Above-median bite
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
NMW/NLW bite 0.488 0.0651 0.706 0.118
Share of women 0.486 0.230 0.482 0.147
Age 43.95 1.338 43.74 2.113
Children aged 0-4 0.154 0.0255 0.152 0.0255
Children aged 5-9 0.157 0.0214 0.156 0.0283
Non-UK nationals 0.0835 0.0600 0.0829 0.0605
Degree or equivalent 0.341 0.134 0.231 0.117
GCE A level or eq 0.216 0.0748 0.231 0.0497
GCSE grades A*-C or eq 0.181 0.0426 0.236 0.0545
Share of youth 0.0277 0.0174 0.103 0.0632
Share of Apprentices 0.00597 0.00800 0.00823 0.00789
Gross Value Added 0.937 0.0753 0.944 0.0828
Unemployment Rate 0.0489 0.0116 0.0457 0.0125
Employment Rate 0.720 0.0270 0.720 0.0285
Flexitime 0.129 0.0423 0.0933 0.0487
Other worker-led 0.0784 0.0670 0.0330 0.0401
Annualised hours 0.0492 0.0219 0.0486 0.0254
Zero hours contract 0.00705 0.00762 0.0138 0.0140
Unsocial hours 0.353 0.0674 0.494 0.137
∼ allowance 0.0429 0.0358 0.0201 0.0266
Observations 539 540
National Living Wage/Minimum Wage bite is the ratio of the minimum wage to the the previous period’s
median wage in the region and industry. Both sets of statistics weighted by the number of underlying
individual-level observations.
Regions are the eleven Government Office Regions of Great Britain22. Whilst ASHE
recognises 21 industries, I aggregate these to the nine industries available in the Labour
Force Survey, using averages weighted by the number of jobs in cases where several
ASHE industries correspond to a single Labour Force Survey industry.
In the following sections, I will analyse whether regions and industries most affected
22Estimates for Northern Ireland are not available in disaggregated form by industry.
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Figure 4: Employer-friendly types of schedule flexibility
Average over region-industry cells, allowances conditional on working unsocial hours.
by the introduction of the National Living Wage saw changes in schedule amenities and
disamenities. I consider four types of flexible or “non-standard” schedules: Flexitime
schedules and other worker-led schedule types such as compressed work weeks, term-
time working or job shares, are the two categories that are expected to primarily benefit
workers. The remaining categories of zero hours contracts and annualised hours are
expected to primarily benefit employers and represent a disamenity for workers. I also
study effects on unsocial hours and allowances paid to compensate workers for them.
I analyse the latter margin conditionally on the first, i.e. the two outcomes of interest
are, firstly, working unsocial hours and secondly, receiving an unsocial hours allowance
conditionally on working them.
On average across all cells, all schedule types fluctuated over the sample period
(cf. figures 4 and 5), but only zero-hours contracts saw a dramatic change, with the
share beginning to increase sharply in 2013. This increase may in part be driven by
increased awareness and understanding of this type of schedule among respondents.
However, there is no reason to believe that this increased awareness, driven by a na-
tional policy discussion and press coverage, should differ by treatment intensity of the
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Figure 5: Worker-friendly types of flexible schedules, average over region-industry cells.
minimum wage. There is substantial variation across region-industry cells and there
are cells in the sample which experienced increases and decreases of each schedule type
examined.
Information on allowances for unsocial hours are part of the Labour Force Survey’s
pay section and therefore only available for a subset of the data, namely those respon-
dents in the first or fifth quarter of their participation.
3.3.2 Results
Wages, Jobs and Employment Wages and employment effects of the National
Minimum Wage have been studied extensively and are not the focus of this paper. The
consensus in the literature is that the National Minimum Wage has had little or no effect
on employment overall [Stewart, 2002, Metcalf, 2008, Dolton et al., 2012]. In something
of an exception, Dickens et al. [2015] find a negative effect on employment retention
for women working part-time. Dickson and Papps [2016] use a wage gap specification
on data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, the Labour Force Survey and
the British Household Panel Study from 1997-2013, defining treatment intensity as the
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amount by which workers’ wages have to be raised to comply with the new minimum
wage. They find a negative effect on turnover and on hours worked, but not on flows
out of employment. The evidence found on flows into employment is mixed.
Table 27: Minimum wage bite and wage growth at the 30th percentile
OLS Fixed Effects FEs with covariates
NMW/NLW bite 1.296∗∗ (0.553) 9.733∗∗∗ (1.155) 9.466∗∗∗ (1.188)
- squared -0.794∗∗ (0.400) -3.829∗∗∗ (0.874) -3.678∗∗∗ (0.896)
N 1060 1060 1060
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Analytical weights. All include
year fixed effects. (3) additionally includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group and
gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment and
unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices and region-industry level GVA.
Here, I limit myself to briefly showing effects on the sample I go on to use, to
contextualise my results on job attributes. In order for results to be informative about
the relationship between wages and job amenities, minimum wage increases need to
induce wage growth, at least in the lower part of the distribution. Figure 3 plots the
adult rate of the National Minimum Wage and National Living Wage in nominal and
real terms as well as the minimum wage bite. Table 27 shows that a higher bite (with
respect to the previous year’s wage distribution) was associated with larger increases in
the 30th wage percentile in the current year. Since I use the bite with respect to the
lagged median wage, this does not imply an endogeneity problem.
Any model with a legal or natural lower bound on attributes (including the one
sketched out in the appendix in Section 3.3.3) predicts that for some values of the
minimum wage, some types of firms will become unprofitable and exit the market. This
could happen alongside an adjustment in the attribute offer of the remaining firm, or
it could be the only driver of changes in the attribute distribution in the market, with
the remaining firms keeping their offer constant. So even though the literature has not
found evidence of overall employment effects of minimum wages in the UK, an effect on
non-wage amenities is not predicated on this (dis-)employment effect being zero.
To illustrate employment effects in this sample, I estimate regressions using the
number of jobs from ASHE in a region-industry cell as an outcome. I find that a
negative association between minimum wage bite and employment is significant in a
least-squares regression, but not in a fixed-effects model, or a dynamic model ( Table
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Table 28: Minimum wage bite and jobs
OLS Fixed Effects Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -2907.1∗∗ (-2.88) -138.8 (-1.32) 396.4 (0.72)
- squared 1306.6 (1.72) 76.07 (0.97) 562.3 (1.53)
Gross Value Added 65.78 (1.10) 91.95∗∗∗ (7.95) -11.03 (-0.18)
L.jobs 0.966∗∗∗ (3.65)
Observations 990 990 862
Av. Marg. Effect -1334.3 -47.25 1055.6
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.680
Hansen Test 0.187
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Includes controls for cell
composition with respect to age group and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment,
non-UK nationality, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed effects.
32 instruments used in (3).
28). This is in line with the results from Dolton et al. [2015], who use data for an
overlapping but slightly earlier period. The dynamic specification for jobs is broadly
analogous to the one used for the schedule outcomes. There are two differences, for
obvious reasons: It is not weighted (because the outcome is not from the Labour Force
Survey) and it does not include employment or unemployment rates as controls.
I also estimate a set of probit regressions using individual-level LFS data on inflows
to and outflows from employment in the quarter preceding the survey date (Table 29).
This means that the regressions capture flows just before as well as just before the each
uprating of the National Minimum Wage/introduction of the National Living Wage. I
assign individuals to their current industry for inflows, and to the industry of their last
job for outflows and the outcome is a flow (i.e. a transition conditional on the previous
state). I assign everyone to their region of residence rather than their region of work,
since information on non-employed workers’ previous region of work is incomplete. As in
my main specification for schedule types, I allow for a quadratic effect to reflect possible
switching between different margins of adjustment. I condition on region-industry level
gross value added, as well as a range of personal characteristics and region and industry
(but not joint) and year fixed effects.
None of the coefficients are significant at the 5% level. There is some evidence of
a convex effect on inflows at a higher significance level (p=.08), with a positive but
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Table 29: Minimum wage bite and inflows to and from employment
Outflows
Inflows to non-participation to unemployment
Bite -0.884 (0.542) 0.151 (0.357) -0.0146 (0.287)
- squared 0.738∗ (0.419) 0.0487 (0.301) 0.0426 (0.264)
Woman -0.0647∗∗∗ (0.0158) 0.0874∗∗∗ (0.0152) -0.0296∗∗ (0.0120)
Children, 0-4 -0.0300 (0.0254) -0.150∗∗∗ (0.0367) -0.115∗∗∗ (0.0191)
Children, 5-9 0.0442∗ (0.0247) -0.103∗∗ (0.0408) -0.0811∗∗∗ (0.0207)
Mother, 0-4 yo -0.897∗∗∗ (0.0390) 0.443∗∗∗ (0.0448) 0.256∗∗∗ (0.0291)
Mother, 5-9 yo -0.297∗∗∗ (0.0345) 0.114∗∗ (0.0475) 0.158∗∗∗ (0.0250)
Degree 0.596∗∗∗ (0.0288) -0.0886∗∗ (0.0288) -0.237∗∗∗ (0.0225)
Higher education 0.475∗∗∗ (0.0329) -0.0372 (0.0335) -0.168∗∗∗ (0.0249)
GCE A level 0.341∗∗∗ (0.0324) -0.0214 (0.0299) -0.140∗∗∗ (0.0211)
GCSE A*-C 0.308∗∗∗ (0.0231) -0.0538∗ (0.0293) -0.102∗∗∗ (0.0203)
Observations 108702 448963 448963
P-value (bite) 0.212 0.501 0.975
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Probit regression. NLW bite from
ASHE, other variables from LFS. Includes year, region and industry fixed effects. P-value in table foot
is for joint significance of linear and quadratic bite.
insignificant point estimate of the marginal effect at intermediate and high bites. This
would be a plausible effect sign since higher wages could incentivise work, but the
evidence is weak. Other coefficients behave as expected: mothers, especially those with
children who have not yet reached school age, are significantly more likely to transition
to un- or non-employment, with the opposite being true for fathers. Mothers are also
less likely to transition into new employment. Young workers and less educated workers
at every level of education are more likely to exit employment and less likely to enter
it. There is no separate effect of gross value added, which is not too surprising after
industry fixed effects and sorting of individuals with different characteristics has been
taken into account.
In summary, consistently with the rest of the literature, there seems to be little
or no effect on employment, especially once dynamics are taken into account. There
is no evidence of an effect on outflows, and only weak evidence of a positive effect on
inflows. I now move on to the main part of my analysis, focusing on changes in schedule
amenities and disamenities.
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Schedule disamenities Zero-hours contracts23 and annualised hours are types of
schedule flexibility that primarily benefit employers by allowing them to react to demand
fluctuations. From the worker’s perspective, a guaranteed number of weekly hours is a
job amenity that (some) workers value, and I therefore a priori interpret zero-hours
contracts and annualised hours as disamenities. I would therefore expect a higher
minimum wage bite to be associated with a greater prevalence of these contract types.
In fixed-effects regressions, there is a significant convex effect on zero-hour contracts
that is robust to a range of specifications (Table 30). The marginal effect is positive for
the whole range of observed bites.
Using an Arellano-Bond specification, a single lag is enough to pass an autocorre-
lation test. The lagged prevalence of zero-hours contracts is not significant, which is
perhaps intuitive given that the advantage of these contracts is their flexibility. The
marginal effect of the minimum wage bite remains significant at the 5% level for bite
values of 60% (this is very close to the mean bite) and above. Hansen tests for overiden-
tification are not rejected. Roodman [2009] highlights a p-value close to 1 as a warning
sign that the test is weakened by too many instruments. The value of .74 is not very
close to 1, but it is in a range where he recommends caution nonetheless. Reassur-
ingly, the specification does not reject a Sargan test, which is not weakened by many
instruments.
In Section 3.3.3, I also present some alternative specifications which achieve better
values of the Hansen test. The sign and significance of both coefficients remains the
same, although their point estimates change somewhat. In summary, there is strong
evidence that a higher minimum wage bite has been associated with an accelerated
expansion of this schedule type for higher-bite industries.
Annualised hours are another type of flexibility that are primarily driven by employer
needs24. There are no significant effects on the prevalence of annualised hours in any
23Workers on zero-hours contracts are on call, without any guaranteed hours. Petkova [2018] reports
that workers on zero-hours contracts have more variable working hours and are more likely to report
wanting more hours than they currently have.
24According to the UK employment arbitration body ACAS, “[i]n an annual hours system an employee
works a certain number of hours over the whole year, but with a certain degree of flexibility about when
those hours are worked. Normally, a period of regular hours or shifts forms the core of the arrangement,
with the remaining time left unallocated and used on an ’as needed’ basis. Sometimes, the employee
is paid in advance for the unallocated time, and may be called upon at short notice, perhaps to cover
colleagues or according to a surge in demand. Annualised hours are most often used for shift workers,
but in theory they can be applied to any employee. [...] In manufacturing, they are sometimes used to
achieve continuous production throughout the year. Organisations that need to run 24 hours a day all
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Table 30: Effect of minimum wages on zero-hours contracts and annualised hours,
fixed-effects and dynamic specifications
Zero-Hours Contracts Annualised Hours
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -0.213∗∗∗ -0.106 0.0352 -0.380
(0.0560) (0.156) (0.121) (0.444)
- squared 0.221∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.0362 0.0801
(0.0464) (0.0944) (0.104) (0.233)
Graduate Share 0.00927 0.0241 -0.0385 -0.0285
(0.0125) (0.0154) (0.0305) (0.0812)
Gross Value Added -0.00240 -0.0111 -0.00193 0.0247
(0.00767) (0.00926) (0.0172) (0.0361)
Employment Rate -0.0520 -0.0681 0.00125 0.313∗
(0.0329) (0.0673) (0.100) (0.180)
L.Outcome 0.0793 0.316∗∗
(0.117) (0.0995)
Constant 0.0798∗∗ 0.0142 0.0381 0.0446
(0.0322) (0.0699) (0.0783) (0.303)
Observations 966 966 966 966
Av. Marg. Effect 0.0396 0.193 0.0767 -0.289
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.626 0.902
Hansen Test 0.744 0.161
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 35 instruments used in (2) and (4).
specification (Table 30). An Arellano-Bond model with one lag passes an autocorrelation
test and there is significant persistence in the share of annualised hours. It seems likely
that introducing or removing a system of annualised hours requires significant changes
to the production process and that it would therefore be a less appropriate margin for
short-term adjustments.
There is a significant concave effect of a higher minimum wage bite on the prevalence
of unsocial hours (Table 31). Unsocial hours are defined here as working evenings, nights
year, such as hospitals and the emergency services, can also find this arrangement beneficial.” [ACAS,
2019]
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Table 31: Effect of minimum wages on unsocial hours and allowances for them, fixed-
effects and dynamic specifications
Unsocial Hours Allowances for Unso-
cial Hours
Saturday hours only
FE A.-Bond FE A.-Bond FE A.-Bond
NMW/NLW bite 0.642∗∗∗ 0.658 0.130 -0.253 0.769∗∗∗ 0.201
(0.179) (0.539) (0.0951) (0.482) (0.159) (0.402)
- squared -0.221 -0.0395 -0.0515 0.151 -0.375∗∗ -0.246
(0.157) (0.258) (0.0678) (0.154) (0.132) (0.192)
Graduate Share -0.147∗∗ -0.132 -0.0515 -0.0275 -0.232∗∗∗ -0.248∗∗∗
(0.0436) (0.0862) (0.0398) (0.0592) (0.0432) (0.0697)
Gross Value 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗ 0.0252∗ 0.0400 0.0828∗∗∗ 0.0443
Added (0.0226) (0.0410) (0.0128) (0.0346) (0.0205) (0.0276)
Empl. Rate 0.281∗∗ 0.152 0.116 0.324 0.128 0.420∗
(0.135) (0.260) (0.123) (0.255) (0.123) (0.242)




Constant -0.0649 -0.130 -0.120 -0.182 -0.121 0
(0.107) (0.331) (0.0951) (0.317) (0.102) (.)
Observations 966 966 966 966 966 879
Av. Marg. Effect 0.389 0.613 0.0708 -0.0798 0.339 -0.0811
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.465 0.768 0.170
Hansen Test 0.181 0.474 0.0512
Number of instr. 35 35 27
FE: Fixed-effects model, A.-Bond: Arellano-Bond model. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Saturday
work is a subcategory of unsocial hours. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects.
or weekends. This is in line with theoretical predictions for a job attribute that generates
disutility for workers. Presumably, switching to more sociable hours would be costly
for employers, otherwise they would have no reason not to do so. In an Arellano-Bond
model, one lag is sufficient to pass the autocorrelation test, and there is significant
persistence. However, the effect of the bite is no longer significant once this persistence
is accounted for.
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Drilling a little deeper, the effect in the fixed-effects regression is driven by Satur-
day work, rather than work on Sundays, nights or evenings. The main Arellano-Bond
specification for Saturday work rejects the Hansen test, as do many of the adjustments
used in other parts of the paper. I report a specification with two lags and a reduced
covariate vector25. The coefficients on bite are not significant. The same is true for
the main Arellano-Bond specification, if one is prepared to ignore the overidentification
issue. A potential problem is that I can only observe the extensive margin, i.e. I do not
observe how common Saturday work is for those workers who report it. More than one
in four workers (weighted average across cells) report working Saturdays, but they may
have varying degrees of control over this decision. Heterogeneity between frequent and
occasional Saturday workers as well as between (more) voluntary and involuntary ones,
could contribute to the large but imprecisely estimated coefficients for unsocial hours
in general, and Saturday work in particular.
There is no evidence in any of the specifications of an effect on allowances for unsocial
hours, conditional on working such hours (Table 31). It is worth bearing in mind that
this information is only available for a subset of the data and any effect would therefore
be more difficult to detect than for the other outcomes.
Schedule amenities There is a significant negative (somewhat convex) effect of the
minimum wage bite on the prevalence of flexitime schemes (Table 32). This is entirely
driven by jobs in public administration, education and health. This is the largest
industry which gives the corresponding cells a high weight and it has seen large increases
in the minimum wage bite alongside an almost 20% decrease in the share of workers
reporting flexitime work over the sample period.
Flexitime is a schedule type with clear benefits for workers and a potential productiv-
ity cost if production relies on complementarities between workers. The negative impact
of the minimum wage bite on flexitime is therefore consistent with theoretical predic-
tions. In an Arellano-Bond model, flexitime is persistent, which is intuitively plausible.
The linear negative effect of the bite remains significant, and the marginal effect of the
bite even becomes much larger. Neither the Hansen nor the Sargan test are rejected,
and the Hansen test gives no indication of a problem of instrument proliferation.
It is worth bearing in mind that flexitime is more prevalent among higher-paid
25including education dummies, the youth and apprentice shares, gross value added, (un-)employment
rates and a single dummy for the period after 2010. This cut-off was chosen because it provided the
highest R-squared out of a set of regressions, one for every year in the sample.
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Table 32: Effect of minimum wages on flexitime and other worker-led flexible schedules
Flexitime Other Worker-Led
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -0.408∗∗ -0.917∗ -0.209∗∗ -0.372
(0.147) (0.532) (0.0739) (0.279)
- squared 0.266∗∗ 0.417 0.166∗∗ 0.294∗∗
(0.116) (0.259) (0.0557) (0.0981)
Graduate Share 0.0662 0.0474 -0.0149 0.0275
(0.0421) (0.0839) (0.0181) (0.0418)
Gross Value Added 0.00761 0.0655 0.0324∗∗ 0.0390∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0430) (0.00955) (0.0182)
Employment Rate -0.0240 0.151 0.0134 0.156
(0.117) (0.234) (0.0675) (0.182)
L.Outcome 0.225∗∗ 0.400∗∗
(0.0808) (0.150)
Constant 0.188∗ 0.266 0.105∗∗ 0.0326
(0.113) (0.239) (0.0460) (0.134)
Observations 966 966 966 966
Av. Marg. Effect -0.103 -0.440 -0.0189 -0.0350
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.196 0.664
Hansen Test 0.254 0.0409
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 35 instruments each in columns 2 and 4.
workers (using LFS earnings data as-is). Any effect is therefore unlikely to be driven
by direct effects on workers whose wages had to be raised to comply with the new
minimum wage. Spillover effects on workers who were already earning more than the
new minimum wage are a more likely channel. These spillover effects would arise if
employers seeking to compensate for the minimum wage increase reduce, or fail to
increase, the value of their non-treated workers’ total compensation package. In Section
3.3.3, I present some additional evidence that the effect on flexitime is weaker when the
treatment is re-defined with respect to the 30th percentile instead of the median. I also
discuss some of the reasons for this divergence.
There is a smaller effect on worker-led flexible schedules other than flexitime which is
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significantly negative at low bites and becomes significantly positive at very high bites.
Workers are likely to view these schedule types - a compressed work week, job sharing,
term-time working - as an amenity and they could potentially be very important for
combining work and caring responsibilities. However, they vary in their cost to the
employer and the groups of workers in each individual schedule type are too small to
analyse them all separately. The effect is driven by the large industry of public adminis-
tration, education and health, where these schedule types are much more common than
in any other industry. The heterogeneous effect could also be driven by different effects
on directly treated workers and those affected by spillovers.
The Arellano-Bond model is once again able to pass an autocorrelation test after
inclusion of just one lag. There is significant persistence, which is consistent with many
of these schedule types requiring a substantial investment to set up. The quadratic
effect of the bite remains significant.
In summary, while there is some evidence for a decreasing effect of a high minimum
wage bite on the prevalence of schedule amenities, the picture is more nuanced than for
disamenities. Heterogeneity across different schedule types appears to be important, as
is the measure of the minimum wage bite used, and the effect is primarily driven by a
single industry, namely education, health and public administration.
3.3.3 Extensions and Robustness Checks
Table 33: Share of women in industry-region cells, by industry across all years
Mean Minimum Maximum
Energy and water 0.216 0 0.372
Manufacturing 0.257 0.180 0.374
Construction 0.121 0.0426 0.184
Distribution, hotels and restaurants 0.518 0.406 0.601
Transport and communication 0.238 0.165 0.318
Banking and finance 0.471 0.386 0.534
Public admin, education and health 0.719 0.650 0.756
Other services 0.551 0.437 0.716
Total 0.386 0 0.756
N 1,152
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Female-majority industries Both the literatures on workers’ valuation of schedule
amenities and on minimum wages emphasise gender as an important dimension of worker
heterogeneity. Below, I examine the particular role of female-majority industries in the
effects previously described.
Unsurprisingly, variation in the share of women across industry-region-year cells is
strongly associated with the industry dimension (Table 33), whereas variation across
regions and over time is very limited. For many of the schedule types analysed, the
impact is strongest on female-majority industries, including when those industries do
not have a particularly high minimum wage bite. However, the dynamics of female and
male-majority industries are in many cases not very well captured by the Arellano-Bond
models, several of which fail overidentification tests.
For instance, in the case of zero-hours contracts, the average marginal effect of
a high minimum wage bite is significantly larger for female-majority industry-region
cells. This is because the estimated marginal effect is consistently positive for these
industries. In contrast, for male-majority industry-regions, the effect is negative at very
low bites and then rapidly increases, surpassing the marginal effect for female-majority
industry-regions at very high bites.
As with the main specification, there is not much evidence of an effect on annualised
hours. The coefficients for female-majority industry-regions are only significant at the
10% level, and for the male-majority industry-regions, not at all. If there is any effect,
it would be a positive effect in female-majority industries, but the evidence is weak.
In the case of unsocial hours, the patterns from the main specification are once again
confirmed in the fixed-effects regression, with the results pointing to a larger effect in
female-majority industry-regions. There is no effect on allowances for unsocial hours
conditional on working those hours. The dynamic specification, with any choice of lags,
year dummies and either the standard or a reduced covariate vector, again fails the
Hansen test. It does confirm the pattern – a positive effect that is larger in female-
majority industries.
Looking at schedule amenities, I previously set out that the result that the negative
effect on flexitime is driven by the large industry of public administration, education and
health, an industry with a high share of women workers. In line with this, the effect of
a higher minimum wage bite is only significant in industry-region cells with a majority
of women workers (Table 37). The pattern persists in the dynamic specification.
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This specification also sheds some additional light on the non-linear effect found
on other worker-led schedule types: Life for flexitime, the effect is only significant in
female-majority industry-region pairs and the average marginal effect, which was zero
in the baseline specification, is negative for female-majority cells.
As discussed in the main part of the paper, these schedule types are highly persistent
and it is plausible that at least some of them would require a substantial organisational
effort to introduce. The dynamic evolution in industries with and without a female
majority among workers is not easy to capture: The baseline specification as well as
several of the alternatives used elsewhere in the paper (fewer time dummies, different
versions of the covariate vector or additional lags) all fail the Hansen and Sargan overi-
dentification tests. In summary, the evidence of a negative effect on schedule amenities
values by workers is stronger in female-majority industry-region cells, but the dynamics
of worker-led types of flexibility other than flexitime are not very well captured by the
model.
Alternative dynamic specifications for zero-hours contracts In this section,
I will address some concerns with the dynamic specification for individual schedule
types. For zero-hours contracts, the Hansen test in the specification reported above
gives a p-value of .75, which Roodman [2009] considers a value where caution about the
possibility of instrument proliferation is needed. Even though the Sargan test, which
is not weakened by many instruments, gives no additional reason for concern, I present
two alternative specifications in table 38. The coefficients’ sign and significance are
preserved in both specifications.
In the first one, I include a second lag, which brings the Hansen p-value down to .10.
Given that none of the lagged values are significant, this is not my preferred specification.
For the second specification, I cull the covariate vector to only include gross value added
and the employment rate as predetermined covariates and the graduate, youth and
apprentice shares as independent covariates. I also replace the full set of year dummies
with a single dummy for the period after 2013. This cut-off marks a visual break in the
time-series and also offers the greatest explanatory power in a linear regression. This
only reduces the p-value of the Hansen test to .48, but the number of instruments is
down to just 15, which should also alleviate concerns about instrument proliferation.
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Pre-coverage and the National Living Wage introduction The National Living
Wage was announced in July 2015. The BBC called the announcement “[o]ne of the
George Osborne’s big surprises in his budget”. A new legal wage minimum of £7.20
applied to workers aged 25 or over from April 2016, less than a year after the initial
announcement. This represented an increase of 7.5% compared to the 2015 adult rate
of the National Minimum Wage. There was no change for workers between the ages of
21 and 25, who were entitled to the adult rate of the National Minimum Wage, but not
the National Living Wage.
This was by far the largest minimum wage increase in the sample. For this change,
I am able to introduce an additional measure of treatment intensity, namely the an-
ticipated coverage, or the share of workers over 25 whose wage in 2015 was below the
introductory rate of £7.20. This data is not generally available at the region-industry
level, which is why I am unable to use it on all minimum wage increases in the sample.
This measure is highly, but not perfectly correlated with the National Living Wage’s
bite at introduction (ρ = 0.94). Comparing the two alternative measures is interesting
for two reasons: Firstly, if both are measures of impact, they can serve as a robustness
check for each other and results which hold with both measures are more credible than
ones which only hold for one of them. However, there could also be genuine differences
in the impact on high-bite versus high-coverage regions and industries: High-bite but
low-coverage regions and industries would be strongly affected by spillover effects on
those (by construction, many) workers who earn between the introductory National
Living Wage rate and the median.
The sample is restricted to the two years surrounding the introduction, and addi-
tionally by using anticipated coverage as a measure of treatment intensity, which has
more missing values than the bite measure. I present two specifications on the effect of
the National Living Wage’s introduction. The fixed-effect regression used in the main
part of the paper produces no significant effects at the 5% level for any of the outcomes
analysed (table 39). Only the positive quadratic effect on unsocial hours is significant
at the 10% level, predicting a U-shape, in contrast to the results for the whole period
in the main section, which predicted a positive relationship. However, when London
is excluded, the point estimate of the average marginal effect switches sign and the
coefficient loses significance. In summary, this specification does not deliver evidence of
a widespread effect of this single minimum wage increase on unsocial hours.
To limit the number of parameters to be estimated, I also present a specification
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Figure 6: At the time of the National Living Wage introduction, flexitime plateaued
or decreased in areas with high previous prevalence levels.
with a reduced set of covariates, a linear effect of coverage and separate industry and
region fixed effects, instead of the industry-region fixed effects used in the main part of
the paper (table 40). Contrary to expectations and the main set of results, a positive
effect on flexitime is significant at the 6% level. The context for this result is that cells
which had recorded a high level of flexitime in 2015, saw stagnation or a decline in 2016.
The pattern is present within industries (cf. figure 6). Since fixed effects account for
this, the effect disappears in the main specification.
Bite with respect to the 30th percentile Minimum wage bites are commonly
defined with respect to the median. However, it is possible that the lower part of
an industry’s wage distribution is more relevant to the impact that a minimum wage
increase has. If there is a lot of dispersion in the middle of the distribution, a low
bite may also mask a large mass of affected workers at the bottom. To address this
possibility, I present versions of both main specifications (fixed effects and Arellano-
Bond models) using bite with respect to the 30th percentile as a measure of treatment
intensity in table 42. As expected, the two bite measures are highly correlated with
each other (ρ = .977).
Fixed-effects results for the schedule disamenities confirm the results in section 3.3.2.
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Similarly to the main results, effects on annualised hours and allowances for unsocial
hours are not significant in either a fixed-effects or an Arellano-Bond specification, and
regressions for these two outcomes are not shown here.
The dynamic specification for zero-hours contracts broadly confirms the result for
the original definition of the bite: Both the linear and the quadratic coefficient are
highly significant and the average marginal effect is positive, with a large and significant
positive marginal effect at very high bites.
As with the standard definition of bite, there is a positive and significant effect in the
fixed-effects regression on unsocial hours that does not carry over to the dynamic specifi-
cation, although the average marginal effect is still negative. The original Arellano-Bond
specification using the newly defined bite fails the Sargan and Hansen overidentification
tests. The overidentification issue is not a straightforward one to resolve. An amended
specification using a reduced covariate vector26, a single time dummy for the period
after 2009 and with two lags does pass both tests and is the one I report in table 41. No
other permutation of these alterations to the original specification produces significant
coefficients on the newly defined bite, and nor does the original specification itself.
For amenities, the coefficients in the fixed-effects regression preserve their sign, but
are substantially smaller than the main result and only significant at the 10% level. As
discussed in section 3.3.2, the effect of minimum wage bite with respect to the median is
driven by the large industry of public administration, education and health. Compared
to other industries, this gap between bite at the median and bite at the 30th percentile
is negative, i.e. this industry has relatively low bite at the median given its bite at the
30th percentile.
This is apparent from visually inspecting a scatter plot and also in a simple OLS
regression of bite at the median on bite at the 30th percentile interacted with a dummy
for public administration, education and health: The interaction effect is highly sig-
nificantly negative. Differences in bite of course track differences in the shape of the
wage distribution by construction: Public administration, education and health has the
largest gap between the 30th percentile and the median of all industries in the sample,
at just over £3. This places the industry next to a different set of comparator industries
in both regressions, leading to the weakening of the result.
The marginal effect on other worker-led schedules is now negative across nearly all
26with gross value added and the employment rate as predetermined covariates and the graduate,
youth and apprentice shares as independent covariates
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Figure 7: Sample share of zero-hours contracts and casual work over time
of the observed bites27 and significant at low and intermediate bites, instead of the
U-shaped effect previously found. The original dynamic specification for other worker-
led schedules using bite based on the 30th percentile also fails the Hansen and Sargan
over-identification tests. I therefore report an alternative specification with a reduced
covariate vector (analogous to the one used for unsocial hours above) with two lags,
which passes both tests for both schedule amenities. For a number of variations on
the original dynamic specification, whether or not they pass the Hansen test, the linear
coefficient on the newly defined bite is negative and highly significant. The average
marginal effect is also negative, as in the main results.
Zero Hours Contracts versus “casual” work Unlike other outcomes analysed
here, zero-hours contracts could be considered to be a job security disamenity as well
as a schedule disamenity, since not only the distribution of hours across time, but
also the total number of hours is uncertain and could potentially drop down to zero.
This dimension could be as or even more important for workers’ utility as the schedule
dimension. Different employers may also use zero hours contracts for different purposes,
with the result that the expected trajectory of a job may be more akin to a job with a
regular schedule but uncertain duration, or an unpredictable schedule but an expected
long duration.
27up to 95% for the fixed-effects regression and everywhere for the Arellano-Bond specification
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From a policy perspective, we would be interested in whether increased use of zero-
hours contracts induces a “casualisation” of work. Figure 7 shows that a minority
of zero-hours contract workers characterise their employment as “casual”. In addi-
tion, there are overlaps between zero-hours contracts and other types of non-permanent
work including agency work, contracts for a specific task and “other” reasons for non-
permanency. These account for a smaller share of zero-hours contract work, and consid-
ering all of them together, they still account for a minority of zero-hours contract jobs.
The large increases in casual and zero-hours contract work and zero-hours, non-casual
work have have only been accompanied by small decreases in other forms of casual work.
Estimating the main specifications on the share of workers whose job is either casual
or a zero-hours contract confirms the previous results for zero hours contracts only.
There is some evidence of a decrease in casual work that is not on a zero-hours contract,
but it is not robust to accounting for dynamics using the Arellano-Bond specification.
Taken together, this implies that the increased prevalence of zero-hours contracts at
high minimum wage bites is not solely due to a sustitution from other types of casual
work, although this may play a partial role.
The response that a job is non-permanent for “other” reasons could also reflect the
perceived risk of a zero-hours contract employer implicitly terminating the employment
relationship by no longer giving the worker any hours. However, there is no effect of
minimum wage increases on jobs that are on-permanent for “other” reasons and a zero-
hours contract. In fact, the increase in zero-hours contracts is entirely in those jobs that
employees describe as permanent, where coefficients are similar in size and significance
to the specification for zero-hours contracts in general described above. I include a
second lag in the Arellano-Bond specification since the specification with one lag fails
the Hansen test. The potential issue of the Hansen test failing due to many instruments
is addressed earlier in this section. In summary, whilst the effective job security in the
additional zero-hours contract jobs associated with minimum wage increases may still
be poor, the results nevertheless suggests that the effect of minimum wages on zero-
hours contracts has primarily affected them as a schedule type, rather than as a form
of casual or temporary contract.
Two-way clustered standard errors The main qualitative results (a negative ef-
fect on flexitime and other worker-friendly types of flexibility and a positive effect on
zero-hours contracts) are robust to two-way clustered standard errors. Results for this
specification are shown in Table 45.
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Conclusion
Twenty years after the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in the UK, the
consensus view is that it has had no effect on employment. I have used region-industry-
level data to analyse whether employers have instead adjusted schedule amenities and
disamenities in response to increases in minimum wages in the UK. This alternative
adjustment channel could have important implications for the distributive consequences
of minimum wages for workers.
Using fixed-effects regressions and dynamic models, I have shown that in regions and
industries highly impacted by minimum wage increases, schedule disamenities such as
zero-hours contracts and unsocial hours have increased in prevalence. Annualised hours,
on the other hand, have not reacted, likely because they require substantial changes to
workplace organisation. Schedule amenities valued by workers present a more complex
picture. In accordance with theoretical predictions, flexitime has decreased in prevalence
where the impact of minimum wage increases has grown. On the other hand, minimum
wage increased have a non-linear relationship with other worker-led schedule types,
including compressed work weeks, job shares and term-time working. This is likely due
to differences in costs of adjusting to and sustaining such schedules.
Appendix I: Job attributes and a minimum wage in a search model
To fix ideas, consider the following equilibrium search model based on Hwang et al.
[1998]28 where jobs are characterised by a wage w and an attribute x. A worker employed
in a job (w,x) receives utility v(w,x)=w+h(x). For the sake of conciseness, fix h′(x) > 0,
i.e. define the attribute as a worker-friendly amenity, or absence of a burden. I follow
Hwang et al. [1998] in assuming that nature constrains x to be non-negative. A firm
offering a bundle valued at v will have size m(v) in equilibrium.
Firms differ in their cost of providing the amenity.29 For ease of exposition, without
a minimum wage, assume there are 2 types of firms operating in the market. The cost of
28The worker side of this model was essentially set out in Gronberg and Reed [1994], however, that
paper is not very explicit when it comes to firms’ decision-making process on the composition of job
offer bundles, which is the most relevant decision margin for this application.
29In some cases, the cost of the attribute will be a direct monetary cost, such as in the case of a
bonus. In others, it will be the cost of mitigating a disamenity, for example through health and safety
investments. In still others, it will be lost product, for example if by introducing flexible schedules, a
firm forgoes gains from synchronised working.
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providing amenity x for a firm of type j is cj(x), with c1 < c2 ∀x > 0 and c(·) fulfilling
regularity conditions, cj(0) = c
′
j(0) = 0 and c
′′
j (x) > 0. All firms produce the same
output ρ per worker gross of attribute provision costs.
In choosing the job offer to make, a firm maximises profits [ρ−w−cj(x)]m[u(w, x)].





h′(x?j ). Type-1 firms will therefore choose to provide a higher level of the attribute than
type-2 firms. Given this choice, there is then a range of feasible wages, trading off
profit-per-worker and firm size. In equilibrium, no firm will make an offer that will
always be rejected. Therefore, every firm will at least offer the unemployed worker’s




All firms of the same type earn the same profits in equilibrium, and the distribution of
utilities form job bundles offered will be continuous.
Now consider the introduction of a minimum wage wmin. Assume for now that the
level of the minimum wage is such that v(wmin, 0) < v?new (I will discuss the other case
below). Denote by xmin the level of the attribute that, combined with the minimum
wage, delivers the reservation utility of an unemployed job seeker, i.e. v(xmin, wmin) =
v?. Van den Berg [2003] provides conditions on the search environment that ensure
that an equilibrium with a low reservation wage that enables the survival of type-2
firms exists.
Case I: Type-2 firms are constrained in their wage offers, but succeed in
adjusting the attribute If ρ > c2(x
min)+wmin but v(wmin, x?2) > v
?, firms of type 2
will still be profitable. However, the preferred bundle of the lowest-paying firm, (x?2, w2),
is no longer feasible, as the wage has to comply with the new statutory minimum. Given
this wage increase relative to the unconstrained response to v?, this firm has an incentive
to decrease the quantity of x it offers, since this will cut costs without affecting firm size.
As in the unconstrained situation, they cannot increase their size by poaching workers
from any other firm, so they have no incentive to offer a utility level beyond v?. They
will thus offer the bundle (xmin, wmin). Profits will still be lower than at their preferred
bundle and the condition c′2(x) = h
′(x) will no longer hold. In equilibrium, all firms
of the same type must still earn the same profits, and the distribution of utilities must
still be continuous. Given that at the lower bound of the distribution c′2(x) < h
′(x),
a firm that aims to offer a marginally higher utility than v? will prefer to increase the
attribute rather than the wage, since a marginal increase in utility can be delivered at
cost 1 through the wage, but at cost c′2(x)/h
′(x) < 1 through the attribute. As long as
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x < x?2, firms offering better bundles will do so via an improved attribute. Unlike in
the unconstrained equilibrium, there will therefore be a non-degenerate distribution of
attribute provision within a single type of firm. If v(x?2, w
min) is less than v1 (the lower
bound on the distribution of utilities offered by type-1 firms and at the same time, the
upper bound on the offer by type-2 firms), all firms offering a better-valued job bundle
than (x?2, w
min) will continue to offer x?2 and increase the wage.
Since there is no change in the number of firms operating in the market, there will
be no change in offer arrival rates. As long as there is enough scope for a decrease in x
to compensate for the higher wage induced by the minimum wage, the offer distribution
F(v) chosen by firms will remain the same. In turn, workers will have no reason to
change their offer acceptance strategy, since the offer distribution in terms of utilities
remains the same.
Case II: Type-2 firms are constrained in both their wage and attribute offers
If v(wmin, 0) > v?, the distribution is bounded below by v(wmin, 0) instead of by v?.
There will once again be a non-degenerate distribution of x : The lowest-utility offer will
be v(wmin, 0) and subsequent firms will prefer to increase utility by offering a better
attribute until x?2 is reached. The whole distribution of utilities offered will be shifted
upward relative to the unconstrained case.
Both in this case and the previous one, we should observe a proportion of firms
lowering their attribute offer. They should be firms for whom the minimum wage is
binding.
Case III: Type-2 firms become unprofitable If ρ < c2(x
min)−wmin, or ρ < wmin
in the case where no xmin exists, then all firms of type 2 will cease to be profitable and
exit the market. If v(x?1, w
min) < v?, then type-1 firms will choose the same attribute
level as before and the situation is analogous to the one without a job attribute analysed
by Van den Berg [2003]. He shows that under certain assumptions on the matching
function and the search parameters, the wage distribution as a whole will shift upwards.
By re-parametrising ρ − cj(x?j ) = pj , j = 1, 2, his conclusions apply. In this situation,
the composition of attributes in the market changes, but this is purely due to type-2
firms, which provided a lower level of the attribute, exiting the market. No firm changes
their attribute offer.
The cases where the minimum wage is set so high as to constrain type-1 firms are
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essentially analogous. In summary, depending on the firm’s cost of providing the job
attribute and the level of the minimum wage, effects on the provision of job attributes in
the market could be positive or negative. Negative effects would arise through changes
within-firm, whereas positive effects could only arise through selection, i.e. exit of
firms providing lower levels of attributes. This would likely be associated with some
unemployment, at least in the short run while workers reallocate to the more productive
firms. Most of the previous empirical literature has found no effect on employment of
the National Minimum Wage [Stewart, 2002, 2004a,b, Metcalf, 2008, Dolton et al.,
2015], although there are some exceptions that find negative effects for specific groups
of workers [Dickens et al., 2015, women part-time workers] or small positive effects for
specific periods [Dolton et al., 2012]. I would therefore not expect to find positive effects.
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Table 34: Effect of minimum wages on zero-hours contracts and annualised hours,
female-majority vs male-majority industries
Zero-Hours Contracts Annualised Hours
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -0.291∗∗∗ -0.308∗ 0.156 0.421
(0.0522) (0.164) (0.116) (0.260)
- squared 0.276∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗ -0.0583 -0.124
(0.0395) (0.135) (0.0928) (0.198)
Female majority -0.0955∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗ 0.124∗ 0.305∗∗
(0.0258) (0.0644) (0.0641) (0.106)
Female majority 0.252∗∗ 0.578∗∗ -0.354∗ -0.843∗∗
× Bite (0.0768) (0.200) (0.195) (0.330)
Female majority -0.165∗∗ -0.416∗∗ 0.256∗ 0.569∗∗
× Bite squared (0.0566) (0.148) (0.145) (0.247)
Graduate share 0.000591 0.0208 -0.0294 0.0329
(0.0123) (0.0169) (0.0304) (0.0387)
Gross Value 0.00255 -0.0106 -0.00612 -0.00368
Added (0.00766) (0.00965) (0.0177) (0.0275)
Employment Rate -0.0547∗ -0.0533 -0.00862 0.310∗
(0.0327) (0.0865) (0.0993) (0.183)
L.Outcome 0.0846 0.214∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.0599)
Constant 0.104∗∗ 0.0713 0.0192 -0.310∗
(0.0349) (0.0991) (0.0788) (0.172)
Observations 966 966 966 966
AME (Fem Majority) 0.0884 0.266 0.0284 0.179
AME (Male Majority) 0.0245 0.151 0.0889 0.278
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.251 0.832
Hansen Test 0.0328 0.0594
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 41 instruments each in columns 2 and 4..
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Table 35: Effect of minimum wages on unsocial hours and allowances for them, female-
majority vs male-majority industries
Unsocial Hours Allowances for Unsocial Hours
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite 0.382∗∗ 0.943∗∗ 0.0798 0.121
(0.171) (0.480) (0.120) (0.342)
- squared -0.0174 -0.135 -0.0101 -0.140
(0.154) (0.368) (0.0889) (0.172)
Female majority -0.248∗∗ -0.0312 -0.0383 0.125
(0.0864) (0.172) (0.0712) (0.146)
Female majority 0.728∗∗ -0.0398 0.125 -0.432
× Bite (0.267) (0.527) (0.207) (0.424)
Female majority -0.509∗∗ 0.120 -0.0895 0.350
× Bite squared (0.199) (0.398) (0.147) (0.301)
Graduate share -0.168∗∗∗ -0.0546
(0.0437) (0.0410)
Gross Value Added 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0271∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0131)




Constant 0.0357 -0.115 -0.0939 0.0128
(0.113) (0.163) (0.0893) (0.170)
Observations 966 966 966 966
AME (female majority) 0.508 0.886 0.0902 -0.0715
AME (male majority) 0.362 0.788 0.0682 -0.0392
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.940 0.994
Hansen Test 0.00356 0.101
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 23 instruments each in columns 2 and 4..
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Table 36: Effect of minimum wages on Saturday work, female-majority vs male-
majority industries
FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite 0.629∗∗∗ (0.181) 0.559 (0.395)
- squared -0.274∗ (0.157) -0.443∗ (0.265)
Female majority -0.151∗ (0.0768) 0.116 (0.151)
Female majority × Bite 0.417∗ (0.235) -0.461 (0.466)
Female majority × Bite squared -0.268 (0.174) 0.403 (0.351)
Graduate share -0.247∗∗∗ (0.0436)
Gross Value Added 0.0921∗∗∗ (0.0204)
Employment Rate 0.101 (0.128)
L.Saturday work 0.364∗∗∗ (0.0685)
L2.Saturday work 0.219∗∗∗ (0.0512)
Constant -0.0482 (0.102) -0.0514 (0.161)
Observations 966 879
AME (female majority) 0.426 0.0526
AME (male majority) 0.316 0.0515
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.238
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 23 instruments in column 2, Hansen test statistics could not be estimated.
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Table 37: Effect of minimum wages on flexitime and other worker-led flexible schedules,
female-majority vs male-majority industries
Flexitime Other Worker-Led
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -0.178 -0.129 -0.00733 -0.211
(0.155) (0.365) (0.0567) (0.178)
- squared 0.0899 -0.0204 0.00630 0.127
(0.126) (0.211) (0.0458) (0.109)
Female majority 0.236∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.160
(0.0807) (0.172) (0.0499) (0.110)
Female majority -0.671∗∗ -1.623∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -0.446
× Bite (0.234) (0.501) (0.141) (0.308)
Female majority 0.468∗∗ 1.129∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.300
× Bite squared (0.166) (0.359) (0.0976) (0.211)
Graduate share 0.0854∗∗ 0.0637 0.000249 0.0290
(0.0401) (0.0610) (0.0176) (0.0384)
Gross Value Added -0.00273 0.0337 0.0243∗∗ 0.0340∗
(0.0179) (0.0368) (0.00970) (0.0175)
Employment Rate -0.0188 0.0747 0.0223 0.106
(0.115) (0.207) (0.0676) (0.155)
L.Outcome 0.203∗∗ 0.173
(0.0703) (0.109)
Constant 0.120 0.0531 0.0388 0.0337
(0.110) (0.192) (0.0474) (0.115)
Observations 966 966 966 966
AME (Fem majority) -0.211 -0.483 -0.105 -0.168
AME (Male majority) -0.0755 -0.152 -0.000111 -0.0658
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.285 0.296
Hansen Test 0.171 0.00276
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 41 instruments each in columns 2 and 4.
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Table 38: Robustness checks for zero-hours contracts
Second Lag Reduced covariate vector
L.Zero Hours Contract -0.0915 (0.185) 0.0500 (0.100)
L2.Zero Hours Contract -0.0726 (0.143)
NMW/NLW bite -0.516∗∗ (0.185) -0.234 (0.145)
- squared 0.434∗∗ (0.155) 0.339∗∗ (0.119)
Gross Value Added -0.0108 (0.0117) -0.0231 (0.0201)
Employment Rate -0.0845 (0.0692) -0.147 (0.128)
Graduate Share -0.000650 (0.0154) 0.0194∗ (0.0103)
Post-2013 0.0113∗∗∗ (0.00267)
Constant 0 (.) 0.145 (0.0935)
Observations 879 967
Year dummies Yes No
Av. Marg. Effect -0.0128 0.0920
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.686 0.567
Hansen Test 0.102 0.479
Sargan test 0.124 0.446
Number of instruments 35 15
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Includes analytical weights,
(1) includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group and gender, presence and ages of
children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment and unemployment rates, share of
youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed effects.
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Table 39: Effects of the National Living Wage introduction on selected outcomes (fixed-
effects regression)
Flexitime Zero-Hours Contracts Unsocial Hours
2016 -0.00381 0.0108∗ 0.0143
(0.0114) (0.00557) (0.0130)
2016 × NLW pre-coverage 0.00321 -0.0226 -0.259
(0.135) (0.0529) (0.178)
Squared 0.0323 0.0358 0.793∗
(0.358) (0.142) (0.435)
Graduate Share 0.0484 0.0733∗ -0.153
(0.105) (0.0401) (0.139)
Gross Value Added 0.0154 -0.0456 -0.192
(0.113) (0.0351) (0.178)
Employment Rate 0.308 -0.418∗∗ -0.204
(0.382) (0.154) (0.566)
Constant -0.0503 0.313∗∗ 1.026∗∗
(0.325) (0.118) (0.493)
Observations 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW pre-coverage from ONS
calculations based on ASHE, other variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes the full covariate
set (cf. main results in section 3.3.2) and region-industry fixed effects.)
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Table 40: Effects of the National Living Wage introduction on selected outcomes,
simplified specification
Flexitime Zero-Hours Contracts Unsocial Hours
2016 0.0123 0.00625∗∗ -0.000283
(0.00858) (0.00304) (0.00898)
NLW pre-coverage -0.276∗∗∗ -0.0247 0.291∗∗
(0.0684) (0.0290) (0.113)
2016 × NLW pre-coverage 0.0768∗∗ -0.00841 -0.0339
(0.0378) (0.0206) (0.0594)
Graduate Share -0.0335 -0.0125 -0.287∗∗
(0.0739) (0.0222) (0.0915)
Gross Value Added 0.138 0.0132 -0.154
(0.115) (0.0435) (0.129)
Employment Rate 0.336 -0.159 0.0391
(0.519) (0.182) (0.525)
Constant -0.210 0.109 0.493
(0.361) (0.123) (0.359)
Observations 144 144 144
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW pre-coverage from ONS
calculations based on ASHE, other variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes gross-value added,
employment rate, graduate, youth and apprentice shares as covariates as well as region and industry
fixed effects.
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Table 41: Effects on schedule disamenities, using bite with respect to the 30th percentile
Zero-Hours Contracts Unsocial Hours
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -0.301∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗ 0.442∗∗ -0.449
(0.0678) (0.186) (0.219) (0.573)
- squared 0.220∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ -0.0982 0.406
(0.0472) (0.103) (0.167) (0.464)
Graduate Share -0.00147 0.00333 -0.187∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗
(0.0125) (0.0166) (0.0431) (0.0457)
Gross Value Added 0.00102 -0.00355 0.0924∗∗∗ 0.0462
(0.00793) (0.00895) (0.0225) (0.0482)
Employment Rate -0.0298 -0.0109 0.335∗∗ -0.189







Observations 966 966 966 879
Av. Marg. Effect 0.0148 0.00952 0.301 0.134
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.484 0.401
Hansen Test 0.583 0.0916
Number of instr. 35 16
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. (4) includes a single post-2009
dummy, the share of graduates, youth and apprentices, employment rates and region-industry level
GVA. (1) - (3) additionally include controls for cell composition with respect to age group and gender,
presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, unemployment rates and
year fixed effects.
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Table 42: Effects on schedule amenities, using bite with respect to the 30th percentile
Flexitime Other Worker-Led
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite -0.281∗ -0.568 -0.124∗ -0.421∗∗
(0.168) (0.402) (0.0709) (0.169)
- squared 0.118 0.211 0.0666 0.176
(0.117) (0.264) (0.0485) (0.108)
Graduate Share 0.0737∗ 0.0749 -0.0139 0.0236
(0.0405) (0.0559) (0.0173) (0.0390)
Gross Value Added 0.00647 0.0478∗ 0.0330∗∗∗ 0.0320∗
(0.0181) (0.0287) (0.00950) (0.0173)
Employment Rate -0.0348 0.0554 0.00607 0.244
(0.114) (0.211) (0.0684) (0.152)
L.Outcome 0.273∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗
(0.0684) (0.166)
Observations 966 966 966 966
Av. Marg. Effect -0.111 -0.265 -0.0278 -0.168
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.157 0.502
Hansen Test 0.173 0.0180
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. (4) includes the share of graduates,
youth and apprentices, employment rates and region-industry level GVA. (1) - (3) additionally include
controls for cell composition with respect to age group and gender, presence and ages of children,
educational attainment, non-UK nationality, unemployment rates and year fixed effects. 35 instruments
used in columns 2 and 4..
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Table 43: Zero-hours contracts versus casual work as an outcome, fixed-effects and
dynamic specifications
Casual, not on a ZHC Casual or ZHC
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite 0.0361 0.0106 -0.177∗∗ -0.129
(0.0220) (0.0778) (0.0564) (0.148)
- squared -0.0431∗∗ -0.0136 0.178∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0349) (0.0467) (0.0925)
Graduate Share -0.00129 0.00529 0.00820 0.0253
(0.00807) (0.0119) (0.0139) (0.0180)
Gross Value Added 0.00356 0.00916 0.00115 -0.00346
(0.00321) (0.00566) (0.00781) (0.00999)
Employment Rate -0.0382 -0.0312 -0.0905∗∗ -0.107
(0.0264) (0.0508) (0.0416) (0.0865)
L.Outcome 0.127∗∗ 0.0146
(0.0505) (0.0868)
Constant 0.0216 0.0148 0.101∗∗ 0.0537
(0.0193) (0.0477) (0.0384) (0.0748)
Observations 966 966 966 966
Av. Marg. Effect -0.0133 -0.00492 0.0267 0.171
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.282 0.518
Hansen Test 0.769 0.838
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 35 instruments used in columns 2 and 4..
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Table 44: Zero-hours contracts versus casual work as an outcome, fixed-effects and
dynamic specifications
ZHC and other temporary ZHC and permanent
FE Arellano-Bond FE Arellano-Bond
NMW/NLW bite 0.00196 0.00460 -0.191∗∗∗ -0.141
(0.0121) (0.0308) (0.0485) (0.124)
- squared -0.0000982 -0.0135 0.194∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0186) (0.0400) (0.0734)
Graduate Share 0.00267 -0.000973 -0.00254 0.00667
(0.00271) (0.00391) (0.0103) (0.0119)
GVA -0.00136 -0.00154 0.00521 -0.00359
(0.00138) (0.00227) (0.00602) (0.00729)
Employment Rate -0.00592 -0.0231 -0.0417 -0.0361





Constant 0.00320 0.0215 0.0708∗∗ 0.0238
(0.00819) (0.0159) (0.0247) (0.0618)
Observations 966 879 966 966
Av. Marg. Effect 0.00185 -0.0108 0.0316 0.132
Autocorr. Coeff. 0.327 0.858
Hansen Test 0.00811 0.986
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
and unemployment rates, share of youth and apprentices, region-industry level GVA and year fixed
effects. 35 instruments used in columns 2 and 4.
122
Table 45: Effect of minimum wages on schedule amenities and disamenities, with 2-way
clustering










NMW/NLW bite -0.408∗∗ -0.209∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ 0.0352
(0.147) (0.0739) (0.0560) (0.121)
- squared 0.266∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.0362
(0.116) (0.0557) (0.0464) (0.104)
Graduate Share 0.0662 -0.0149 0.00927 -0.0385
(0.0421) (0.0181) (0.0125) (0.0305)
Gross Value Added 0.00761 0.0324∗∗ -0.00240 -0.00193
(0.0191) (0.00955) (0.00767) (0.0172)
Employment Rate -0.0240 0.0134 -0.0520 0.00125
(0.117) (0.0675) (0.0329) (0.100)
Constant 0.188∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.0798∗∗ 0.0381
(0.113) (0.0460) (0.0322) (0.0783)
Observations 966 966 966 966
Av. Marg. Effect -0.103 -0.0189 0.0396 0.0767
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. NLW bite from ASHE, other
variables from LFS. Analytical weights. Includes controls for cell composition with respect to age group
and gender, presence and ages of children, educational attainment, non-UK nationality, employment
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